The production of psychological knowledge as communicative interaction by Sauri, Pekka
L 
THE PRODUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
AS COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTION 
Pekka Sauri 
A thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
The Department of Human Sciences 
Brunel University 
January 1990 
CONTENTS 
1. Introduction p. 1 
2. Communication and the Construction 
of Meaning 17 
3. Modes of Communication in the 
Production of Psychological Knowledge 53 
4. Consensus as Criterion of Truth: 
A Critique of Habermds 88 
5. The Notion of Unconscious Motive 
Forces and Conununicative Interaction: 
A Critique of Grdnbaum 136 
6. Common Sense and Communicative 
Interaction: A Critique of Smedslund 186 
7. Agreement as Criterion of Validity: 
Preconditions and Consequences 216 
8. Concluding Remarks: Beyond Psycho- 
logical Knowledge 243 
References 250 
Abstract 
THE 
Ph. D. 
PRODUCTION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL 
COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTION 
Thesis, The Department of 
Brunel University 
January 1990; pp. 258 
Pekka Sauri 
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Human Sciences, 
While the traditional natural-scientific model of 
psychology has in recent decades been extensively 
criticized, the implications of this criticism for 
the criteria of epistemologically legitimate 
psychological knowledge have remained unclear. It is 
suggested that the production of psychological 
knowledge should be considered in terms of 
communicative interaction. Two basic modes of 
communicative interaction - one-directional and two- 
directional - are proposed. Epistemologically 
legitimate psychological knowledge requires the 
adoption of the latter mode. 
Agreement between the investigator and the person(s) 
whose conduct is investigated is introduced as the 
pivotal criterion of the validity of psychological 
propositions. If psychological knowledge is based on 
the understanding of the meaning of actions, and if 
meaning may only be ascertained by means of two- 
directional communicative interaction, agreement 
seems to be both (a) necessary and (b) sufficient 
criterion of epistemological validity. 
Three types of counter-arguments to this view are 
examined: Habermas's notion of universal rationality, 
GrUnbaum's defence of the epistemological status of 
the unconscious and Smedslund's common sense 
psychology. None of these pose any serious challenge 
to the proposition of agreement as criterion of 
validity. It is concluded that agreement between the 
investigator and the other participants in an 
investigation is the basic criterion of validity in 
psychology. This conclusion requires a reassessment 
of the notions of objectivity, relativism and 
intersubjectivity. 
Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
1. A Statement of Purpose 
In this thesis, I will examine - and defend - the 
proposition that consensual agreement between the 
participants in a psychological investigation is the 
basic epistemological criterion of the validity of 
psychological knowledge. While this proposItion may 
seem controversial, I wish to present it as a genuine 
solution to the epistemological confusion which still 
besets most psychological investigations despite 
numerous attempts to resolve the problems involved. 
2. The Possibility of Psychological Knowledge: 
Past and Present 
The past few decades have seen a lively debate on the 
nature of psychological knowledge. The main thrust of 
this debate has focused on the argument that the 
methodological and epistemological tradition of the 
natural sciences is unsuitable for the purposes of 
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psychology and the social sciences which require a 
methodological rationale of their own. Smedslund 
(NOTE 1) characterizes the current state of affairs 
thus: 
In psychology, a combination of unfortunate 
circumstances has blocked the development of a 
generally accepted scientific language. After one 
century, psychologists still do not agree on how to 
describe, explain, and predict psychological 
phenomena. -- it is likely that many of the 
difficulties stem from an incompatibility between 
some features of a scientific ideal inherited from 
the elder physical sciences and the particular 
characteristics of psychological phenomena. 
I take it as symptomatic that such complaints should 
still be voiced after many decades of serious 
attempts to establish an epistemologically justified 
theoretical framework for the study of human conduct. 
The work of Winch (2), Taylor (3), von Wright (4), 
Harr6 (5), Shotter (6), Gergen (7) and Habermas (8) - 
much of it either directly or indirectly influenced 
by Wittgenstein (9) - has prepared the ground for a 
conception of psychology based on the notion that 
people are essentially rational, intentional and 
rule-following beings as opposed to mechanisms which 
respond to stimuli. 
The successful explication of an epistemologically 
consistent, autonomous methodology for the production 
of psychological knowledge has, however, proved 
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problematic. Despite their declared intention of 
constructing an appropriate methodology for 
psychology proper - i. e., a form of investigation 
fundamentally different from the natural sciences - 
many theorists still seem to harbour residues of the 
notion of knowledge characteristic of the natural- 
scientific tradition. A considerable proportion of 
the present text will be devoted to indicating this 
natural-scientific residue in various arguments 
originally intended to purge psychology of 
inappropriate assumptions and methods. 
3. The Centrality of Communicative Interaction 
I propose to examine the production of psychological 
knowledge in terms of communicative interaction 
primarily in the context of the validation of 
interpretative propositions between the investigator 
and the person, or persons, whose conduct is being 
investigated and secondarily in the context of the 
validation of such propositions between the 
investigator and the rest of the community of 
investigators. The crucial issue, I will propose, is 
the mode of communicative interaction employed by the 
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investigator. Different modes of conununicative 
interaction may be described in terms of variations 
between the participatory, or first-person, position 
and the third-person position of an observer. 
Confusion between these positions seems to be the 
central source of epistemological problems in 
psychology. 
The central issue in the production of psychological 
knowledge in terms of communicative interaction is 
the nature of the feedback system between the 
investigator and the people whose conduct he purports 
to investigate. It is my impression that traditional 
research designs in psychology are based on one- 
directional communicative interaction: the person 
whose conduct is being studied is afforded little or 
no opportunity to comment on the purpose of the study 
or on the system of meanings in terms of which his 
responses will be assessed. The use of "naive 
subjects" is a case in point. I will argue that 
epistemologically legitimate psychological knowledge 
may only be produced in terms of two-directional 
communicative interaction and that, ultimately, the 
criterion of valid interpretations is indeed 
agreement between the investigator and the person 
whose conduct is being investigated. 
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4. The Epistemological Status of Psychological Laws 
The traditional endeavour of psychologists to 
establish laws which are assumed to govern human 
conduct is, in essence, made redundant if it is true 
that people may choose to act independently of such 
laws when they become conscious of them. It may, of 
course, turn out in empirical studies that they do 
not; but if the possibility is theoretically 
justifiable, and once we have accepted that the 
establishment of behavioural laws takes place within, 
and by means of, the process of communicative 
interaction between participants in the 
investigation, it would seem that this state of 
affairs stands in direct contrast to the causal - or 
"natural scientific" - approach to the explanation of 
the ways in which people go about their business. 
As Gergen (10) puts it in "Towdrd TransforMdtion in 
SOCidl Knowledge", 
"-- it is appropriate to reconsider the earlier 
notion that a science of human activity depends 
importantly on regularized or systematically 
recurring relationships between stimulus conditions 
and behaviour. As is clear, without such regularities 
the prediction of behaviour is largely obviated. Yet, 
as is equally clear, to the extent that the 
individual is capable of transforming the meaning of 
stimulus conditions in an indeterminant number of 
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ways, existing regularities must be considered 
historically contingent - dependent on the prevailing 
meaning systems or conceptual structures of the 
times. " 
The establishment of psychological laws seems a 
viable proposition only in terms of a particular kind 
of communicative interaction: it requires that the 
investigator withholds his strategy from the person 
whose conduct he purports to investigate. Once that 
person is informed about the psychological invariant, 
he may choose to modify his conduct, and the 
invariant becomes redundant. 
5. Necessary Presuppositions 
It is, I think, commonly accepted that knowledge in 
psychology - as in any other field of inquiry - 
requires a consensus among a population of 
investigators if it is to be properly accepted as 
knowledge. This observation seems indeed self-evident 
enough as to be tautological. The notion of consensus 
between the investigator and the Person, or persons, 
whose conduct is being investigated may appear more 
questionable. I will try to show that it is the basic 
criterion of epistemologically legitimate 
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psychological knowledge and to anticipate the 
consequences of this principle for the idea of 
psychological knowledge in general. As the arguments 
I wish to develop in the subsequent chapters have 
grown from a growing disillusionment with the goals, 
logic and methods of empirical investigations of 
human conduct, my approach is entirely theoretical in 
character. References to particular instances of 
interaction serve as illustrations of the arguments 
presented, not as proof of any empirical 
propositions. 
Throughout this study, I intend to stick to the basic 
epistemological attitude - i. e., "how do we know? - 
as strictly as possible. All attempts to make sense 
of people's conduct will be considered in temrs of 
criteria of valid knowledge. This means that utmost 
care is needed in laying down the necessary basic 
assumptions of this study. I do not, for instance, 
know anything about other people's meanings or states 
of mind until I do know, and I cannot claim to know 
unless they choose to tell me. 
The notion of psychological knowledge presupposes 
other people. This means that I have made an anti- 
solipsistic decision: I have decided that other 
people exist in their own right and that they are not 
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mere figments of one big self. This anti-solipsistic 
decision has no rational foundation. There is nothing 
about my sense experience that could verify or 
falsify the notion of solipsism, or anti-solipsism; 
whatever happens, all changes in my experience could 
still be interpreted as functions of my private 
consciousness. For some reason, however, I have 
decided to give these changes the benefit of the 
doubt and given up my initial omnipotence. 
I borrow the basic assumptions of the present study 
from Harr6's "Personal Being" (11): "There are two 
primary realities in human life: the array Of persons 
and the network of their symbiotic interdCtions, the 
most important of which is talk". Harr6 points out 
that the "fundamental human reality is conversation, 
effectively without beginning or end, to which, from 
time to time, individuals may make 
contributions" (12). These distinctions are generally 
speaking congruent with my purposes. There is one 
reservation I want to add: personhood is conferred on 
a being in the context of communicative interaction - 
it is not something that everybody has automatically. 
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6. Truth as Argumentation 
The ontological assumptions compatible with the 
notion of psychological knowledge as a function of 
communicative interaction may now be summarized 
briefly. There may quite plausibly be a material 
reality independent of the human observer; but, as 
our sense experience is inevitably contaminated with 
a variety of viewpoints acquired through our life in 
the social world - that is, our particIpation in 
communicative interaction and material practices - 
there is no privileged method available to us of 
identifying any indisputable, or "objective", facts 
about this material reality. Consequently, if no 
uncontaminated information on any objective reality 
is available to us, the primary method of 
verification of statements is by means of 
argumentation between members of whatever community 
it is that we are committed to. 
Once we have chosen the notion of communicative 
interaction as the basis of the production of 
psychological knowledge, the correspondence theory of 
truth loses is primacy and becomes subsumed by what 
is decided amongst the participants in the current 
interactive network. A comprehensive argument for 
10 
this approach is offered by Habermas (13): "Truth -- 
is removed from direct confrontation with experience 
by being asserted or denied only of statements --. 
Thus truth is conceived as essentially 
intersubjective, that is, as concerned with 
conditions of utterance in the speech community, and 
in particular with reasoning and argument within 
communicative discourse". 
7. Preliminary Definitions 
For the present purposes, I propose to define 
"psychology" as "the production of knowledge about 
what people do and why they do it". It should be 
noted that the relationship between the "what" and 
the "why" is inherently problematic: if we manage to 
find out what. a person is doing, we may already be 
close to understanding why he is doing it. Knowledge 
will be defined as a public, or intersubjective, 
notion: there is no private knowledge. However 
convinced I may privately be about the truth of a 
statement, it remains a belief until brought into the 
sphere of intersubjective evaluation and eventual 
corroboration. 
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It seems in the present context both justified and 
useful to speak in terms of personal pronouns: "I", 
"we" and "he" will figure at various points along the 
text. The "I" refers to the writer of this theecis - 
an investigator of the motive forces underlying 
people's conduct and of the criteria of justification 
employed in validating propositions about those 
motive forces. The "we" refers to the community of 
investigators which includes the writer and the 
readers of this text. The "he" (shorthand for "he and 
she") refers to the person whose conduct is being 
investigated by the "I" and the "we". The use of 
personal pronouns is, I hope, a reasonable precaution 
against the perpetual lure of the objective viewpoint 
the inappropriateness of which for the purposes of 
psychological investigations is by now a commonplace. 
In order to nip further conceptual confusions in the 
bud, explicit definitions of the terms I will employ 
in the text are in order. As the words behaviour and 
action have particular connotations and belong to 
separate conceptual systems, they should be used only 
when adequate conditions for their use are fulfilled. 
Prior to that point, I will use the neutral term 
conduct. The same principle applies to the use of 
cause and reason, prior to the legitimate 
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differentiation of which the neutral term motive 
force will be employed. This may seem like mere 
theoretical splitting of hairs, but I think that such 
semantic precautions are justified, given the 
chequered history of psychological concepts. There 
are probably other terms which should be subjected to 
a similar treatment - person, for instance - but 
there are limits to such semantig acrobatics; 
11 person" will until further notice be used in a 
neutral sense, i. e., without any intended reference 
to the vicissitudes of how personhood is constructed 
or denied in different networks of communicative 
interaction. 
8. The Structure of the Argument 
By stating these preliminary points, it seems that we 
have deconstructed the notion of psychological 
investigation about as close to its basic elements as 
possible, and may now be in a position to start 
reconstructing it with the aim of epistemologIcal 
parsimony - i. e., leaving aside everything which is 
unnecessary and preserving only those notions and 
principles which are legitimately needed. After al. 1, 
we do not know until we do know - that is, until 
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sufficient criteria of knowledge have been fulfilled. 
I will argue that there must be an agreement on those 
criteria; if we are not part of such an agreement, we 
only have beliefs. 
I will press my argument as follows: In Chapter Two, 
I will discuss the notion of communicative 
interaction and consider its role in the construction 
of meaning. In Chapter Three, I will discuss the 
production of psychological knowledge in terms of two 
basic modes of communicative interaction and present 
the notion of consensual agreement between the 
investigator and the person whose conduct is being 
investigated as the essential criterion of the 
validity of psychological propositions. I will then 
move on to discuss three positions which may be 
interpreted as counter-arguments to the notion of 
agreement as criterion of validity: in Chapter Four, 
I will present a critique of certain aspects of 
Habermas's thought; in Chapter Five, I will consider 
GrUnbaum's arguments against the relevance of patient 
assent in the validation of psycho-analytic 
interpretations; and in Chapter Six, I will try to 
show that the notion of common sense psychology as 
developed by Smedslund is not an epistemologically 
valid account of human conduct. Chapter Seven will be 
devoted to a discussion of the preconditions and 
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implications of the notion of agreement as both a 
necessary and a sufficient criterion of validity of 
psychological propositions. The argument will be 
concluded in Chapter Eight, and its consequences for 
the aims and methods of psychology will be reviewed 
briefly. The dubious distinction between the "human 
sciences" and the "natural sciences" will also be 
dealt with. If my arguments are sufficiently 
persuasive, the notion of epistemologically 
legitimate psychological laws will by the end of this 
study seem a contradiction in terms, and the 
prediction of people's conduct will only be possible 
in terms of intersubjective commitments and promises. 
This would entail a fundamental re-evaluation of the 
notion of psychological knowledge. The consequences 
of such a re-evaluation are anticipated by Shotter 
(14): 
Would this mean a total abandonment of the notion of 
evidence and the checkability of truth claims? Not at 
all. For, just as a witness's 'story' in a court of 
law can, if properly told, specify quite precisely 
the evidence required to refute or corroborate it, so 
also with narratives generally: they can specify the 
requirements in terms of which the credibility of the 
reality they specify can be checked out. It simply 
means giving up the belief in an already performed 
and eternally fixed reality, and accepting a vague, 
or an only partially ordered, unstable world, still 
open to further specification by human activity, and 
furthermore open to d number of alternatives. Claims 
worth believing can still exist; they cease however 
to be uncontestable. 
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Chapter Two 
COMMUNICATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING 
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1. Basic assumptions 
I assumed above, while trying to strip the notion of 
psychological knowledge down to its barest 
necessities, that the notion of knowledge about the 
motive forces underlying the conduct of others 
presupposes a plurality of participants as opposed to 
a solipsistic unity. While I cannot know for certain 
whether or not this is the case in any 
epistemologically legitimate manner, the acceptance 
of the notion of psychological knowledge presupposes 
the existence of others. Furthermore, I must assume 
that while I may believe that my fellow beings are in 
many respects similar to myself, the motive forces 
underlying the conduct of others are not necessarily 
the same as my own. In order to know about the motive 
forces underlying the conduct of others, I must 
understand what they mean by doing what I observe 
them as doing. In order to find out about their 
meaning, I must engage in communicative interaction 
with them. The motive forces underlying the conduct 
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of whatever configuration of participants it is that 
I am interested in are explicated through 
communicative interaction; and, conversely, 
communicative interaction is whatever it is through 
which the motive forces underlying the conduct of 
that configuration of participants are explicated. 
While this approach to what constitute. -Y reality 
clearly incorporates a fundamental skepticism as to 
the possibility of knowledge about the precise 
characteristics of what is commonly called the 
material, or physical, world - after all, knowledge 
about that world is available to us only in the form 
of propositions introduced into the network of 
communicative interaction in which we find ourselves 
situated - it is, I will maintain, equally clear that 
the notion of communicative interaction and the 
intersubjective construction of meaning presupposes a 
degree of commitment to the material practices of a 
community. It must be noted, however, that this 
assertion does not presuppose any universal 
characteristics of that material world within which 
we put the beliefs of our existence into practice. As 
Shotter (NOTE 1) puts it, there are no 
"extralinquistic entities whose significance is 
linguistically clear prior to talk about them" 
This outline of the basic assumptions implicit in the 
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notion of the Production of psychological knowledge 
as communicative interaction may serve as a point of 
entry into a definition of communicative interaction 
explicit and pragmatic enough for the purposes of the 
exploration of my argument concerning the justifiable 
epistemological criteria of Psychological knowledge. 
At the beginning of this chapter, I will attempt to 
clarify the concept of communicatIon with particular 
reference to the function of communication in the 
construction of the reality within which participants 
in an interactive situation find themselves on the 
one hand, and to the distinction between the concepts 
of communication and action on the other. I will then 
move on to propose that communicative interaction is 
a necessary prerequisite for the notion of meaning 
and that the final criterion of the correct 
understanding of the meaning of another person's 
conduct is not to be found in the sphere of 
linguistic reference alone: that criterion is 
embedded in the interplay between linguistic and 
extra-linguistic practices of the community to which 
we adhere. This view has important implications for 
the concept of rationality as a whole - an issue to 
which I shall return in a later chapter. 
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2. Communication: A Preliminary Definition 
The construction of a definition of communicative 
interaction both unambiguous and sufficiently general 
is not a simple matter. Building on the basic 
assumptions I outlined above, it may be tentatively 
suggested that communication entails the transfer of 
messages of some sort between what at least initially 
regard themselves as separate entities. Rommetveit 
(2) elaborates: "Communication dims at transcendence 
of the 'private' worlds of the participants. It sets 
up what we might call 'states of intersubjectivity'. " 
Blakar (3) points out that "Mhe most essential 
characteristic of communication is that something is 
being made known to somebody. It follows from this 
that an act of communication is social and 
directional (from a sender to a receiver). A crucial 
characteristic distinguishing communication from the 
general flow of information is that the sender has an 
intention to make something known to the (particular) 
receiver". Communication would thus entail the 
notions of sender, receiver and intentionality. 
Information per se - i. e., without these 
characteristics - does not, according to Blakar, 
qualify as communication. 
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Blakar's formulation is cogent enough as a 
preliminary definition of communication. It must, 
however, be expanded in two respects: the role of 
communication in the construction of reality must be 
addressed, and the different practical possibilities 
of "making something known" available to participants 
in communicative interaction need to be specified. 
In their review of the development of the notion of 
communication through history, Pearce and Cronen (4) 
point out that what was in the Modern era conceived 
as "an odorless, colorless vehicle of thought and 
expression" is now understood as "a form of human 
action by which persons co-create and co-maintain 
I social reality'. This means, according to Pearce and 
Cronen (5), that "(c)ommunication is inherently 
problematic, consisting of conjoint behaviour by two 
or more persons functioning within interpersonal rule 
systems that cannot be fully known or controlled by 
any of the individuals involved. " 
Pearce (6) concludes: "Rather than a means by which 
'internal' states are expressed and 'objective' facts 
represented, communication is that process by which 
spersons', 'institutions' and 'facts' are 
constructed. " 
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Communication, in this view, is not to be understood 
merely as a medium by means of which bits of 
information concerning states of affairs are conveyed 
between participants, but as a process through which 
states of affairs are constructed. While this general 
characterization of the function of communication as 
the basis of the reality within which people conduct 
their lives seems congruent with my approach to the 
epistemological criteria of psychological knowledge, 
it must be pointed out that the adoption of this 
view has acute ramifications for ontology and 
epistemology, and for the relationship between 
ontological and epistemological propositions. 
If it is accepted that knowledge is not possible 
independently of communicative interaction - i. e., 
that knowledge must fulfill some set of criteria 
constructed and maintained in a social context in 
order to be accepted as knowledge - the question of 
the viability of universal, regulative principles in 
psychology must be confronted. I wish to argue that 
the crucial choice is indeed made here: if 
communication is viewed in the above terms, such 
principles are no longer viable. The notion of 
psychological laws requires the kind of definition of 
communication which Pearce and Cronen, above, 
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describe as the Modern concept of communication - 
"the odorless, colourless vehicle of thought and 
action" - which appears quite difficult to justifY. 
Psychological knowledge must, it seems, be worked out 
in the kind of reality based on communicative 
interaction described by Bateson (7): 
-- the Newtonian world ascribes reality to objects 
and achieves its simplicity by excluding the context 
of the context - excluding indeed all 
metarelationships -a fortiori excluding an infinite 
regress of such relations. In contrast, the theorist 
of communication insists upon examining the 
metarelationships while achieving its simplicity by 
excluding all objects. 
This world, of communication, is a Berkeleyan 
world, but the good bishop was guilty of 
understatement. Relevance or reality must be denied 
not only to the sound of the tree which falls unheard 
in the forest but also to this chair which I can see 
and on which I am sitting. My perception of the chair 
is communicationally real, and that on which I sit 
is, for me, only an idea, a message in which I put my 
trust. 
It is clear that if we adopt the view of the role of 
communication in the construction of reality 
advocated here, the traditional juxtapositions 
between realism and idealism as well as objectivity 
and relativism must eventually be reconsidered. I 
will attempt a clarification of these issues in a 
later chapter. 
3. Verbal and Non-Verbal Communication 
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It is my intention to consider the production of 
psychological knowledge in terms of communicative 
interaction between the investigator and the person 
or persons whose conduct is being investigated on the 
one hand and between the investigator and other 
investigators on the other. I take it for granted 
that regardless of variations in methodological 
technique, all validation of hypotheses pertaining to 
the motive forces underlying people's conduct entails 
some kind of communicative interaction between the 
investigator and the other(s): the investigator seeks 
support for his hypothesis based on some theory of 
the motive forces underlying people's conduct by 
means of entering a communicative relationship of 
some nature with other people. 
. 
It may be ventured that psychological investigations 
are ordinarily based on verbal interaction - both 
talk and written documents play various parts in the 
production of an item of psychological knowledge from 
the construction of hypotheses to the accumulation of 
evidence and the reportage of the results of the 
investigation. In everyday interaction, talk may be 
characterized as the primary device of 
communication: according to Goffman (8), "(i)t is an 
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example of that arrangement by which individuals come 
together and sustain matters having a ratified, 
joint, current, and running claim upon attention, a 
claim which lodges them together in some sort of 
intersubjective, mental world". 
For the purposes of my present argument, however, I 
wish to extend the scope of communication beyond 
merely verbal exchanges. Messages may be conveyed 
between people by various non-verbal means. Harr6 
(9) concurs: "By 'conversation' I mean not only 
speech exchanges of all kinds, but any flow of 
interactions brought about through the use of a 
public semiotic system, such as that involved in the 
meaningful flying of flags, the wearing of uniforms, 
ballroom dancing, gestures and grimaces, a concours 
d'616gance and so on. " Any exchange of signifiers - 
facial expressions, gestures, glances, inarticulate 
grunts, and forms of communication further down the 
line towards non-verbal actions such as kisses, hugs, 
the showing of an erect middle finger, physical 
expressions of aggression and violence and so on - 
may count as communicative interaction in particular 
situations in different cultures: something is made 
known to somebody. 
It is when a misunderstanding or disagreement arises 
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or when the issue at hand should be explained to an 
outsider that more universal media of communication - 
e. g. verbal language - are resorted to. In particular 
circumstances, two people may communicate in a 
mutually satisfactory manner merely by looking at 
each other: it is taken for granted that this 
exchange of glances conveys a particular view of 
whatever it is that is currently attended to. Should 
the participants later find that they did not after 
all mean the same thing, the disagreement must be 
discussed in a medium of communication other, and 
apparently more universal and public than than the 
original and quite private medium of glances. The 
disagreement must, so to speak, be referred to a 
larger vocabulary of signifiers which allows for more 
versatile argumentation and more explicit methods of 
validation. While verbal language seems, empirically, 
a commonly accepted instrument of argumentation, 
other possibilities of making something known to 
somebody must be acknowledged when the limits of 
understanding are approached - for instance, when 
limit cases such as "infants", 19geriatrics il, the 
"mentally handicapped" and so on are encountered in 
practical situations of communicative interaction. 
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4. Communication VS. action: 
distinction 
a problematic 
I wi sh at this juncture to problematize the 
categorical distinction between the notions of 
communication and action. This, I think, is an 
important point if we want to consider the criteria 
of understanding the meaning of people's conduct. The 
theory of speech acts as introduced by Austin (10) 
and developed by Searle (11) may serve as a bridge 
between the two spheres of human conduct. As Labov 
and Fanshel (12) put it, "(t)he term /speech act/ may 
be clarified by noting that a speech act is an action 
carried out by means of speech". 
Austin proposed a distinction between locutionary, 
illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts: 
roughly, a locutiondry speech act is one by means of 
which a person says something; an illocutionary 
speech act is one by means of which a person performs 
an action by saying something; and, finally, a 
perlocutionary speech act is one by means of which d 
person achieves an effect in his audience. In 
Habermas's words (13), "the three acts that Austin 
distinguishes can be characterized in the following 
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catch-phrases: to say something, to act in saying 
something, to bring about something through acting in 
saying something 
For my present purposes, I wish to propose that the 
notion of speech acts in itself renders the 
distinction between communication and action 
sufficiently problematic as to warrant the 
elimination of any precise boundary between the two 
forms of making things known. Heritage (14) points 
out that "(a)ll uses of language, including the most 
mundane of descriptions, are routinely - if tacitly - 
understood as actions which are grasped through an 
understanding of' 'the purposes and intentions of 
speakers. -- Speaking is a major domain of social 
action and is not to be treated as something separate 
from social action or as organized by a separate set 
of methods". 
it is interesting to note that Habermas (15) 
disagrees: "The self-sufficiency of the speech act is 
to be understood in the sense that the communicative 
intent of the speaker and the illocutionary aim he is 
pursuing follow from the manifest meanings of what is 
said. It is otherwise with teleological actions. We 
identify their meanings only in connection with the 
intentions their authors are pursuing and the ends 
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they want to realize. As the meaning 2f what is said 
is constitutive for illocutionary acts, the intention 
of the agent is constitutive for teleological 
actions. " The distinction between speech acts and 
(teleological) actions is, however, rendered 
problematic by the introduction of the 
epistemological dimension: in order get to know "the 
meaning of what is said" or "the intention of the 
agent", we must, presumably, enter into communicative 
interaction of some sort with the person in question 
and find out what he means by his utterance or 
intends by his action. If we obtain a satisfactory 
answer, we understand his conduct better than we did 
before. The distinction between "action" and 
"communication" seems unwarranted: while the meaning 
of an action may be elucidated by means of 
communication, communication obtains its meaning from 
action. 
Habermas, however, wishes to maintain the distinction 
between action and communication for the purposes of 
his theory of communicative action. "To avoid 
misunderstanding", he emphasizes (16), "1 would like 
to repeat that the communicative model of action does 
not equate action with communication. Language is a 
medium of communication that serves understanding, 
whereas actors, in coming to an understanding with 
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one another so as to coordinate their action, pursue 
their particular aims. " Be this as it may, Habermas's 
statement does not furnish an explicit justification 
for the strict distinction between the concepts of 
communication and action: both may carry meanings the 
validation of which may take place with or without 
reference to verbal justification.. depending on the 
methods of justification prevalent in particular 
networks of communicative interaction. 
I conclude that the distinction between action and 
communication is ambiguous enough as to justify a 
loose definition of communication in which no precise 
boundary between the two spheres of conduct is drawn. 
Even though verbal language may in the majority of 
cases be the final court of appeal for the validation 
of agreements and disagreements, communicative 
networks may be imaginable in which agreements are 
based on non-verbal and intuitive methods of 
communication. 
This loose definition of communication implies a 
similarly loose notion of rationality - i. e. 
rationality must be understood in the general sense 
of an intersubjective method of justification of 
beliefs. 
31 
5. The Meaning of Meaning 
I have suggested that the notion of conununication is 
necessary for the notion of psychological knowledge - 
i. e., epistemologically valid propositions about the 
motive forces underlying people's conduct. 
Objectivist approaches to the study of these motive 
forces have been variously criticized for what 
amounts to their failure to attend to the rational 
character of people's conduct (17). This by now quite 
familiar line of criticism Pointed out that the 
person whose conduct was being studied might have 
made his moves in the context of a meaning system 
which was completely or partly different from that of 
the investigator and that, consequently, the observed 
movements may have signified something else 
altogether than what the investigator took them to 
signify. The other person was doing one thing, while 
the investigator thought he was doing another. The 
establishment of what was really going on requires 
negotiation of the meaning of the conduct in question 
between the investigator and the other person. 
What, then, is meaning? Harr6 (18) observes that 
"meaning is a notoriously troublesome concept, and no 
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common understanding of it can be presumed". 
Sainsbury (19), however, braves an attempt at 
definition: "Our experience consists of interrelated 
perceptions, thoughts, communications and actions. 
All this experience is experience of something and 
that something is characterized in a particular way 
before we can be said to experience it at all. Such 
characterization is the application of meaning. " 
Meaning, in other words, is inseparable from 
perception, thought, communication and action; the 
establishment of the meaning of other people's 
conduct presupposes involvement in communicative 
interaction. Taylor (20) offers a useful articulation 
of the argument for inclusion of meaning in the 
production of psychological knowledge: 
(1) Meaning is for a subject: it is not the meaning 
of the situation in vacuo, but its meaning for a 
subject, a specific subject, a group of subjects, or 
perhaps what its meaning is for the human subject as 
such (even though particular humans might be 
reproached with not admitting or realizing this). (2) 
Meaning is of something; that is, we can distinguish 
between a given element - situation, action, or 
whatever - and its meaning. But this is not to say 
that they are physically separable. -- And (3) Things 
only have meaning in a field, that is, in relation to 
the meanings of other things. This means that there 
is no such thing as a single, unrelated meaningful 
element; and it means that changes in the other 
meanings in the field can involve changes in the 
given element. Meanings cannot be identified except 
in relation to others, and in this way resemble 
words. 
While these observations seem to provide a 
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sufficiently explicit circumscription of the meanang 
of meaning, Taylor's second point requires attention: 
"we can distinguish between a given element -- and 
I its meaning'. This distinction seems questionable. 
Taylor seems to imply that the meaning of an 
lielement" may be detached from and attached to the 
element like a label of some kind. It must be asked 
whether this view is justifiable. As far as the 
investigation of the motive forces of of people's 
conduct is concerned, the meaning of something is 
that something; when meaning is subtracted from an 
experience, or an instance of conduct, there seems to 
be no residual. What is left does not mean anything. 
For all epistemological purposes. the meaning of an 
instance of conduct is that instance of conduct. As 
Harr6 (21) puts it. "We do not ask: 'Here is an 
action - what is its meaning? ', but 'What is going 
on? '81. 
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6. The Criteria of Understanding 
From the epistemological viewpoint, the central 
aspect of the problem of meaning is the method of 
verification employed by the investigator of the 
motive forces underlying people's conduct - i. e. how 
the investigator (or anyone else, for that matter) 
knows that he has reliably grasped the meaning of a 
particular instance of conduct or speech performed by 
another person. Habermas (22) points out that 
"(m)eanings - whether embodied in actions, 
institutions, products of labor, words, networks of 
cooperation, or documents - can be made accessible 
only from the inside. Symbolically prestructured 
reality forms a universe that is hermetically sealed 
to the view of observers incapable of communicating; 
that is, it would have to remain incomprehensible to 
them. The lifeworld is open only to subjects who make 
use of their competence to speak and act. They gain 
access to it by participating, at least virtually, in 
the communications of members and thus becoming at 
least potential members themselves. " Meaning, 
according to Habermas, may thus only be established 
from the first-person, participatory position; the 
position of the third-person observer precludes the 
understanding of meaning. 
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Meaning may be explained by means of words. Verbal 
explanation consists of referring words to other 
words the meanings of which are assumed to be more 
self-explanatory, or familiar to the participants in 
the same way. In many cases, this assumption is 
undoubtedly adequate for the practical purposes at 
hand, but as an epistemological method of 
verification it has its weaknesses: if we explain the 
meaning of a word by reference to other words, 
concepts and expressions will never reach a 
legitimate end. The final reference must again be 
accounted for by a further reference to an 
expression, the meaning of which must be assumed to 
be self-explanatory. McGinn (23) points out that 
"(t)o interpret a sign -- is simply to translate it 
into another sign; and translation cannot by itself 
determine meaning or understanding, since the sign 
into which the translation is made must itself be 
understood in a particular way. At some point 
understanding must break out of the circle of signs - 
no matter what sort of a sign we consider". 
To "break out of the circle of signs" would seem to 
presuppose reference to whatever activities the 
participants engage in : Ln their lives. Taylor (24) 
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notes that 11(t)he meanings and norms implicit in 
these practices are not just in the minds of the 
actors but are out there in the practices themselves, 
practices which cannot be conceived as a set of 
individual actions, but which are essentially modes 
Of Social relation. of mutual action". This means, in 
other words. that the meanings Of actions are 
ultimately dependent on ostensive definitions (25): 
in order to convey the meaning Of an action to 
another person. we must show him what it means in 
relation to other actions in our form of life. 
An example may shed light on the matter. Let us 
suppose that somebody tries to explain to us what d 
spade is. We are newcomers from an alien culture and 
have never seen one. Our instructor tells us that a 
spade is used for digging. Coherently enough, 
however, as we have never before encountered d spade, 
we do not know what "digging" is either. Perhaps 
there are no gardens where we come from. The 
Earthling proceeds to show us what "digging" means: 
he sticks the spade into the soil, performs the rest 
of the relevant movements, and proclaims: "This is 
digging, and the spade is the tool used for the 
purpose of digging. " But, as we have no gardens at 
home, we are still puzzled: OK, so he sticks this 
thing in the soil and turns a bit of it over, but 
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what does it mean? Why does he do it? What is he 
doing? Our host - apparently patience itself - tells 
us what a garden is: a patch of land on which edible 
plants are intentionally cultivated by humans. We may 
now say "Now I see what you mean" - whereupon our 
host would nod eagerly and heave a sigh of relief - 
or we may still be puzzled: "What is 'eating'? " But 
at some point along the line of questions like this 
lead us across the borderline between understanding 
and incomprehension, and between two genuinely 
incompatible languages: beyond that point, we would 
not be human beings, and we would have little chance 
of understanding the other person's meanings, and the 
context in which he realizes his existence; there 
would be no communication in any sensible use of the 
term. 
Showing the meaning of an expression, in other 
words, presupposes familiarity with a particular form 
of life in the context of which a number of basic 
concepts are already shared. As Von Wright (26) puts 
it, "(j)ust as the use and the understanding of 
language presuppose a language community, the 
understanding of action presupposes a community of 
institutions and practices and technological 
equipment into which one has been introduced by 
learning and training. One could perhaps call it a 
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life-community. We cannot understand or 
teleologically explain behaviour which is completely 
alien to us". 
The final criterion is participation in the other 
person's form of life, and perhaps sharing a 
practical project with him, until the demands of a 
successful practical action gradually make sure that 
the participants do indeed entertain a common system 
of meanings upon which they are in agreement. If we 
grab the spade and start digging what we now know to 
be a garden, if we go on doing it for as long as the 
job is done, and especially if we take part in 
watering and weeding and maintaining the garden and, 
in time, in harvesting, eating and perhaps even 
marketing its produce, we reach and even fuller 
understanding of the place of a spade in this 
particular system of meanings. The more fully we 
participate in a particular form of life, or life- 
community, the better qualified we are to grasp the 
meanings in the context of which the other 
participants mind their business - and, also, to 
contribute to the construction and further 
development of those meanings. 
Winch (27) points out that meaningful conduct is 
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rule-governed: our conduct is meaningful if it 
follows a rule. To follow a rule, in turn, 
presupposes that we commit ourselves to a particular 
kind of conduct also in the future. Our behaviour is 
transformed into action when we manage to convey to 
whoever is making the ascription the impression that 
it takes place in the context of a system of rules of 
some description. This means that we commit ourselves 
to the possible outcomes of our action as implied by 
the system of rules within which that action is 
situated. Our conduct acquires a meaning, and that 
meaning establishes it as action. 
But how can we be certain that we have understood the 
meaning of somebody's action correctly, or that 
somebody as understood ours? 
It seems that we cannot. In the end, the criterion 
problem merges into the routine of practical action 
and material practices which is accepted as justified 
until it is questioned once more: it becomes absorbed 
into and liquidated by convention - which, by 
definition, is something implicit and unquestioned, 
and thus, for the present purposes, beyond 
epistemological validation. In this way, the 
determination of the meaning of signs and actions is 
in constant interplay between convention and 
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questioning. As long as somebody keeps using a spade 
in a manner which seems to be at least roughly in 
accord with our own system of meanings, we have no 
reason to cast doubt on whether or not he has grasped 
the correct meanings of a spade. When for some reason 
or other we open discussion on the meaning, and uses 
of, a spade, we may find that the other person was in 
fact doing something completely different from 
digging a garden; he may have entertained a meaning 
for the spade which entailed a completely different 
system of meanings for what we regarded as gardens, 
cultivation, food, survival, material existence, and 
so on. When we decide that re-negotiation of the 
prevalent conceptual system must end, at least for 
the moment, and go on with whatever the current 
project is now called, the meanings involved merge 
once again into routine, tradition and convention - 
and gradually sink from the sphere of rational 
justification into the realm of irrationality. We may 
still be wrong about the meaning of a word: it may 
turn out that, even though we have thought we have 
been doing the same thing as the other participants, 
their idea of what they were doing was different from 
ours. Ostensibly, we may use a concept perfectly 
competently or act as if we would be fully familiar 
with its meaning, but it may suddenly transpire that 
what was thought of as our grasp of the meaning of 
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the item in question was in fact mere imitation 
without any real sense of what it represented to the 
rest of the community. 
The problem of finalizing adequate criteria of 
meaning is usefully illustrated by Ayer (28). - "But 
unless there is something that one is allowed to 
recognize, no test can ever be completed: there will 
be no justification for the use of any sign at all. 
-- It is through hearing what other people say, or 
through seeing what they write, or observing their 
movements, that I am enabled to conclude that their 
use of the word agrees with mine. " Ayer reiterates 
the view I took up above: the final criterion of 
meaning is not to be found in further references to 
signs, but in that sphere of existence where 
reference and practical action intermingle. Ayer goes 
on (29): "My argument is that since every process of 
checking must terminate in some act of recognition, 
no process of checking can establish anything unless 
some acts of recognition are taken as valid in 
themselves. This does not imply that these acts of 
recognition are uncheckable in the sense that their 
deliverances could not in their turn be subjected to 
further checks; but then these further checks would 
again have to terminate in acts of recognition which 
were taken as valid in themselves and so on ad 
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infinitum. " 
The limit, as Ayer points out, must be drawn at some 
point in time for shared meaning to be possible at 
all. After a certain period of successful mutual 
involvement in the practices of the community - 
involvement, in other words, in those activities to 
which the concepts used by the participants refer - 
we no longer doubt the former outsider's 
understanding of the meaning of the projects in which 
he is involved. It is here that Wittgenstein's remark 
(30) acquires its weight: "If language is to be a 
means of communication there must be agreement not 
only in definitions but also -- in judgements. " We 
must believe that we - ourselves and the former 
outsider - are genuinely committed to the same aim. 
It is here that we give up attempts at explicit 
justification and get on with whatever pragmatic 
projects it is that we are involved in and do not 
doubt the value of. We share, or assume that we 
share, the same judgements as to what is worth our 
while. This is the boundary between knowledge and 
belief, or intuition; and this is where the realm of 
rationality ends. 
One more point needs to be made on the argument that 
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the criteria of understanding the meaning of a 
Person's conduct are finally to be found in the 
activities of a community and the commitment of both 
the person in question and ourselves - i. e., the 
investigators - to those activities. This point 
concerns the possibility of private meaning. McGinn Is 
(31) objections to what he sees as the implications 
of CY is of the community thesi... of criteria of meaning 
capture this point in a concise form: 
The strongest community thesis is presumably this: it 
is not possible for an individual to follow rule R 
unless he is a participating member of a rule- 
following community in which R is also followed by 
others. -- So strong is this thesis that it excludes 
the possibility of someone introducing a rule which 
only he follows, say a word which only he (in fact) 
understands: thus the thesis declares impossible a 
creative mathematician who discovers a new 
mathematical function which he names and perhaps goes 
on to investigate (think of the discovery of 
exponentiation), or a zoologist who comes across a 
hitherto unknown species and gives it a name. Such 
newly introduced expressions are not of course 
incapable of being grasped by persons other than 
their original introducer; but they would be cases of 
words which only one member of a linguistic community 
in fact understands. I take it as obvious that this 
strong thesis is self-evidently absurd, and I doubt 
that it has ever been (explicitly) held: it makes 
nonsense of the idea that a member of a rule- 
follofing community can be innovative in the rules he 
follows. (32) 
McGinn's counter-argument is, it seems, based on 
quite a fundamental epistemological oversight - i. e., 
a failure to recognize the tautological nature of the 
"community thesis": if an innovation, or a meaning, 
is private, this means that it is not available to 
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others including us, the investigators. As long as 
the zoologist or mathematician only uses the new rule 
Privately, we - the others - cannot know of it by 
definition. It is only after the the rule is 
communicated to us, the others, or the community, 
that we know of it and are able to talk about it. 
This is how new concepts and meanings come about in 
the first place: they are introduced into the sphere 
of communicative interaction and incorporated into 
the existing system of concepts or meanings. But if 
an innovation is truly private, we cannot know about 
it, and there is no other criterion of its exIstence 
- unless the innovator is myself, and then I just 
know; but nobody else does, until I choose to tell 
them. 
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7. Accounts and Accountability 
The early reaction against the traditional third- 
person approaches to the study of human conduct drew 
attention to the artificial nature of the methodology 
customarily employed in research (33). It Was 
pointed out that, in many cases, relevant information 
on the psychological functioning of subjects could be 
best generated by means of asking them instead of 
mobilizing a complex array of experiments, tests, 
questionnaires and other techniques of assessment 
designed for the purpose. This orientation was based 
on the assumption that a person is himself the best 
authority on his conduct and the motive forces that 
underlie them. The concept of accounts thus gained 
prominence. It was argued that the dCtOr'S account - 
i. e. his own justification for the conduct under 
investigation - was the primary data of psychological 
research, and that it should form the basis of the 
explanation of conduct instead of mere observation 
and other traditional techniques of collecting 
evidence. Shotter (34) provides a description of 
this development: 
The central shift of perspective -- is the attention 
paid, not at all to the structure of behaviour 
itself, but to the structure and function of the 
accounts of behaviour that people give of themselves 
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in their everyday social life. Accounts can be 
distinguished from theories in this sense: an account 
of an action or activity is concerned with talking 
about the action or activity as the activity it is. 
According to Harrd and Secord (35), "Weaning is 
elucidated in the accounts of se*quences of actions, 
and these accounts are often commentaries, produced 
in real life for the purpose of justification, 
explanation or excuse". Accounting - i. e., the 
multifarious ways of how people make sense of their 
situation and report this sense to others - was 
introduced as a central area of study by Garfinkel 
(36) and investigated since by the proponents of the 
ethnomethodological approach. Garfinkel's "leading 
policy is to refuse serious consideration to the 
prevailing proposal that efficiency, efficacy, 
effectiveness, intelligibility, consistency, 
planfulness, typicality, uniformity, reproducibility 
of activities - i. e. that rational properties of 
practical activities - be assessed, recognized, 
categorized, described by using a rule or a standard 
obtained outside actual setting within which such 
properties are recognized, used, produced, and talked 
about by settings' members" (37). The 
ethnomethodological approach takes it for granted 
that people organize their practical activities in a 
rational manner, whatever the particular 
characteristics of that rationality may be. People, 
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in other words, are able to account for them when 
asked to do so. "Any setting", Garfinkel continues 
(38), "organizes its activities to make its 
properties as an organized environment of practical 
activities detectable, countable, recordable, tell-a- 
story-aboutable, analyzable - in short, dCcountdble. " 
The same principle forms the basis of the ethogenic 
approach to the study of human action introduced by 
Harr6 and Secord (39) and further developed in Harrd 
(40) and Harr6, Clarke and De Carlo (41). The 
ethogenic method focuses on the analysis of those 
accounts in search of the meanings the actors give to 
their actions and the rules and conventions which 
they follow (42). 
Accounts, however, are not the whole story. 
Unquestioning reliance on the subject's accounts of 
his conduct and his interpretations of the motive 
forces underlying it is based on a neglect of the 
importance of communicative interaction between the 
investigator and the other person similar to the 
traditional non-communicative approach. While people 
may well be said to be the best authorities on their 
actions, it must be noted that the actor's version of 
why he does what he does is subject to continuous 
revision, augmentation and enrichment if the dialogue 
48 
is allowed to continue - that is, if he is given 
feedback on his account, if he gets a chance to 
comment on this feedback, and so on, until the 
participants agree on a satisfactory interpretation. 
In this way, the meaning of an instance of conduct is 
intersubjectively constructed in the course of the 
: investigation; in terms of epistemology, meanings 
only come into existence through communicative 
interaction. There is, after all, nothing that can be 
known about private meanings. 
8. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have attempted to define the 
notions of communicative interaction on the one hand 
and meaning on the other. I pointed out that it is 
useful for the purposes of the present study to 
question any categorical distinction between (1) 
verbal and non-verbal communication and (2) between 
communication and action: messages can be conveyed 
and meanings can be shared in ways which resist such 
classifications. After a discussion of the criteria 
of understanding the meaning of conduct, I concluded 
that the notion of meaning is inseparable from the 
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notion of communicative interaction. I will now 
proceed to examine the process of reaching agreements 
on psychological propositions in terms of different 
modes of communicative interaction. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Modes of Conununication in the Production of 
Psychological Knowledge 
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1. Introduction 
The central role of communicative interaction in the 
construction of meaning is by no means a novel one: 
it has been emphasized by a considerable number of 
investigators and theorists in the past few decades. 
Symbolic interactionism, as developed by Mead (1), 
focuses on the ways in which the relevant features of 
the world are constituted and situations defined by 
means of symbolization in human interaction; Goffman 
(2) has studied extensively the ways in which people 
make use of the frames of reference, rituals and 
roles - both verbal and non-verbal - available to 
them in defining their situations; the 
ethnomethodological approach introduced and developed 
by Garfinkel (3) concentrates on the processes of 
interpretation and negotiation by means of which 
people construct and share meanings in their everyday 
activities. While any comprehensive review of this 
literature is beyond my present scope, I will return 
to the epistemological implications of 
ethnomethodologY in a later section. 
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Here, however, my intention is to consider the role 
of two basic modes of communicative interaction - 
i. e., one-directional and two-directional 
communication - in the production of psychological 
knowledge, and the communicative relationship between 
the investigator and the person whose conduct is 
being investigated. In order to maintain the 
epistemological perspective of this study, we must 
accept that this task requires flexible shifts 
between the alternate positions of the first-person 
participant and the third-person, fly-on-the-wall 
observer. While studying a particular instance of 
communicative interaction, we play a part in the 
larger network of interaction which includes 
ourselves as investigators. 
In this context, validation of propositions about the 
motive forces underlying the conduct of others 
becomes a moot point. It is one thing to make 
observations of the relationship between the 
investigator and the other participant, or 
participants, in an investigation. It is another 
matter for the investigator to include himself in 
the communicative network within which psychological 
knowledge is being produced. As such an inclusion 
places particular emphasis on the mode of 
communicative interaction between the participants 
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and on the process of how a "result" of the 
investigative enterprise is achieved and reported to 
outsiders, the notion of investigating this 
interaction by empirical means seems to warrant a 
careful re-evaluation. 
2. The Notion of One-Directional vs. Two-Directional 
Communicative Interaction 
In Chapter 1, above, I introduced the notion of 
feedback between the investigator and the person 
whose -conduct is being investigated as a basic 
concern in the present investigation of what may be 
said to constitute epistemologically valid 
psychological knowledge. In this chapter, I will 
distinguish between two different modes of 
communicative interaction according to the extent to 
which they allow, and make use of, feedback between 
the participants in an investigation. I call these 
two modes simply two-directional and one-directional 
communicative interaction. 
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Two-directional communicative interaction would be 
defined as an open feedback system between the 
investigator and the other person. In the production 
of psychological knowledge, this would mean that the 
investigator keeps the other participant or 
participants in the investigation informed about the 
aims of the study, the rationale of the techniques 
employed, and the meaning he ascribes to his (the 
other's) responses. The other participant is provided 
with an opportunity to comment on these matters and 
to present his own interpretation of his responses. 
The interpretation of the other participant's 
responses is, presumably, the critical area of this 
feedback system; from the epistemological viewpoint, 
it does not seem to matter if the other participant 
is tricked into responding under false pretences, 
provided that the real purpose and design of the 
investigation is revealed to him before the findings 
are reported to the rest of the community. The outer 
limit of two-directional communicative interaction is 
reached when the participants share their subjective 
views on the relevant aspects of the situation with 
each other. 
One-directional communicative interaction is, as may 
be anticipated, the opposite of the two-directional 
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kind. The feedback system is either wholly or partly 
closed, and the other participants in the 
investigation - i. e., those who provide the 
"evidence" for the investigator's hypothesis - are 
not provided an opportunity to comment on the purpose 
of the study, the investigator's hypothesis and the 
interpretation of his responses. The other 
participant's understanding of the situation is not 
taken into account, and his responses are assessed in 
the context of a system of meanings in the 
construction of which he has not taken part. 
In terms of my initial argument that agreement 
between the investigator and the person whose conduct 
is being investigated is the basic criterion of 
epistemologically valid psychological knowledge, it 
is clear that such an agreement may only be reached 
by means of two-directiondl communicative 
interaction. Two-directional communication is 
congruent with the investigative position of the 
first-person participant, whereas the position of the 
third-person observer is based on one-directional 
communication. 
I wish to clarify these two modes of conununicative 
interaction by placing them in the more general 
theoretical framework provided by HaberMdS'S theory 
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of communicative action and, in particular, by his 
juxtaposition of action oriented to success and 
action oriented to reaching understanding (4). 
"Success", for Habermas (5), "is defined as the 
appearance in the world of a desired state, which 
can, in a given situation, be causally produced 
through goal-oriented action or omission. " Habermas 
goes on to call an action oriented to success 
instrumental when it is considered under the aspect 
of following technical rules of action and when the 
efficiency of an intervention into a complex of 
circumstances and events becomes assessed (6). 
Conversely, an action oriented to success is called 
strategic when it is considered in relation to 
following rules of rational choice and appraised from 
the standpoint of the efficacy of influencing the 
decisions of rational opponents (7). 
According to Habermas, instrumental action is the 
nonsocial form of action oriented to success, whereas 
strategic action is its social. manifestation. By way 
of contrast to the categories of action oriented to 
success, Habermas proposes the category of 
communicative action which is applicable when "the 
actions of the agents involved are coordinated not 
through egocentric calculations of success but 
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through acts of reaching understanding" (8). "In 
communicative action", Habermas elaborates (9), 
"Participants are not primarily oriented to their own 
individual successes; they pursue their individual 
goals under the condition that they can harmonize 
their plans of action on the basis of common 
situation definitions". 
In the framework of communicative action, 
Participants dim at the realisation of "an agreement 
which is the condition under which all participants 
in the interaction may pursue their own plans" (10). 
Elsewhere, HaberMdS points out that "(t)he goal of 
coming to an understanding -- is to bring about an 
agreement -- that terminates in the intersubjective 
mutuality of reciprocal understanding, shared 
knowledge, mutual trust, and accord with one another. 
Agreement is based on recognition of the 
corresponding validity claims of comprehensibility, 
truth, truthfulness, and rightness" (11). 
Habermas goes on to suggest that "the actors 
themselves, in every phase of interaction, can know - 
however vaguely and intuitively - whether they are 
adopting a strategic-objectivating attitude towards 
the other participants or are oriented to consensus" 
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(12) or, at least, "under suitable conditions, these 
attitudes should be identifiable on the basis of the 
intuitive knowledge of the Participants themselves" 
(13). People, in other words, ' can genuinely know 
whether they are acting to further their egocentric 
aims or trying to reach an agreement with some other 
person or persons. 
Throughout, Habermas emphasizes the rational 
character of agreements reached in action oriented to 
reaching understanding: 
A communicatively achieved agreement has a rational 
basis; it cannot be imposed by either party, whether 
instrumentally through influencing the decisions of 
opponents. Agreement rests on common convictions. The 
speech act of one person succeeds only if the other 
accepts the offer contained in it by taking (however 
implicitly) a 'Yes' or 'no' position on a validity 
claim that is in principle criticizable. Both ego, 
who raises a validity claim with his utterance, and 
alter, who recognizes or rejects it, base their 
decisions on potential grounds or reasons (14). 
But not every would-be understanding satisfies the 
specific criteria Habermas wishes to establish for 
legitimdte dgreements. 
Reaching understanding -- is considered to be a 
process of reaching agreement -- among speaking and 
acting subjects. Naturally, a group of persons can 
feel at one in a mood which is so diffuse that it is 
difficult to identify the propositional content or 
the intentional object to which it is directed. Such 
a collective like-mindedness -- does not satisfy the 
conditions for the type of agreement -- in which 
attempts at reaching understanding terminate when 
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they are successful. A communicatively achieved 
agreement, or one that is mutually presupposed on 
commun: Lcative action, is propositionally 
differentiated. Owing to this linguistic structure, 
it cannot be merely induced through outside 
influence; it has to be accepted or presupposed as 
valid by the participants. (15) 
Habermas requires of legitimate agreements that they 
be propositionally differentiated and linguistically 
structured. The participants in an agreement must 
also display a sufficient degree of communicative 
competence (16) which Habermas describes principally 
in linguistic terms. I will discuss the limitations 
of Habermas's consensus theory of truth in the 
following chapter; for the present, I wish to point 
out that it is not an unproblematic matter to limit 
valid agreements only to linguistically structured 
ones. Insofar as the notion of rationality is 
understood in the widest possible sense of 
justification of beliefs, the question of how a 
distinction is made between experiential and 
linguistic or implicit and explicit, or non-verbal 
and verbal justification needs to be addressed. It 
seems inopportune to assume that the linguistic 
structures prevalent in other cultures or communities 
would ipso facto resemble those of ours closely 
enough as to make the identification of their 
criteria of justification unproblematic. The same 
reservations must preliminarily be voiced about 
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Habermas's criteria of communicative competence: if 
an agreement is reached in a network of interaction 
in which we are not participants, are we entitled to 
judge the validity of that agreement by our criteria 
- in other words, can we be certain that the same 
criteria of communicative competence are a priori 
applicable in all possible networks of interaction? 
If not, the application of our criteria to an 
agreement reached in a network in which we are not 
participants would appear to require that we enter 
that network and proceed to argue for the validity of 
our criteria until agreement is reached. But I will 
return to these limitations of the criteria of 
agreements in the next chapter. 
It will be quite clear by this point that, for all 
practical purposes, the Habermasean category of 
action oriented to success corresponds quite closely 
to MY origInal notion of one-directional 
communicative interaction. Similarly, Habermas's 
category of action oriented to consensus corresponds 
to my notion of two-directional interaction. In order 
to keep the Habermasean categories in perspective -I 
am not, for example, prepared to commit the notions 
of one-directional and two-directional interaction to 
Habermas's strict requirements of propositional 
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content and linguistic structure -I am going to 
keep to my original dichotomy also from now on. 
3. The Identification of One-Directional and Two- 
Directional Modes of Communication 
it might be thought that it is relatively 
unproblematic to describe a psychological 
investigation in terms of one-directional 
communication. A checklist of obvious signs of the 
third-person, objectivating attitude suggests itself 
immediately. We must not, however, fall into the 
trap of tacitly adopting the one-directional mode of 
communicative interaction ourselves: the 
epistemological investigation at hand requires that 
we are constantly alert to how we are situated in 
relation to the networks of communicative interaction 
in which psychological knowledge is being produced. 
In order to be able to provide illustrations of modes 
of communication in terms of practical communicative 
exchanges without actually taking part in those 
exchanges. I propose to start off in the third-person 
attitude of an outside observer and then move on to 
problematize the notion of identifying modes of 
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communicative interaction from this Position. 
In a psychological investigation based on one- 
directlonal communicative interaction, the 
investigator - who is, after all, in the business of 
seeking valid answers to particular questions 
pertaining to the motive forces underlying people's 
conduct - stops communicating his interpretations, 
inferences and conclusions to the person(s) whose 
conduct is being investigated in order to be able to 
gain support for his hypothes: ls and, ultimately, to 
be able to report his result to the investigative 
community to which he subscribes. The person whose 
conduct is being investigated is thus derived of an 
opportunity to reflect on the result in the context 
of the investigation and, potentially, to change his 
conduct on the basis of this reflection. 
It may be argued that most of what is conventionally 
accepted as psychological knowledge - i. e. 
explanations of why people do what they do in the way 
they do it - is based on one-directional interaction 
in the sense that the investigator does not report 
his findings to the person or persons whose conduct 
is being investigated as part of the research design. 
The standard design appears to rely on the collection 
by means of a variety of techniques of responses 
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which are then interpreted or analyzed in terms of 
the hypothesis in support of which the evidence is 
being collected. The interaction is discontinued when 
the subjects" of the study have provided the 
appropriate responses. There are variations in the 
extent to which the feedback system is limited: the 
most extreme case is the use of "naive subjects" who 
must not be aware of the real purpose of the 
investigation. As an analysis of anything like a 
sufficient sample of published empirical studies is 
beyond the scope of the present text, I will 
illustrate the notion of a psychological 
investigation based on one-directional communicative 
interaction with a relevant example - i. e., Milgram's 
well-known study of obedience of authority (17). 
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4. An Illustration of One-Directional Communicative 
Interaction in the Production of Psychological 
Knowledge: Milgram's Study of Obedience 
The choice of Milgram's study as an example of 
results generated by means of one-directional 
interaction may seem obvious to the point of 
triviality. After all, the experiments on which the 
study was based were a paradigm of one-directional 
communication. Under the pretext of an experimental 
study of paired-associate learning, "naive subjects 11 
were instructed to administer probressively stronger 
electric shocks of up to 450 volts to a learner every 
time the latter failed to reproduce a pair of words 
correctly. The "learner" was an accomplice of the 
experimenter, and no real shocks were generated by 
the intricate device labelled "shock generator" which 
the subject manipulated in the course of the 
experiment. 
Staged feedback from the experimenter was an 
important variable: 
At various points in the experiment the subject would 
turn to the experimenter for advice on whether he 
should continue to administer shocks. Or he would 
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indicate that he did not wish to go on. 
The experimenter responded with a sequence of 'prods', using as many as necessary to bring the 
subject into line. 
Prod 1: Please continue, or, Please go on. 
Prod 2: The experiment requires that you continue. 
Prod 3: It is absolutely essential that you 
continue. 
Prod 4: You have no other choice, you must go on. 
The prods were made in sequence: only if prod 1 
had been unsuccessful, could Prod 2 be used. If the 
subject refused to obey the experimenter after Prod 
4, the experiment was terminated. The experimenter's 
tone of voice was at all times firm, but not 
impolite. The sequence was begun anew on each 
occasion that the subject balked or showed reluctance 
to follow orders. (18) 
The famous results showed that, despite increasingly 
agonized protests and finally complete silence from 
the "learner", the majority of subjects proceeded to 
administer the maximum shock to him when he was in 
the adjacent room. A considerable number did so when 
the "learner" was in the same room, and even when 
they had to press his hand on the 
order to administer the punishment. 
Milgram dismisses objections to the 
shock-plate in 
one-directiondl 
nature of his procedure (19) as irrelevant: 
Baumrind writes: 'The game is defined by the 
experimenter and he makes the rules' - -. It is true 
that for disobedience to occur the framework of the 
experiment must be shattered. That, indeed, is the 
point of the design. That is why obedience and 
disobedience are genuine issues for the subject. He 
must really assert himself as a person against a 
legitimate authority. (20) 
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The very aim of the experiment, in other words, was 
to investigate the consequences of one-directional 
interaction in d particular context. As far as this 
argument is concerned, Milgram. is, of course, right: 
it is obvious that the consequences of one- 
directional interaction cannot be studied in a two- 
directional setting. Milgram even adopted the two- 
directional mode after the experiment was terminated: 
the subjects were "debriefed", i. e. told about the 
real aims of the study and interviewed on their 
feelings about the whole exercise. 
So what is it that is wrong - in the epistemological 
sense - with Milgram's investigation of obedience to 
authority if we cannot accept that one-directional 
interaction cannot be studied in d two-directional 
setting? 
In terms of communicative interaction, Milgram's 
otherwise impressive results may be criticized on the 
grounds that the interaction was discontinued by the 
investigator and the results reported prematurely: 
the results were produced in the context of one-way 
communicative interaction, and it would certainly 
have been rather surprising if the subjects would 
have behaved in a similar manner had the experiment 
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been replicated after the "debriefing" procedure - 
i. e., after the interaction had been made two- 
directional. It is, or course, conceivable that some 
of the subjects would have administrated "severe 
shocks" to the "learner" even in a repeat experime-nt 
(in which the subject should have been told that now 
the shocks were real); but epistemologically 
legitimate conclusions could be drawn only when the 
subject in question agreed with the investigator on 
the interpretation of his conduct. 
The fact that Milgram's experiments were about the 
consequences of one-directional communication and 
that their purpose would have been nullified by two- 
directional interaction does not make his results any 
more valid in the epistemological sense. While 
Milgram's results - namely, that even perfectly 
ordinary people were liable to engage in extremely 
harsh treatment of a fellow man - are in many ways 
highly instructive, they remain epistemologically 
unfounded. 
It is poignant that while Milgram's experiment was 
designed in order to investigate obedience and 
disobedience to authority, actual discomfort was only 
caused to the naive subject, i. e. the "teacher", not 
the "learner". As Milgram reports (21), a number of 
his subjects expressed signs of severe distress and 
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what may from the outside be described only as Panic, 
or hysteria: 
As the experiment proceeds, laughter intrudes into 
his performance. At first, it is d light snicker, 
then it becomes increasingly insistent and 
disruptive. The laughter seemed trIggered by the 
learner's screams. -- His very refined and 
authoritative manner of speaking is increasingly 
broken up by wheezing laughter. (22) 
While Milgram does point out that the subjects were 
thoroughly "debriefed" after the experiment and that 
the after-effects of the experience were 
conscientiously monitored - "A year after his 
participation in the experiment, he affirms in the 
questionnaire that he has definitely learned 
something of personal importance as d result of being 
in the experiment" (23) - it seems reasonable to 
suggest that it is the experimenter rather than the 
naive subject who provides the more relevant 
illustration of obedience to authority in the context 
of Milgram's experiment. What made the experimenter, 
or the investigator, cause such acute distress to 
many subjects - to such an extent that the latter 
ended up behaving in ways totally alien to their 
self-concept? It may be ventured that it was a matter 
of obedience to some internal ("This is a useful 
scientific experiment") or external III have 
undertaken to do this job for Professor Milgram") 
authority. In this sense, the experiment did make its 
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point twice over, both internally and externally; 
judging by Milgram's reports, not a single 
experimenter broke off the experiment because of the 
distress caused to the naive subject. 
Milgram's study could have produced epistemologically 
legitimate results if the obedience experiment had 
been used as an 
-input 
into the interaction between 
the participants, and if the subsequent conduct of 
the subjects would have been investigated by means of 
two-directional methods - for example, whether the 
subjects would have been less liable to succumg to 
irrational obedience after the experience of 
Milgram's experiment than before. In this context, 
the experiment could have served as a preliminary 
part in, say, a study of social learning. As they 
were reported, Milgram's experiments may have been 
valuable for particular pragmatic purposes - for 
example, as an illustration of "the banality of 
evil", as he puts it (24); by treating them in the 
one-directional mode of communication, people can be 
tricked into treating other people in the one- 
directional mode of communication - but, from the 
epistemological viewpoint, they remain artefacts. 
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5. The Epistemological Status of One-Directional and 
Two-Directional Communication 
The identification of one-directional and two- 
directional communicative interaction from the non- 
participatory position is not always as simple as in 
the case of Milgram's study. Labov and Fanshel (25) 
Provide an illustration in the shape of an excerpt 
from a conversation between a therapist and his 
client: 
Th. /therapist/: (breath) So - then - and for some 
reason you feel they're angry because you're so, 
underweight, or 
because they - think you're underweight. 
R. /client/: ...... Pon't -I dunno, 
I don't -I 
don't -I never felt like that - it's just that ... no 
I never thought of it like that and I don't -I don't 
think I feel anger because ... (breath) I mean I jist get annoyed, like I'm not -I 
don't say I get - angry, but it jist gets annoying to 
hear the same thing. 
R.: I mean, the first thing if I say I have a pain in 
my finger - right away, it's because 'Oh, you're 
thin! ' 
I mean after awhile it gets annoying to hear and I- 
I-know that - 
Th.: Yes - 
R.: I guess - maybe I should let it - not bother me. 
R.: I mean, I went to the doctor last week - 
Th.: But why do they keep repeating it? 
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R.: I don't know 
Th.: What are they feeling? 
R.: ..... that I'm doing it on purp - like, I w1s - like they... well - they s- came out an' tol' me in 
so many words that they worry and worry an' I seem to take this very lightly. 
Th.: So they get angry at you. 
R.: Yes ... they do, Yes. 
Th.: So there's a lot of anger passing back and forth. 
R.: ..... Yeh.. 
Th. : (Mm. ) 
It may be surmised that the therapist attempts to 
construct an acceptable interpretation of the 
client's account and to gauge her opinion of this 
interpretation. The therapist seems keen to introduce 
the concept of anger into the conversation -a word 
which the client does not mention: 
(1) "So - then - and for some reason you feel they're 
angry because you're so, underweight or because they 
- think you're underweight. " 
(2) "So they get angry at YOU. " 
(3) "So there's a lot Of anger Passing back and 
forth. " 
This exchange might be preliminarily interpreted in 
terms of the therapist and his client reaching an 
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agreement on the interpretation suggested by the 
therapist after a rational and - in Habermas's (26) 
terms - undistorted exchange of views. The client's 
final affirmations ("Yes ... 
they do, yes" and 
".... Yeh.. ") count as expressions of genuine 
agreement with the therapist's "anger" thesis: an 
agreement has been reached on the proposition that 
the client's conduct has (in some supposedly coherent 
way) been based on some regulative theory which 
incorporates anger. 
We might, on the other hand, be excused for 
constructing the opposite interpretation. The 
therapist's contributions to the interaction might 
with some justification be interpreted in terms of 
one-directiondl communication: he is trying to 
convince his client of the validity of his 
interpretation based, apparently, on some underlying 
theory of human conduct. The central concept of his 
interpretation - i. e. anger - does not come up at all 
in the client's account. The therapist introduces it 
independently and proceeds to use it repeatedly and 
with clear emphasis. From this angle, the client's 
response might be interpreted as uncertain, vague 
and, perhaps, unconvinced: 
'#Yes... they do, Yes. " 
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"..... Yeh.. " 
According to this interpretation, the therapist has 
acted in a strategic manner in order to achieve an 
appearance of an agreement with the client. The 
agreement, in other words, is not genuine; it is one 
achieved in the context of, as Habermas calls 
"systematically distorted communication" 
Habermas elucidates this concept thus: 
it, 
(27) . 
Rationalization here means extirpating those 
relations of force that are inconspicuously set in 
the very structures of communication and that prevent 
conscious settlement of conflicts, and consensual 
regulation of conflicts, by means of intrapsychic as 
well as interpersonal communicative barriers. 
Rationalization means overcoming such systematically 
distorted communication in which the action- 
supporting consensus concerning the reciprocally 
raised validity claims - especially the consensus 
concerning the truthfulness of intentional 
expressions and the rightness of underlying norms - 
can be sustained in appearance only, that is, 
counter-factually. (28) 
"Such communication pathologies", Habermas says 
(29), "can be conceived of as the result of a 
confusion between actions oriented to reaching 
understanding and actions oriented to success. In 
situations of concealed strategic action, at least 
one of the parties behaves with an orientation to 
success, but leaves others to believe that all the 
II 
presuppositions of communicative action are satisfied 
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Arguments may be proffered for the legitimacy of both 
of the above interpretations of the therapeutic 
episode described by Labov and Fanshel. After all, 
the client does seem to agree with the therapist's 
interpretation; on the other hand, the therapist'o 
manner of leading the client to assent may be 
described as suggestive enough as to be considered 
consistent with the one-directional, strategic mode 
of communication. 
So far, however, we have assessed the qualities of 
episodes of communicative interaction from the 
vantage point of an observer: we have had no 
opportunity to validate our interpretations of the 
dynamics of the network of communication under 
observation against the interpretations of the 
participants in that network. At this point, I 
propose that we remind ourselves of the 
epistemological aims of the present study and adopt 
the role of a participant. 
6. Agreement As Ultimate Criterion 
Above, I have been describing one-directional and 
two-directional modes of communication in terms of 
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their Particular characteristics - i. e. how they 
appear to an observer. While Perhaps necessary for 
the understanding of the issues involved, this method 
of distinguishing between the two dichotomical modes 
of communication is a highly Problematic issue: if we 
devised a preliminary check-list of characteristics 
to look for in order to identify in terms of 
practical interaction an orientation to egocentric 
success on the one hand and an orientation to 
understanding on the other, we would ultimately have 
to rely on an interpretation of different aspects of 
particular cases of communicative interaction. The 
final criterion of the validity of an interpretation 
would, however, be agreement between the interpreter 
and the person whose conduct is being subjected to 
interpretation. 
But the problem of interpretation is more fundamental 
than merely one of classifying speech acts into the 
two modes of communicative interaction I outlined 
above. I wish to argue that there is no independent 
method of establishing the validity of either 
interpretation: the interpretations must be referred 
back to the participants - with the reservations and 
impressions constructed by the observer - in order to 
ascertain the legitimacy of the agreement. It is 
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therefore ultimately irrelevant to the issue of the 
epistemological legitimacy of Psychological knowledge 
qua interpretations to base the analysis of such 
legitimacy on the characteristics of the Process of 
interaction as such. As the validity of such an 
analysis finally depends on the agreement of the 
relevant participants, it seems that we once more 
have to concede the only valid criterion of the 
correct identification of one-directional 
communication on the one hand and of two-directional 
communication on the other is the presence or absence 
of an agreement at the conclusion of the sequence of 
interaction in question. It is, in other words, the 
manner in which a sequence of interaction is 
discontinued which allows us to draw conclusions as 
to the validity of the interpretation produced in its 
course. 
I return to this argument in connection with a 
critical assessment of certain aspects of Habermas's 
theory of communicative action in the next chapter. 
7. The Possibility of Mistdken Agreement 
I have proposed that, if we accept that the 
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production of Psychological knowledge is essentially 
a function of the Process of communicative 
interaction between the Participants involved, those 
participants must agree on the suggested 
interpretation of the motive forces underlying the 
instance of conduct in question if it is to qualify 
as epistemologically legitimate. While I still 
maintain that this conclusion may not be evaded, some 
Potential objections must be dealt with at this 
stage. 
To begin with, it may be pointed out that agreements 
may be reached mistakenly. The participants in an 
agreement may find out that what they thought was a 
legitimate agreement had in fact been based on 
misunderstanding. Utterances of the type "But I 
thought you meant P" may be regarded as typical in a 
situation where the misuderstanding becomes explicit 
and the basis of the sense of agreement reached 
founders. How can we be certain that the agreement to 
which we subscribe is genuine - i. e., that there are 
no misunderstandings as to the meanings of the 
expressions employed in the negotiation of the 
agreement? 
In the strictly epistemological sense, 
certain from within the network of 
we cannot be 
communicative 
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interaction in which the agreement has been reached. 
We may devise a checklist of criteria with a view to 
ascertaining the validity of the agreement, but there 
is no independent guarantee of the exhaustiveness of 
such a checklist. The notion of an agreement already 
implies criteria of some description: after all, :1f 
the agreement did not seem acceptable to us - 
according to whatever implicit or criteria we may 
entertain - we would not be party to it. 
Any agreement to which we subscribe at the moment is 
open to re-evaluation when communicative practices - 
including both the symbolic-linguistic and material 
spheres of interaction - go on: while we may be in 
explicit agreement on the criteria of our shared 
understanding, these criteria may one day be replaced 
by new and more relevant ones, and the original 
agreement may become regarded as false by one, or 
several, of the participants. 
It must be pointed out that even the falsehood of an 
agreement should be ascertained by means of some 
criteria - and, if agreement is regarded as the 
fundamental epistemological criterion, it must 
apparently be accepted that an agreement between the 
participants is required as the criterion of the 
identification of a previous agreement as false. 
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In other words, if we stick to a strict reading of 
the consensus theory of truth, the identification of 
an agreement as false requires the establishment of a 
new agreement as to the changed status of the 
previous one. If the participants, on the other hand, 
cease to be participants and seek new networks of 
agreement, no knowledge is produced, and 
epistemological criteria do not become applicable. 
These observations may be extended to cover 
mistaken agreements due to misunderstandings in the 
use of language. Ultimately, agreements may be tested 
against continued, shared practices of action and 
communication. If the participants in an agreement 
engage in joint action and communication for a period 
of time and if no counter-arguments are brought 
forward, the agreement is still valid. There is, 
however, no certainty as to the validity of the 
agreement at a later point in time. If the validity 
of the agreement, on the other hand, becomes 
challenged, it may quite certainly be concluded that 
the agreement is no longer in force. 
By way of summary: a current agreement cannot be 
false by definition. If counter-arguments or doubts 
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are not forthcoming and if the interaction has not 
btoken down, it must be concluded that sufficient 
criteria for the validity of the agreement have been 
fulfilled. Current agreements may, however, become 
regarded as false at some future point in time. 
Sufficient criteria may only be fulfilled in the 
present. An agreement is either in force in the 
present or it is not an agreement. 
8. Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have introduced the notions of 
one-directional and two-directional communicative 
interaction and elaborated them by means of 
Habermas's categories of action oriented to success 
and action oriented to reaching understanding, to 
which they correspond. I argued that the production 
of epistemologically legitimate psychological 
knowledge requires two-directional communicative 
interaction; whatever hypotheses are validated by 
means of one-directional interaction do not count as 
psychological knowledge. The identification of the 
different modes of communication on the basIs of the 
characteristics of the process of interaction is, 
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however, problematic: while we as observers may 
Classify d communicative exchange as one-directional 
or two-directional, we are not in d Position to know 
the meanings and rules operative within the network 
of interaction. It is only the presence of an 
explicit agreement that allows us to conclude that a 
communicative episode had been based on two- 
directlondl interaction. It may be said that if no 
consensus as to the validity of the hypothesis at 
hand is reached, the hypothesis cannot claim 
epistemological legitimacy in any case. if a 
consensus obtains, it May be observed that it could 
be the result of distorted communication or that the 
participants were not competent communicators. This, 
however, may only be subsumed to another process of 
communicative interaction: we must introduce our 
doubts into the network of interaction and find out 
whether the participants still remain committed to 
their agreement. As long as an agreement pertains, 
the validation of doubts as to its legitimacy leads 
to an infinite regress within which nothing may be 
said about the validity of the agreement. 
I will now move on to examine three types of counter- 
argument against the notion of agreement between the 
investigator and the person whose conduct is being 
investigated as the basic criterion of the validity 
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of psycholog: ical propositions. In Chapter Four, I 
will present a discussion of Habermas's views on the 
preconditions of acceptable agreements; in Chapter 
Five, I will assess the challenge to agreement as a 
criterion of validity posed by the notion of 
unconscious motive forces; and in Chapter Six, I will 
present a critique of Smedslund's theory of common 
sense as the basis of valid psychological 
propositions. 
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Chapter Four 
CONSENSUS AS CRITERION OF TRUTH: A CRITIQUE OF 
HABERMAS 
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While the consensus theory of truth as championed by 
Habermas is in principle congruent with - and, 
indeed, necessary for - my present argument about the 
epistemological basis of psychological propositions, 
certain aspects of Habermas's position require a 
critical assessment. Despite Habermas's original 
purpose of eliminating references to objectively true 
states of affairs as a criterion of the validity of 
propositions, it appears that some of the 
qualifications he attaches to his consensus theory of 
truth have the actual effect of perpetuating the 
notion of an objective state of affairs independent 
of the propositions put forward and discussed in the 
context of communicative interaction. Such 
qualifications. I wish to show, bear serious 
implications for the consensus theory of truth as a 
whole: after all, all qualifications attached to the 
notion of consensus must be introduced into 
communicative interactions by the participants - 
which, in due course, makes it logically impossible 
to externalize them. I will try to examine this 
difficulty below. 
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1. The Consensus Theory of Truth: A General 
Description 
In reviewing Habermas's ideas on consensual agreement 
as the ultimate criterion of truth, I will loosely 
follow Hesse's (NOTE 1) treatment of the subject. 
This approach serves a dual purpose: while Hesse's 
article presents a succinct encapsulation of 
Habermas's views, her criticism of the latter also 
wdrrants some comments. 
Hesse paraphrases Habermas's consensus theory of 
truth in five points: 
(1) Since even the most elementary observation 
statements are expressed in terms of some theory 
language or other, and since these theory languages 
change with time, truth cannot inhere in observation 
statements simply as correspondence between statement 
and the empirical world. 
(2) We therefore have to understand theory languages 
not as directly describing the world, but dS 
interpreting it more and more "adequately" as science 
develops. 
(3) "Adequacy" is measured by experimental 
verification, but also necessarily by argumentative 
reasoning from the truth of theoretical postulates 
formulated in the language. 
(4) If adequacy were measured by verification alone 
we should fall into the meaning variance problem', 
because there would be no linguistic means of 
identifying the experience expressed in the language 
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of one theory with those expressed in the language of 
another. (It has to be assumed here either that 
ostensive fdce-to-face identifications do not work, 
or that they cannot be assumed to be available 
because communication between scientists typically 
takes place linguistically at a distance from the 
actual experiments referred to -- as Habermas puts it 
in a different context science is "dialogical", not 
Is monological". ) 
(5) Therefore, in order to guarantee the identity of 
reference of observdtion statements made in different 
theoretical languages which are "about" the same 
subject matter, we cannot rely on their 
"correspondence" with the subject matter, but we 
rather need communication and argumentation between 
and within different theory-languages. (2) 
Thus, the truth of propositions in both empiriCdl 
science and in hermeneutic interpretations is defined 
as the ideal consensus of competent practitioners of 
those discip lines (3). 
But must the consensus be "ideal" and the 
practitioners "competent" if it is to be legitimate? 
Let us first consider the notion of communicative 
competence - bearing in mind that the notions of the 
ideal speech situation and communicative competence 
seem closely interwoven. 
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2. Communicdtive Competence 
Habermas (4) defines communicative competence as "the 
ability of a speaker oriented to mutual understanding 
to embed a well-formed sentence in relations to 
reality, that is: 
1. To choose the Propositional sentence in such a way 
that either the truth conditions of the -proposition 
stated or the existential presuppositions of the 
Propositional content mentioned are supposedly 
fulfilled (so that the hearer can share the knowledge 
of the speaker); 
2. To express his intentions in such a way that the 
linguistic expression represents what is intended (so 
that the hearer can trust the speaker); 
3. To perform the speech act in such a way that it 
conforms to recognized norms or to accepted self- 
images (so that the hearer can be in accord with the 
speaker in shared value orientations). 
"To the extent that these decisions do not depend on 
particular epistemic presuppositions and changing 
contexts", Habermas elaborates (5), "but cause 
sentences in general to be engaged in the universal 
pragmatic functions of representation, expression, 
and legitimate interpersonal relation, what is 
expressed in them is precisely the communicative 
competence for which I am proposing a universal- 
pragmatic investigation 
problems appear, however, when the basic 
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epistemological question is asked: how is it Possible 
to know that the above criteria of communicative 
competence are fulfilled among the Participants in a 
given process of communicative interaction? Within a 
process of interaction, the achievement of an 
agreement on the validity of a Proposition would in 
itself seem to imply that the signatories of that 
agreement fulfill the criteria of communicative 
competence - which, tautologically, is implied by the 
achievement of the agreement. It is of course 
possible that a section of the participants are 
acting in a strategic manner, keeping the others in 
the dark as to their covert objectives, but this 
cannot be known from inside the current network of 
interaction. If it were known, no agreement would 
apparently prevail. As long as the agreement is 
endorsed by the participants, foul play - or, in 
Habermas's terms, "systematically distorted 
communication" - may only be identified by outsiders; 
but, as outsiders are by definition not in a position 
to ascertain the meanings which underlie an agreement 
reached by insiders. 
Presumably, at least some ascriptions of rights and 
social status are defined in terms of communicative 
competence. Insofar as there are in a community, for 
examP 1e, "children" and "old", 11 mentally ill" and 
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"mentally subnormal" people - or, indeed, insofar as 
the definition of the status of participants in an 
interactive situation as subjects or objects is based 
on ascriptions of communicative competence - limits 
between competence and incompetence must, apparently, 
be drawn by some combination of participants; and, it 
seems, it is on these ascriptions that inclusions 
into and exclusions from the network of interaction 
within which agreements are negotiated are based. 
Harr6 (6) has suggested that ascriptions of 
competence based on supposedly context-independent 
justifications - such as stages of cognitive 
development - are themselves arbiters of those 
justifications. 
Perhaps the very idea of 'cognitive development' is a 
cultural artefact. We might suppose instead that in 
every culture what someone does is a reflection of 
their beliefs as to whether they have the right to do 
something adn/or the confidence to carry out a 
cognitive operation in the possible or actual 
presence of certain others. -- The cognitive 
'development' is a secondary phenomenon, an 
appearance, a cultural illusion, a way of 
representing a redistribution of rights in the 
changing social structures of psychologically 
symbiotic dyads, triads etc. interconnected with a 
changing capacity to deal with few or many matters at 
once. (7) 
However "context-independent" our criteria of 
communicative competence are supposed to be, we have 
to convince others about the justification and 
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relevance of those criteria within our Particular 
context; if limits are to be drawn and some members 
of our network of interaction are to be excluded from 
the circle of competent speakers, those limits must, 
presumably, be justified somehow. If we manage to 
justify them to the members who, supposedly, do not 
satisfy our criteria of communicative competence, 
they do satisfy those criteria - otherwise they would 
not have understood and accepted our justifications. 
In terms of communicative interaction, it seems 
irrelevant whether our criteria are "context- 
independent" or context-dependent'. the 
justification of any criteria of corwiunicative 
competence takes place within our context in any case. 
Habermas's claim that the criteria of communicative 
competence he has outlined "do not depend on 
particular epistemic presuppositions and changing 
contexts but cause sentences in general to be engaged 
in the universal pragmatic functions of 
representation, expression and legitimate 
interpersonal relation" seems at best irrelevant and 
at worst unjustified: either the evaluation of the 
communicative competence of participants in actual 
interactive situations makes no difference to the 
agreement that has been reached or the task of 
ascriptions of competence is conferred on outsiders. 
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The problem is expressed succinctly by Hesse (8): 
"What are the criteria Of competence in discourse, 
whether technical or Practical, if they are not or 
not only found in the canons of formal logic" - 
which, as Hesse observes, they are not? If the 
criteria of competence are properly transcendental, 
they should be so In terms of logic; if they are not 
based on logic, their existence and function must, 
presumably, be established by empirical means. This, 
again, refers the issue back to particular networks 
of communicative interaction and, finally to 
agreements on particular propositions about the 
criteria of competence. 
The notion of communicative competence - and 
definitions thereof - is, in other words, consistent 
with the one-directional mode of communicative 
interaction or, in Habermasedn terms, strategic 
action; and this, in turn, would seem to render the 
notion of communicative competence irrelevant to the 
evaluation of the validity of an agreement. 
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3. The Ideal Speech Situation 
Similar objections may be voiced against Habermas's 
idea of the ideal speech situation as the ultimate 
criterion of truth achieved through consensus. 
Habermas tends to describe the notion of the ideal 
speech situation as the opposite of situations in 
which communicative interaction is "systematically 
distorted", i. e. "the action-supporting consensus 
concerning the reciprocally raised validity claims - 
especially the consensus concerning the truthfulness 
of intentional expressions and the rightness of 
underlying norms - can be sustained in appearance 
only, that is, counterfactually" (9). 
Habermas points out that 
the design of an ideal speech situation Is 
necessarily implied in the structure of potential 
speech, since all speech, even intentional deception, 
is oriented toward the idea of truth. This idea can 
be andlyzed with regard to d consensus achieved in 
unrestrained and universal discourse. Insofar as we 
Master the means for the construction of the ideal 
speech situation, we can conceive the ideas Of truth, 
freedom and justice, which interpenetrate each other 
- although of course only as ideas. (10) 
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Giddens (11) summarizes "ideal speech situation" as 
an interactive situation in which there are "no 
external constraints Preventing Participants from 
assessing evidence and argument, and in which each 
participant has an equal and open chance of entering 
into discussion", while Hesse (12) describes the 
concept in terms of a state of affairs in which "dll 
participants must have equal chances of engaging in 
discourse and of putting forward justifications, 
refUtdtions, explanations and interpretations; they 
must have equal chances of sincerely putting forward 
their own inner feelings and attitudes; and they must 
have equal status with regard to the power to issue 
permissions, commands, etc. ". 
These definitions proffered by Habermas himself and 
the versions constructed by others may, for the 
present purposes, suffice to provide an outline of 
the notion of the ideal speech situation. We may now 
turn to an examination of that notion with particular 
reference to epistemological considerations. It must 
be said that the problems involved are indeed 
considerable. Hesse (13) encapsulates the basic 
epistemological difficulty: "That can ideal speech 
situation occurs is falsifiable but not verifiable ... 
... it may never 
be realized in history, and 
98 
indeed it seems as though we could not certainly 
recognize it if it were. " This seems a crucial point. 
The notion of a consensual agreement would itself 
seem to imply that the agreement is accepted by the 
participants as valid. The speech situation, in other 
words, would have been regarded by the Participants 
as sufficient for the agreement to have become 
possible in the first place. In this sense, it may be 
argued that the notion of the ideal speech situation 
is irrelevant to consensual agreements: an agreement 
presupposes a state of affairs in which the 
participants accept the prevailing conditions as, : if 
not ideal, at least sufficiently undistorted. In 
order for any objections to this acceptance from an 
outside vantage point to be valid, they would have to 
be introduced into the original network of 
interaction for assessment. A consensus, in other 
words, is a consensus as long at it remains a 
consensus; propositions pertaining to the particular 
characteristics of that consensus are ultimately 
irrelevant. 
Thompson (14) offers a systematic critique of the 
notion of the ideal speech situation, suggesting a 
six-step reconstruction of Habermas's thesis: 
(i) The process of communication implies that it is 
possible for at least two subjects to come to an 
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agreement dboUt d state Of affairs. 
(ii) To come to an agreement implies that it is 
possible to distinguish between a genuine and a deceptive agreement. 
(iii) A genuine agreement is an agreement induced by 
the force of the better argument dlone. 
(iv) The force of better argument Prevails if dnd 
only if communication is not hindered through 
external and internal constraints. 
(v) Communication is not hindered through interndl 
constraints if and 'only if for all potential 
participants there is a symmetrical distribution of 
chances to select and employ speech-acts. 
(vi) A situation in which there is a symmetrical 
distribution of chances to select and employ 
communicative, constative, representative and 
regulative speech-acts is an ideal speech situation. 
(15) 
Thompson expresses doubts as to the possibility of an 
agreement being based on a better argument alone: "-- 
it is difficult to see why subjects can be said 
genuinely to agree about something only when their 
agreement is induced by the force of better argument, 
as opposed, for example, to the feeling of compassion 
or the commitment to a common goal. Yet if there dre, 
as there certainly seem to be, alternative ways in 
which a genuine agreement can be induced, then the 
momentum which allegedly leads to the presupposition 
of an ideal speech situation is dissipated at an 
early stage" (16). While these objections may in the 
first instance seem cogent enough, Thompson appears 
to labour under the same epistemolOgiCdl oversight as 
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Habermas. To wit: 
-- it seems doubtful whether the elimination of 
internal constraints, which seem to have been swept 
under the fifth step of the argument, remains 
uncertain. Moreover, it seems doubtful whether the 
elimination of internal constraints could be 
guaranteed by a symmetrical distribution of chances 
to employ and select speech-acts; and yet in spite of 
this formal equality, the final decision is merely an 
expression of the prevailing status quo, bearing 
little resemblance to the quality of the arguments 
adduced. What Habermas's assumption of symmetry 
seems to neglect, and what his occasional allusions 
to the model of 'Pure communicative action' do 
nothing to mitigate, is that the constraints which 
affect social life may operate in modes other than 
the restriction of access to speech-acts, for example 
by restricting access to weapons, wealth or esteem. 
(17) 
Here, however, Thompson breaks the rules by 
readopting the position of the "fly-on-the-wall" 
third person. If he is aware of restrictions of 
access to weapons, wealth of esteem in a network of 
interaction, he would have to introduce his viewpoint 
into the network in question - which would cast the 
prevailing consensus into doubt - or concede that his 
doubts are not epistemologically valid. 
Thompson concludes: "I hope that enough has been said 
to suggest that Habermas's argument for the 
presuppositions of an ideal speech situation, as well 
as his conceptualisation of the latter, are in need 
of considerable attention" (18). While 
this 
verdict seems in general terms correct, 
it is for the 
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wrong reasons; there are no justifidble grounds for 
questioning the genuineness of an agreement from the 
position of an epistemological outsider. It is, after 
all, the very myth of this Position that the whole of 
Habermas's project is intended to undermine. Whether 
or not his project may be interpreted as successful 
is another matter. 
In his reply to Thompson, Habermas (19) states that 
he is "not claiming that a valid consensus can come 
about only under conditions of the ideal speech 
situation. " Habermas's elaboration of this point 
warrants quoting in full: 
The communicative practice of everyday life is 
immersed in a sea of cultural taken-for-grantedness, 
that is, of consensual certainties. To this life- 
world background of actual processes of reaching 
understanding, there also belong normative 
convictions and empathetic identifications with the 
feelings of others. As soon, however, as an element 
of this naively known, prereflexively present 
background is transformed into the semantic content 
of an utterance, the certainties come under the 
conditions of criticisable knowledge; from then on 
disagreement concerning them can arise. Only when 
this disagreement is stubborn enough to provoke a 
discursive treatment of the matter at issue do we 
have d case concerning which I am claiming that a 
grounded agreement cannot be reached unless the 
participants in discourse suppose that they are 
convincing each other only by force of better 
arguments. Should one party make use of privileged 
access to weapons, wealth or standing, in order to 
wring agreement from another party through the 
prospect of sanctions or rewards, no-one involved 
will be in doubt that the presuppositions of 
argumentation are no longer satisfied. (20) 
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This, however, means that Habermas renders one of his 
theoretical cornerstones irrelevant: if all 
agreements are necessarily valid, the status of the 
ideal speech situation seems to be left without 
foundation or purpose. 
4. The Possibility of a Universal Rationality 
While I hold the (above conclusions with regard to the 
notions of communicative competence and the ideal 
speech situation as inescapable, the criticisms I 
have put forward must be considered in terms of the 
general problem of rationality and the justification 
of validity claims. The central issue to be clarified 
is whether there may be said to exist a universal 
rationality based on the characteristics and 
practices which make human communities human. 
Habermas, as will be seen, defends this position, 
which may indeed be regarded as a necessary 
foundation for his theory of communicative action as 
a whole. I will attempt an examination of this issue 
from the vantage point of the different categories of 
communication outlined above. I base my analysis 
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mainly on the line of argumentation Habermas offers 
in his treatment in "The Theory of Communicative 
Action" of the characteristics of what he calls "the 
mythical" and "the modern" ways of understanding the 
world. I must immediately point out that, for the 
purposes of my overall argument, I equate the 
distinction between of "the mythical" and "the 
modern" ways of understanding with the distinction 
between the perspective of "others" - i. e., the 
people whose conduct is being investigated - and that 
of "ourselves" - i. e., the investigator, or the 
community of investigators to which we (explicitly or 
implicitly) subscribe. 
From the complexity of Habermas's abundant exposition 
of his views, I choose as a starting point his 
assertion about the a priori assumptions which 
supposedly underlie the very notion of communicative 
interaction: "In communicative action", Habermas 
states (21), "we today proceed from those formal 
presuppositions of intersubjectivity that are 
necessary if we are to be able to refer to something 
in the one subjective world, identical for all 
observers, or to something in our intersubjectively 
shared social world. -- Validity claims are in 
principle open to criticism because they are based on 
formal world-concepts. They presuppose a world that 
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is identical for (all POsa: 'Lb-le observers, or a world 
intersubjectively shared by members, and they do so 
in an abstract form freed of all specific content. 
Such claims call for the rational response of a 
partner in conununication". 
Elsewhere, Habermas elaborates on this claim of the 
universal character of rationality: 
If some concept of rationality is unavoidably built 
into the action-tbeoretic foundations of sociology, 
then theory formation is in danger of being limited 
from the start to a particular, culturally or 
historically bound perspective, unless fundamental 
concepts are constructed in such a way that the 
conpcept of rationality they implicitly posit is 
encompassing and general, that is, satisfies 
universalistic claims. The demand for such a concept 
or rationality also emerges from methodological 
considerations. If the understanding of meaning has 
to be understood as communicative experience, and if 
this is possible only In the performative attitude of 
a communicative actor, the experiential basis of an 
interpretive -- sociology is compatible with its 
claim to objecivity only if hermeneutic procedures 
can be based at least intuitively on general and 
encompassing structures of rationality. From both 
points of view, the metatheoretiCdl and the 
methodological, we cannot expect objectivity in 
social-theoretical knowledge if the corresponding 
concepts of communicative action and interpretation 
express a merely particular perspective on 
rationality, one intervowen with a particular 
cultural tradition. (22) 
According to Habermas, then, an - at least in 
principle - identifiable system of rationality is the 
necessary basis upon which all communicative 
interaction must rely; this universal rationality is 
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context-free and independent of the variations 
between one culture and the next. This Proposition 
forces upon us the question of the commensurability 
versus incommensurability of civilizations and 
worldviews - i. e. whether genuinely alternative 
standards of rationality are possible. 
As Habermas himself clearly recognizes, in terms of 
the pragmatics of inquiry the question boils down to 
"whether and in what respect the standards of 
rationality by which the investigator was himself at 
least intuitively guided might claim universal 
validity" (23). From the communicative vantage point, 
this question inevitably evokes the categories of 
one-directional and two-directional interaction. How 
is the rationality or irrationality of a world-view 
or meaning system established, and which type of 
communicative interaction is employed? Habermas deals 
with this issue consistently enough: "Symbolic 
expressions of speaking and acting subjects can be 
identified only under descriptions that refer to the 
action orientations (and the possible reasons) of an 
actor. The interpreter has therefore no other choice 
than to test whether an obscure expression - one that 
is not simply unintelligible in certain aspects - 
would not after all appear as rational if one 
clarified the presuppositions from which the agent 
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proceeds in his context" (24). This observation 
appears to imply reliance on two-directional 
communication - or, at least, it does not dppear to 
preclude the centrality of two-directional 
communication - in the establishment of the form of 
rationality prevalent in a culture, a community or, 
apparently, a person. So far, Habermas seems partial 
to the possibility of alternative standards of 
rationality, and the impression is strengthened by 
his subsequent comments: 
For the interpreter it is not d question of 
hermeneutic charity but a methodological precept that 
he proceed from the presumptive rationality of the 
questionable expression in order, if necessary, to 
assure himself step by step of its irrationality. In 
doing so, only hermeneutic severity in relation to 
his own presuppositions can preserve him from 
exercising criticism without self-criticism and 
falling prey to just the error -- of simply imposing 
the supposedly universal rationality standards of 
one's own culture upon alien cultures. (25) 
Despite these concessions, however, Habermas proceeds 
to distance himself from the apparent conclusion: 
"This methodological position does not at all result 
in a prior decision on alternative standards of 
rationality -- The context-dependence of the criteria 
I by which the members of different cultures at 
different times judge differently the validity of 
expressions does not, however, mean that the ideas of 
truth, normative rightness, of sincerity, of 
107 
authenticity that underlie (only intuitively, to be 
sure) the choice of criteria are context-dependent in 
the same degree" (26) While this point hardly needs 
to be questioned, it must be noted that the opposite 
position - i. e., that the ideas of truth, normative 
rightness, sincerity and authenticity were not 
context-dependent, and, consequently, that 
alternative standards of rationality were unviable - 
does not follow either. 
Hdbermas proceeds to a critique of Winch's (27) 
position on the possibility of genuinely different 
modes of rationality, pointing out that "worldviews 
can be compared with one another not only from the 
quasidesthetic and truth-indifferent standpoints of 
coherence, depth, economy, completeness, and the 
like, but also from the standpoints of cognitive 
adequacy. The adequacy of d linguistically 
articulated worldview is a function of the true 
statements that are possible in this language system" 
(28). 
Habermas, in other words, seems to emphasize the 
importance of external criteria of adequacy here as 
opposed to considerations of internal consistency 
only: language systems, and world-views, must 
be 
capable of being subjected to evaluations of 
their 
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capacity to represent external states of affairs. 
Habermas goes on to construct the sort of counter- 
argument that could be Proffered by proponents of the 
Winchian view: "If we wish to compare standards of 
rationality built into different cultural 
interpretive systems, we ought not to confine 
ourselves to the dimension of science and technology 
suggested by our culture and take as the measure or 
their rationality the extent to which true statements 
and effective techniques are made possible. 
Worldviews are comparable only in respect to their 
potency for conferring meaning. -- They thereby 
structure forms of life that are incommensurable in 
their value. The rationality of forms of life cannot 
be reduced to the cognitive adequacy of the 
worldviews underlying them" (29). 
Habermas counters this by arguing that this cognitive 
adequacy - in other words, "the coherence and the 
truth of the statements possible in them as well as 
the effectiveness of the plans of action dependent on 
them" - is reflected in the practice of managing the 
forms of life based on particular worldviews. This 
statement warrants attention: by stressing the 
relevance of cognitive adequacy in evaluating the 
rationality of worldviews, Habermas quite 
unambiguously links rationallty with the 
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effectiveness of plans of action. But could the 
criteria of effectiveness not vary across cultures? 
Habermas quotes Evans-Pritchard's account of the 
contradictions which Proponents of a certain magical 
worldview are faced with when questioned about their 
beliefs: "-- the Azande themselves experience 
unavoidable absurdities as disagreeable as soon as 
they enter upon a stubborn consistency check such as 
the anthropologist undertakes. But a demand of this 
kind is brought to bear upon them; it does not arise 
within the framework of their own culture; and when 
an anthropologist confronts them with it, they 
generally evade it. But isn't this refusal, this 
higher tolerance for contradiction, a sign of a more 
irrational conduct of life? Must we not call action 
orientations that can be stabilized only at the cost 
of suppressing contradictions irrational? " (30) 
At this point, it begins to appear that this line of 
argument leads to an infinite regress of alternative 
principles of distinguishing between rationality and 
irrationality - principles which seem variably, but 
insurmountably, context-bound. In order to divest the 
notion of rationality of its context-bound 
characteristics, it might be helpful to redefine it 
simply as justification of choices between 
alternative viewpoints or courses of action without 
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any reference to, for example, verbalization or even 
ostensive definitions. In some cultures or 
communities, justification may be purely intuitive: 
the community just knows and declines to explicate 
their knowledge to outsiders. In this case, we are in 
no position to draw any valid conclusions on the 
rationality or irrationality of the world-view of 
that community. 
If that community, however, functions in the long run 
- if it is not a merely temporary aberration - we may 
have to concede that there must be some sort of 
underlying justification-cum-rationality underlying 
its practice of conducting life: that particular form 
of life could not otherwise _qo on. 
If we wished - for 
whatever purposes we may have in mind, strategic or 
otherwise - to show that the worldview prevailing in 
a culture or a community is properly irrational, we 
would, presumably, have to show that the culture or 
cormnunity in question does not, in fact, function; we 
would, in other words, have to question the very 
existence of that culture or community. This can, of 
course, be done; but it remdins doubtful whether we 
would have proved our point as to the rationality or 
irrationality of our object of investigation. 
ill 
Of course, even this minimalist conception of 
rationality may eventually be eroded by the passage 
of time: implicit, intuitive systems of jUStifiCdtion 
may gradually become integrated into more explicit 
"rationality cultures" - as seems to have been the 
case with regard to a considerable number of 
"primitive societies"; but I would maintain that 
developments of this kind do not prove anything about 
the viability or unviability of the notion of 
alternative standards of rationality. 
Moving on, Habermas introduces another potential 
candidate for the status of a universal criterion of 
rationality: following Horton's (31) line of 
argument, he considers the position according to 
which it is possible to evaluate worldviews "by the 
degree to which they hinder or promote cognitive- 
instrumental learning processes" (32). A rational 
worldview is "open"; it permits awareness and 
discussion of alternatives based on the diminished 
sacredness of beliefs. An irrational worldview, 
conversely, is "closed" - i. e., characterized by a 
lack of alternatives, sacredness of beliefs and 
anxiety about threats to them. 
Habermas seems to accept this criterion quite 
explicitlY: "This dimension of 'closed' versus 'open' 
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seems to provide a context-independent standard for 
the rationality of worldviews" (33). He qualifies 
this immediately by conceding that "the point of 
reference is again modern science" (34)) with its 
Western-instrumental trappings - but, some way later, 
seems to associate this modern, or scientific, 
v: Lewpo: int with a universal rationality. Consider the 
following passage: 
In fact, however, the structures of worldviews 
determine a life-practice that is by no means 
exhasuted in cognitive-instrumental interaction with 
external reality. Rather, worldviews are constitutive 
across the whole breadth of processes of 
understanding and socialization, in which 
participants relate as much to the orders of their 
common social worlds as to happenings in the one 
objective world. If mythical thought does not yet 
permit. a categorial separation between cognitive- 
instrumental, moral-practical, and expressive 
relations to the world, if the expressions of the 
Azande are for us full of ambiguities, this is a sign 
that the 'closedness' of their animistic worldview 
cannot be described solely in terms of attitudes 
toward the objective world; nor can the modern 
understanding of the world be described solely in 
terms of formal properties of the scientific 
mentality. (35) 
Despite the final reservation, Habermas seems to 
support here the argument that the modern, scientific 
worldview does represent a more rational attitude 
than does, say, the Zande culture. The aim of this 
argument, Habermas states, is "not to upset the 
universalist Position but to Provide it with a more 
subtle defense" (36); even more unambiguously, he 
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goes on to declare that "(s)cientific rationality 
belongs to a complex of cognitive-instrumental 
rationality that can certainly claim validity beyond 
the context of Particular cultures to (37 - my italics 
this time). 
Habermas concludes his discussion of the possibility 
of alternative standards of rationality by arguing 
that "Winch's arguments are too weak to -uphold the 
thesis that inherent to every linguistically 
articulated worldview and to every cultural form of 
life there is an incommensurable concept of 
rationality; but his strategy of argumentation is 
strong enough to set off the justified claim to 
universality on behalf of the rationality that gained 
expression in the modern understanding of the world 
from an uncritical self-interpretation of the modern 
world that is fixated on knowing and mastering 
external nature" (38). While it must be said that 
Habermas is again more ambiguous here than in his 
previous assertion - if Winch's arguments are "strong 
enough to set off" the claim to a universal 
rationality, how can this claim still be "justified"? 
- it still seems reasonable to conclude 
that, despite 
his reservations, Habermas ends up supporting the 
notion of universal criteria of rationality. 
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The position HdberMds defends here must, however, be 
compared with the views on the possibility of valid 
interpretations which he supports elsewhere. If we 
believe that there are universal criteria of 
rationality, this belief apparently underlieS. our 
dealings with others - and presumably, insofar as it 
is relevant to the issues at hand in each episode of 
communicative interaction, invests us with a 
strategic interest which at least potentially directs 
our choice between modes of interaction: after all, 
it was pointed out above that the presence of a 
strategic interest was compatible with the choice of 
the one-directiondl mode of communication. 
It seems therefore paradoxical that Habermas should 
in another section of "Theory of Communicative 
Action" emphasize the principle that two-directional 
communication is necessary for the understanding of 
mean: ing. 
-- the interpreter cannot become clear about the 
semantic content of an expression independently of 
the action contexts in which participants react to 
the expression in question with a "yes" or d "no" or 
an dbstention. And he does not understand these 
yes/no positions if he Cannot make clear to himself 
the implicit reasons that move the participants to 
take the positions they do. For agreement and 
disagreement, insofar as they are judged in the light 
of reciprocally raised validity claims and not merely 
caused by external factors, are based on reasons that 
participants supposedly or actually have at their 
disposal. -- But if, in order to understand an 
expression, the interpreter must bring to mind the 
reLSons with which the speaker would if necessary 
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and under suitable conditions defend its validity, he 
is himself drawn into the process of assessing 
validity claims. For reasons are of such a nature 
that they cannot be described in the attitude of a 
third person, that is, without reactions of 
affirmation or negation or abstention. (39) 
Thus Habermas takes a clear stand in relation to the 
production of valid interpretations: the interpreter 
is necessarily drawn into the process of evaluating 
the validity of justifications; and, if this is not 
possible in the attitude of a third person - which 
would, presumably, entail the choice of a one- 
directional mode of communication - the interpreter 
must adopt a two-directional, non-strategic mode of 
communication. This, however, appears impossible if 
the interpreter wishes to maintain the view that 
genuinely alternative standards of rationality are 
not viable - with the proviso that the interpreter 
regards himself as functioning within the 
universalist rationality the notion of which he 
accepts. 
Habermas points out quite cogently that "the method 
of interpretive understanding places the usual type 
of objectivity of knowledge in question, because the 
interpreter, though without aims of action of his 
own, has to become involved in participating in 
communicative action and finds himself confronted 
with the validity claims arising in the object domain 
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itself. -- The interpreter could neutralize the 
latter only at the cost of assuming the objectivating 
status of an observer; but from that standpoint 
internal interrelations of meaning are entirely 
inaccessible" (40). 
Here, Habermas's views are perfectly congruent with 
the notion of consensual agreement as the basis of 
legitimate interpretations. He does not leave much 
room for doubt about this: "(A)n interpreter who 
participates virtually, without his own aims of 
action, can descriptively grasp the meaning of the 
actual course of a process of reaching understanding 
only under the presupposition that he judges the 
agreement and disagreement, the validity claims and 
potential reasons with which he is confronted, on a 
common basis shared in principle by him and those 
immediately involved" (41). 
I would maintain that the two positions of Habermas's 
which I have attempted to outline above - i. e., the 
notions of universal criteria of rationality on the 
one hand, and of agreement based on participation and 
two-directional interaction on the other - are 
ultimately incompatible. It seems that Habermas wants 
to fend off the notion of fully-fledged relativism by 
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means of his theory of the universality of 
rationality. but, at least on the strength of the 
arguments I have reviewed here, he cannot have it 
both ways: the adoption of a two-way, consensus- 
oriented mode of communication precludes - or renders 
irrelevant - the notion of any a priori universal 
criteria within that particular episode of 
interaction. I must conclude that Habermas has failed 
to present a solution to this problem. 
5. Communication, context and convention: Habermas 
and Coulter 
The notions of context and convention - i. e. the 
background convictions in which communicative 
interaction and action in general are necessarily 
embedded - must also be addressed here. Habermas uses 
the concept of Lebenswelt, or lifeworld, "as the 
correlate of processes of reaching understanding" 
(42). 
Subjects acting communicatively always come to an 
understanding in the horizon of a lifeworld. Their* 
lifeworld is formed from more or less diffuse, always 
unproblematic, background convictions. This lifeworld 
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background serves as a source of situation 
definitions that are presupposed by participants as 
unproblemdtic. (43) 
But, if our lifeworld is formed from "more or less 
diffuse, always unproblematic, background 
convictions', what is its epistemological status? In 
order to clarify this problem, I wish to make use of 
Coulter's (44) treatment of the notions of context 
and convention. While I do not intend to equate 
Habermas with Coulter, the issues concerned are 
closely related. 
In general terms, Coulter presents a cogent analysis 
of the communicative construction of what have 
traditionally been regarded as mental contents, such 
as thoughts, emotions, and memory. In places, 
however, it appears that certain concepts still 
retain an objective status of some sort - or, rather, 
that the wheel has turned a full circle, and some 
entities which were previously recognsized as 
socially constructed have once more assumed an 
objective, or external, status. The main culprits in 
Coulter's case are the notions of context and 
convention. 
For the purposes of the present argument, it seems 
reasonable to build on the basic Wittgensteinian 
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postulate that our actions - including speech-acts - 
only have meaning in the context in which they are 
performed (45); no action may be identified without 
reference to the circumstances within which it takes 
place. Further, it seems equally reasonable to asswfie 
that the context without which a particular action 
would be meaningless is a creation of the 
participants in the communicative interaction : in 
question. Whatever the physical-material 
circumstances present, they only become a context 
when construed as such by the participants - or, to 
emphasize the epistemological criterion, the context 
cannot become known by the participants unless, and 
until, it has been established through a process of 
negotiation and agreement. 
principle, but certain 
Coulter seems to agree in 
passages in his text are 
ambiguous: 
-- when I observe someone's conduct, I do so in 
context, and it is both his conduct and the context 
in which it is performed that enable me to say of him 
that he as such-and-such and intention or that he has 
understood what has been said or agreed about, etc. 
(46) 
But whose context are we dealing with here? While it 
is no doubt true that both a person's conduct and the 
context within which it is performed play a part in 
our making sense of his intention, the communicative 
link between ourselves and the person in question is 
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easily overlooked. Our context - i. e. our 
interpretation of what is relevant in the situation, 
and what its various aspects mean - may be quite 
different from that of the person in question, and 
the most straightforward method of finding out about 
the degree of congruence or incongruence between 
contexts is surely to do with engaging in some sort 
of verbal interaction with him. If this method of 
validation is neglected, our interpretation of the 
current context remains unchallenged, and the spectre 
of objectivism looms on the horizon once more. 
Another example of Coulter's ambivalent position 
deserves mention: 
-- notice that we will often find that someone's 
claims about the way the world appears to him can 
tell us something about himself rather than the world 
in cases where the report of the appearance is 
totally unacceptable in terms of group culture and 
its interpretive procedures. For instance, if you 
were to tell me that the ordinary scene we have both 
observed outside your window now appears to you like 
a nightmare from one of Dali's surrealist paintings, 
this would tell me something about you: viz: that you 
are hallucinating, or joking, lying, the victim of an 
illusion, etc. Your scene from the window could not 
have appeared to anyone like that, so there is 
something wrong with you or the circumstances of your 
looking. (47) 
There is "something wrong", however, only if I 
terminate the dialogue at this point, keep my 
conclusions to mYself and choose not to attempt to 
find out what you mean. Obviously, the fact that my 
121 
perception - or interp retation, which seems the more 
appropriate term here - of the scene from the window 
is different from Yours makes me wonder what sort of 
reasons prompted Your idiosyncratic view, i. e., what 
your context was; but the obvious, and 
epistemologically sound, course of action for the 
"me" would be to continue the interaction in order to 
find out why there was such a discrepancy between our 
reports - to give you an opportunity to provide a 
context for your statement. 
To recapitulate: even though it is the context of our 
actions that provides them with their meaning, this 
context is itself a construction dependent for its 
existence on whoever is involved in its validation. 
It may be "frozen" in order to promote d pragmatic 
plan of action, but mistaking such a freeze-frame for 
an autonomous, objective factor would certainly give 
rise to further epistemological confusion. 
The notion of convention is eqUdllY susceptible to 
this kind of "second-generation" objectivism. Coulter 
points out - quite rightly - that, in our practical 
affairs, we do not negotiate the precise meaning of 
each word, gesture or act that we use while 
interacting with other members of our community. In 
Coulter's formulation, 
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-- in most ordinary communicative situations, the 
sense of what I say (and do) is determinable quite 
independently of any of my possible intentions in 
saying it; if it were not, communicative interaction 
could not proceed in the orderly way it usually does, 
since we would continually ne ascribing and/or 
avowing our communicative intentions in order to make 
elementary sense of another's words or speech acts to 
ensure that he has grasped the sense of ours. But how 
could the words with which the communicative 
intentions are articulated themselves be understood 
without still further intention-determinations, etc. 
per impossibile? It seems necessary to postulate 
conventions as the bases for our mutual understanding 
of talk and action. (48) 
Coulter seems right insofar as the very language we 
use in our interactions is itself a convention. When 
we use language, we take the meaning of most of our 
expressions for granted; we simply assume that the 
other person shares with us the same system of 
meanings. This may not be sensibly contested. But 
even so, it should be noted that conventions are not 
givens; they, too, are essentially a product of the 
communicative interactions of people who have come to 
believe that they share at least roughly the same 
system of meanings. The nature of conventions is thus 
dynamic, not static, as Coulter seems to come close 
to implying: "Even on those occasions where we 
(intelligibly) intend to mean one thing rather than 
another, we are still relying on conventional meaning 
that is independent of our intention on that occasion 
(unless what we are doing is giving the word or 
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phrase a special meaning for that occasion). " (49) In 
other words, we rely on a conventional meaning that 
is independent of our intention unless, or until, we 
choose to do otherwise - which seems to take us back 
to where we started. (50) 
It would be difficult to dispute the validity of 
Coulter's claim that for practical interaction to be 
possible for us in the first place, we must rely on 
conventional meanings; but it is important to 
recognize that this statement only makes sense in 
terms of a vague notion of probability - it does not 
tell us anything about particular instances of 
meaning something by an expression. If we choose to 
point out that we have relied on a conventional 
meaning in our use of a particular concept, that 
concept will be brought under scrutiny and potential 
re-evaluation which would undermine the conventional 
use of that concept. 
Convention and regeneration of meanings are in 
constant interplay in communicative interaction. 
Members of communities grow up into a world of for- 
grantedness, i. e. a system of conventional meanings 
and ways of rendering sense experience intelligible. 
The issue at moot here is, however, the point at 
which conventions become questioned and liable to 
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change, as members of the community in question 
become capable of reflecting upon the origins of 
particular concepts, rules, or implicit meanings, and 
of subjecting them to re-evaluation through 
communicative interaction. The revised concept rflaY 
then gradually recede into the realm of convention 
and become an aspect of the unquestioned conceptual 
landscape, or lifeworld, until its relevance is 
questioned once more. For most of the time, the 
majority of the concepts through which reality is 
structured will remain "for granted" - but, as 
disgruntled opinions as to their relevance in the 
current situation are voiced by a sufficient number 
of members with sufficient vigour, they face eventual 
re-evaluation. 
125 
6. Conclusions 
When entering a process of interaction we necessarily 
do so from the bdSiS Of our more or less explicit or 
implicit, and more or less consIstent or 
inconsistent, assumptions on acceptable criteria of 
the validity of propositions and arguments. Insofar 
as we enter the process of interaction in an 
investigative purpose - that is, with a view to the 
production of psychological knowledge - we obviously 
have a partiCUldr interest in mind; but insofar as 
we, as investigators, start from the premise that the 
knowledge we are about to produce will only be valid 
if it is based on two-directiondl interaction, I 
venture that this interest does not as such 
systematically distort the process of interaction at 
hand. 
The other participants in the investigative 
interaction must, presumably, proceed from their 
respective background assumptions as to acceptable 
criteria of justification of validity claims. Our 
initial assumptions regarding the characteristics of 
their criteria may turn out to be anything between 
precisely correct and completely mistaken; the same 
observation applies to their initial assumptions 
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regarding our criteria. If no agreement on an 
acceptable interpretation of the conduct under 
investigation is reached, no knowledge is produced, 
and no epistemologically valid conclusions on the 
rationality or irrationality of the motive force--B 
underlying the conduct of the other participants may 
be drawn. 
If, on the other hand, an agreement is reached, it 
must be assumed that an agreement on an acceptable 
interpretation of an item of conduct presupposes an 
agreement on the criteria of justification underlying 
the specific agreement in question. While it may be 
that the agreement'on the criteria of justification 
is based on the criteria originally entertained by 
the investigators, it is equally possible that it may 
be based on the criteria originally entertained by 
the other participants in the investigation - or on 
any combination of the original two sets of criteria, 
or of the original sets of criteria complemented by 
criteria that are new to both groups of participants, 
and so on. While Habermas seems to be right insofar 
as he emphasizes the necessity of agreement on 
criteria of justification as a prerequisite of 
legitimate knowledge of them - an agreement between a 
particular configuration of participants and 
investigative set-ups may, theoretically, be extended 
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to encompass all Possible configurations - it does 
not seem to follow that the type of rationality 
constructed in the Process of negotiation and 
agreement in a Particular-but-infinitely-extensible 
context could be described in te rms, C, f 
particularistic or substantive criteria of 
justification. 
It is questionable how the exact form and content of 
such a universal rationality could be consistently 
predicted or anticipated in an epistemologically 
relevant manner; after all, if we had constructed a 
potential model for such a universal rationality, we 
would, presumably, have to introduce it into some 
process of communicative interaction in order to 
establish its universal validity - which, in turn, 
would entail the adoption of the two-directional mode 
of interaction and the abandonment of the claim to 
universality for our rationality. We may sensibly 
suggest that our model of rationality be accepted as 
the model prevalent in the present process of 
interaction and present those arguments we manage to 
muster in support of this suggestion but, even in the 
case of eventual agreement on a version acceptable by 
the current participants, it would be difficult for 
us to justify a claim to the effect that the current 
agreement would contribute to the establishment of 
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the present version as universal in any logically 
binding sense. 
Even if in the end all imaginable communities will 
have reached an agreement on a common set of criteria 
of justification - i. e., a common rationality - the 
features of such an agreement may not be determined a 
priori. While it is necessarily true, and 
tautological, that an infinitely extended agreement 
will finally produce a universal rationality, the 
particular characteristics of that rationality are 
established in the course of the negotiation which in 
the end results in agreement and in which we will 
have to participate with those assumptions and 
beliefs we may entertain; and whether or not we 
consider our initial assumptions and beliefs as 
universally valid is neither here or there. If the 
validity of our (supposedly universalist) concept of 
rationality will in any case be determined in the 
course of two-directional interaction with a view to 
consensus, the notion of universality seems more or 
less superfluous. Habermas fails to accommodate and, 
indeed, address this issue which seems essential for 
the implications of his general position. 
If it is accepted that reality is present for 
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subjects situated in networks of communicative 
interaction in the form of propositions and if it is 
similarly accepted that the production of knowledge 
takes place through communicative interaction, it 
would seem to follow that the consensus theory of 
truth is - at least in general terms - superior to 
any version of the correspondence theory. The 
problem with Habermas's description of the consensus 
theory lies with his concept of the ideal speech 
situation and his definition of communicative 
competence which are, ultimately, left without 
epistemological justification. 
In the final analysis, then, a consensus is a 
consensus, and an agreement is an agreement 
regardless of the characteristics of the interaction 
between the participants. If counter-arguments are no 
longer forthcoming from the participants, the 
agreement is legitimate and valid - and, conversely, 
if the agreement is legitimate and valid, counter- 
arguments are no longer forthcoming. At this point, 
the central issue is the decision among the 
participants to subject their agreement to criticism 
from outside their current network or community - 
i. e., to extend the current network of interaction, 
which would open the agreement to argumentation once 
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more. If we are outside that network of interaction, 
the agreement is not our agreement, and we have no 
particular reason - or Possibility, for that matter - 
to endorse it. We may wish to emphasize the 
importance of Particular criteria of legitimate 
agreements and, perhaps, apply particular criteria of 
communicative competence to the participants, but 
such criteria bear no relevance to the network of 
interaction in question as long as we remain 
outsiders. 
All agreements are necessarily local. Some agreements 
may be valid across various localities. When local 
agreements are entered into a process of validation 
with other local agreements and if a common agreement 
is again reached, the degree of universality of the 
agreements involved is increased. This may include 
variations of revision and compromise from simple 
observation of agreement between agreements to the 
abandonment in toto of one or another of the 
agreements by its original signatories and the 
adoption of the competing one, or of an altogether 
new one. If no agreement is reached and negotiations 
are discontinued, the agreement remains local, and 
valid in the local context as long as no counter- 
arguments are brought forward. 
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As long as no communicative interaction between 
different localities takes place, statements 
pertaining to the validity of an agreement currently 
in force in another locality are valid only in the 
context of the locality in which such statements are 
expressed. While Habermas's basic position on 
consensual agreement as the criterion of valid 
interpretations is sound, his attempts to qualify 
this principle by introducing "context-independent 
criteria remain ultimately irrelevant. 
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autonomous entities which evolve according to some 
objective laws of their own. See, for instance, 
McGinn (1984, P. 119): "One's use of language is 
habitual, unreflective, taken for granted; it is not 
a perpetual guessing game in which hypotheses about 
correctness of use are constantly reviewed and 
selected. " While this is quite obviously true in 
everyday life of most people, the point surely is 
that this is an empirical statement, not an 
epistemological one. If we accept the Saussurean view 
that signs are basically arbitrary - i. e. not 
determined by the object with which the sign is 
associated - it would seem to follow that people are 
in principle capable of questioning the meaning Of d 
concept and thus of reflecting on an item of language 
when they feel it no longer serves the purpose it was 
once assumed to serve. Questioning the meanings of 
words and concepts is certainly a crucial part in 
claiming territory from what has been called the 
unconscious; conventions such as language should not 
be afforded more independence from communicative 
interaction than is the case in each interactive 
situation. 
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Chapter Five 
THE NOTION OF UNCONSCIOUS MOTIVE FORCES AND 
COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTION: A CRITIQUE OF GRUNBAUM 
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1. Introduction 
Since the advent of Freud's "The Interpretation of 
Dreams" (NOTE 1), the juxtaposition of unconscious 
and conscious motive forces has been a widely 
employed device for making sense of people's conduct. 
While this distinction has on many occasions 
undoubtedly provided an instructive paradigm for 
psychological investigations and therapeutic 
interventions, the epistemologi-cal problems involved 
are considerable: if the production of psychological 
knowledge is considered in terms of communicative 
interaction between the participants in the 
investigation, the status of "the unconscious" seems 
to warrant particular attention - especially the 
epistemological criteria employed in justifying 
interpretations of particular instances of conduct. 
While it may be argued that it is not the primary aim 
of the therapeutic encounter to generate empirical 
knowledge, I would still suggest that it is useful to 
consider the psycho-analytic situation in terms of 
warranting general psychological propositions. After 
all, there is - presumably -a theory underlying 
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psycho-analytic interpretations, and it seems 
reasonable to expect that there is at least some 
interplay between that theory and the interpretations 
constructed in the course of a sequence of 
therapeutic sessions. 
The notion of unconscious motive forces would seem to 
constitute a serious counter-argument to my initial 
thesis according to which agreement between the 
investigator and the person whose conduct is being 
investigated is the basic epistemological criterion 
of a valid interpretation. In this chapter, I will 
try to show that the epistemological credentials of 
the notion of the unconscious are ultimately 
insuf f icient - 
Freud described the unconscious in various ways at 
different points of his career. For the present 
purposes, and to obtain an illustration of the 
concepts involved, I choose a passage from his later 
work - namely, the 1925 paper "Inhibitions, symptoms 
and anxiety": 
If the ego succeeds in protecting itself from a 
dangerous instinctual impulse, through, for instance, 
the process of repression, it has certainly inhibited 
and damaged the particular part of the id concerned; 
but it has at the same time given it some 
independence and has renounced some of its own 
sovereignty. This is inevitable from the nature of 
repression, which is, fundamentally, an attempt at 
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flight. The repressed is now, as it were, an outlaw; it is excluded from the great organization of the ego and is subject only to the laws which govern the 
realm of the unconscious. If, now, the danger- 
situation changes so that the ego has no reason for fending off a new instinctual impulse analogous to the repressed one, the consequence of the restriction 
of the ego which has taken place will become 
manifest. The new impulse will run its course, under 
an automatic influence - or, as I should prefer to 
say, under the influence of the compulsion to repeat. It will follow the same path as the earlier, 
repressed impulse, as though the danger-situation 
that had been overcome still existed. The fixating 
factor in repression, then, is the unconscious id's 
compulsion to repeat -a compulsion which in normal 
circumstances is only done away with by the freely 
mobile function of the ego. The ego may occasionally 
manage to break down the barriers of repression which 
it has itself put up and to recover its influence 
over the instinctual impulse and direct the course of 
the new impulse in accordance with the changed 
danger-situation. But in point of fact the ego very 
seldom succeeds in doing this: it cannot undo its 
repressions. (2) 
My treatment of the epistemological status of the 
unconscious will be in two parts: first, I will 
examine the proposition - which follows directly from 
MY basic argument - that the fundamental 
epistemological criterion of the validity of 
ascriptions of the origins of a Particular instance 
of conduct to unconscious motive forces is agreement 
between the participants in the investigation; 
second, I will re-evaluate the epistemological status 
of the unconscious in relation to the criterion of 
agreement. 
agreement 
I will argue that if - as I try to show - 
investigation 
between the 
is indeed the 
participants in an 
only epistemologically 
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valid criterion of verification or falsification of 
interpretations involving unconscious motive forces, 
the notion of the unconscious as a basis of 
psychological knowledge is made redundant. 
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2. Agreement and the unconscious: GrUnbaum's critique 
of Habermas 
I will begin by examining GrUnbaum's (3) critique of 
Habermas's (4) advocacy of agreement between the 
investigator and the person whose conduct is being 
investigated as the basic criterion of the validity 
of psychoanalytic postulates, or, in Habermas's 
terms, "general interpretations". Habermas states his 
position as follows: 
Whereas in other areas theories contain statements 
about an object domain to which they remain external 
as statemens, the validity of general interpretations 
dependes directly on statements about the object 
domain being applied by the 'objects', that is the 
persons concerned, to themselves. -- Analytic 
insights possess validity for the analyst only after 
they have been accepted as knowledge by the andlysand 
himself. For the empirical accuracy of general 
interpretations depends not on controlled observation 
and subsequent communication among investigators but 
rather on the accomplishment of self-reflection and 
subsequent communication between the investigator and 
his 'object'. (5) 
Habermas goes on: "interpretive suggestions -- can be 
verified in fact only if the patient adopts them and 
tells his own story with their aid" (6) and points 
out that "(o)nly the Patient's recollection decides 
the accuracy of the construction. If it applies, then 
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it must also 'restore' to the patient a Portion of 
lost life history: that it must be able to elicit a 
self -reflection" (7) . 
GrUnbaum (8) offers a detailed critique of what he 
calls Habermas's emphasis of "Patient assent" as the 
ultimate epistemic arbiter of the validity of 
Psychoanalytic interpretations. "Upon looking at the 
original of Freud's text", writes GrUnbaum (9), "we 
find him emphasizing that, more often than not, the 
cognitive role of the analysand's memory is anything 
but the one depicted by Habermas. For imnediately 
after saying that the analyst's construction 'ought' 
to elicit the patient's corroborative recall, Freud 
declares soberingly: 
-- but it does not always lead so far. Quite often we 
do not succeed in bringing the patient to recollect 
what has been repressed. Instead of that, if the 
analysis is carried out correctly, we produce in him 
an assured conviction of the truth of the 
construction which achieves the same therapeutic 
result as a recaptured memory. (S. E. 1937,23: 265- 
266). " 
GrUnbaum is decidedly unhappy with the notion of 
"patient assent" and calls upon Freud for support: 
Freud claims in effect that 'quite often' there is an 
epistemic asymmetry between the doctor and the 
analysand that is the precise converse of the one 
affirmed by Habermas. For, as Freud reports, quite 
often the patient's memory simply fails to supply 
information vital to the psychoanalytic 
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reconstruction of the Pathogenically relevant Part of his early life history. Then, in lieu of 'a 
recaptured memory' furnished by the Patient, the 
analyst convinces the patient of 'the truth of the 
construction', a conviction therapeutically 
equivalent of the retrieval of a pertinent memory. 
(10) 
I will return to the epistemological implications of 
this view below - but let us first consider the 
principal arguments by means of which GrUnbaum 
objects to Habermas's thesis. Paraphrasing Freud's 
original, he argues that the patient cannot be relied 
upon for verification of an interpretation precisely 
because he (the patient) is unable to recall the 
unpleasant themes which he has repressed into "the 
unconscious": "The patient cannot remember the whole 
of what is repressed in him, and what he cannot 
remember may be precisely the essential part of it. 
Thus he acquires no sense of conviction of the 
correctness of the construction that has been 
communicated to him. " (11) 
"As Hdbermas would have it", GrUnbaum continues, "the 
patient's memory invariably affords him/her 
privileged and hence indispensable cognitive access 
vis-a-vis his/her analyst to the determination of the 
validity of the explanatory psychoanalytic 
interpretations. In effect, Freud rejects this 
epistemic asymmetry as utopian, if only because 
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actual clinical experience with the mnemon: lc 
performance of numerous patients prompted him to give 
cognitive pride of place to the inferences drawn by 
the analyst from the totality of the patient's 
productions. " (12) 
GrUnbaum completes his presentation of Freud's 
position: "In some of his case histories, he also 
offered theoretical reasons for making the doctor the 
ultimate epistemic arbiter, rather than the 
analysand. For example, in a paper on the therapeutic 
fiasco in his treatment of a young lesbian (S. E. 
1920,18: 147-172), Freud expressed full confidence 
in his own etiologic reconstruction of her sexual 
object choice. Yet he pointed out that she completely 
rejected his interpretive insights, and he attributed 
the rejection to her desire to punish him as a father 
surrogate by clinging to her neurosis" (13). GrUnbaum 
concludes that "-- such reliance on the analyst's 
inference is necessary because -- the patient's poor 
mnemonic performance can readily fail to supply the 
information vital to the reconstruction of his 
pathogenically crucial past. Thus, if the confluence 
marshaled by Freud does have probative cogency, while 
the patient's 'Yes' or 'no' may be discounted, then 
there is good reason for according cognitive primacy 
to the analyst's inference over the patient's 'self- 
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reflection'. And just such an epistemic elevation of 
the analyst's inference as the ultimate epIstemic 
arbiter of a psychoanalytic construction is both the 
logical import and explicit tenor of Freud's entire 
paper. Hence, its conclusion obviously gainSaye 
Habermas's bald, peremptory, though repeated, 
assertion that 'the patient himself is the final 
authority It (14) 
Judging by the quotes summoned by GrUnbaum - and by 
his own arguments - Freud appears to have quite 
explicitly rejected the notion of consensus as a 
criterion of psychological knowledge (as far as 
psychoanalytic interpretations may be regarded as 
representative examples of psychological knowledge). 
While we are not in a position to assess the quality 
of an agreement from outside of a network of 
interaction, GrUnbaum saves us the trouble by stating 
Freud's principles in terms which leave little doubt 
as to his preferred mode of interaction in relation 
to the person whose conduct is under investigation: 
"the analyst convinces the patient of the truth of 
the construction" (15). It is the analyst who 
convinces the other of the truth of the 
interpretation: the one-directional mode of 
interaction can hardly be outlined more 
unambiguously. There is apparently a "correct 
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interpretation" independent of the vicissitudes of 
the communicative network at hand, and one of the 
participants "convinces" the other of the validity of 
this interpretation. If the other has not been 
convinced within a given Period of time and effort, 
the interaction is discontinued without an agreement 
at least with reference to this particular 
interpretation - but the "truth" which the 
investigator has already inferred remains valid. The 
other's rejection of the current interpretation 
becomes assimilated into the interpretation itself: 
"he attributed the rejection to her desire fo punish 
him as a father surrogate by clinging to her 
neurosis" (16). 
In terms of communicative interaction, the above 
example may be regarded as a case of frustrated 
negotiations which end up in a return to one- 
directional communication between the investigator 
and the person whose conduct is being investigated. 
Freud abandons the original network of interaction - 
himself and the patient - and turns to another one - 
the audience of his subsequent account, including 
ourselves. His attempts to "convince" the patient of 
the validity of his interpretation have failed; now 
he attempts to convince us of the justification of 
the failure and of the validity of the 
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interpretation. While we may become convinced - and 
many have - it is incumbent on us to be aware of the 
fact that the interpretation will be valid, and 
counted as knowledge, only wi thin this network of 
interaction; the Patient - the original "other" - is 
explicitly excluded. 
3. Hdbermds and GrUnbdum. in terms of communicative 
interaction 
At this showing, Habermas's epistemological position 
seems more solid than GrUnbaum's defence of Freud's 
original thesis. Whereas Habermas relies on agreement 
based on two-directional interaction, GrUnbaum 
purports to establish the patient's meaning by means 
of one-directional communication - which, given the 
postulates I have adumbrated in previous sections, 
seems logically contradictory. 
GrUnbaum still owes Habermas an account of what 
finally constitutes the criteria of the acceptability 
of Psychoanalytic interpretations. Let us give him 
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the opportunity: If-- note that Habermas tacitly 
banished all extraclinical testing of general 
psychoanalytic hypotheses from consideration", he 
urges us (17). "For he simply took it for granted 
that the treatment setting is the sole arena for any 
and all validation of disconfirmation of these 
universal propositions. Just for argument's sake, let 
me assurne that if one were to conf ine all testing to 
the clinical investigations carried out by the 
doctor-patient dyad, then the analyst can confirm an 
interpretation only on the authority of his patient's 
prior certification of its validity. Even then, it 
would hardly follow that the clinical setting is the 
principal arena for the well-designed testing of 
general psychoanalytic hypotheses, let alone the sole 
arena. But if extraclinical tests of at least some of 
these hypotheses are feasible, as indeed they are, 
then patients in analysis surely do not have the 
cognitive monopoly that Habermas conferred on them. " 
(18) By "extraclinical" testing of hypotheses 
GrUnbaum, presumably, refers to reliance on evidence 
obtained from outside the context of communicative 
interaction constituted by the client and the 
therapist. 
GrUnbaum, elaborates: "Freud -- Placed very much 
greater epIstemic reliance on patient responses other 
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than verbal assent or dissent as 'indirect 
confirmations' or disconfirmations of analytic 
constructions. For after concluding that 'the direct 
utterances of the patient after he has been offered a 
construction afford very little evidence upon the 
question whether we have been right or wrong', Freud 
declares that 'it is of all the greater interest that 
there are indirect forms of confirmation which are Jn 
every respect trustworthy'" (19 - my italics). "It is 
patent", he goes on, "that Freud appealed to a 
consilience of inductions from other clinical data to 
assess the probative value of the patient's 
acceptance or rejection of his analyst's 
interpretations. In particular, he invoked the 
patient's neurotic resistance to discount the 
latter's dissent only when the analyst had what he 
took to be consilient support that the interpretation 
was nonetheless true. " (20 - GrUnbaum's italics. ) 
GrUnbaum concludes: flit would seem that the 
validation of Freud's cardinal hypotheses has to 
come, if at all, mainly from well-designed 
extraclinical studies, either epidemiologic or even 
experimental" (21). In other words, support for the 
cardinal hypotheses of the theory of unconscious 
motive forces must be sought from outside the network 
of interaction at hand - which, it seems, means 
that 
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the mode of interaction involved is one-directional, 
the investigator chooses to refrain from conveying 
his assumptions to the other person, the other 
person's meanings remain hypothetical, and the 
resulting interpretation is epistemologically 
illegitimate. GrUnbaum fails to note that any "other 
modes" capable of discrediting or verifying 
interpretations are available to the interactive 
situation only as propositions the validity of which 
must, in a communicative context, be argued for 
within a context of communicative interaction which 
either includes or excludes the person whose conduct 
is being studied. "Extra-clinical" evidence has no - 
and cannot have any - automatic authority. Such 
evidence may only serve as an argument in the 
negotiation of a relevant interpretation; but, as 
GrUnbaum asserts that the patient is incapable of 
participating in two-directional interaction by 
definition, no objection is really relevant. 
GrUnbaum completes his case against agreement-as- 
criterion by asserting that even though external 
criteria were introduced into the interaction as 
arguments by means of which an agreement could 
potentially be achieved, this would still be 
impertinent to the validation or falsification of the 
interpretation. GrUnbaum quotes Eagle (22): "If self- 
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interest (including self-esteem) is sufficiently 
involved and if A's capacity and willingness for 
self-confrontation are limited, A may never be able 
to acknowledge the motive attributed to him - even 
when his attention is called to the same things that. 
led the outside observer to make his judgment. " 
"Accordingly", GrUnbaum goes on, "sometimes analysts 
do take the patient's denial but subsequent 
acceptance of some painful motivational imputation to 
bespeak his achievement of new insight and emotional 
maturation. But -- if, after the dnalysand's initial 
denial., it is ever legitimate for the therapist to 
ascribe such cognitive gain and increased self- 
mastery to the analysand, then this judgment cannot 
itself first derive its warrant from the patient's 
self-confrontational assent. Instead, the doctor's 
verdict as to his client's attainment of new bond 
fide insight is predicated on a criterion of validity 
for interpretations that can authenticate an 
interpretation as genuine (rather than fancied) 
insight independently of the patient's assent. " 
(23 - GrUnbaum's italics. ) 
Let us consider the above passage - both GrUnbaum's 
own position and his paraphrase of Eagle's - in terms 
of communicative interaction between participants in 
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a psychological investigation. 
Plausibly enough, given the basic assumptions 
underlying psychoanalytic theory, "the tendency of 
people to disown unflattering motives and to avow 
flattering ones" is used as an argument against the 
trustworthiness of patient assent as a criterion of 
the validity of an interpretation. The problem, 
however, is a more fundamental one: how does the 
investigator justify his reliance on one-directional 
communication as a trustworthy method of providing 
insight into the patient's meanings? The distinction 
between "flattering" and "unflattering" motives, for 
examp 1e is far from self-evident; it is clear that 
what the investigator regards as flattering or 
unflattering may not carry the same meaning for the 
patient. If it is accepted, as seems reasonable by 
now, that the psychological significance of an event 
is determined by the meanings the person in question 
associates with it, and if it is acknowledged that 
meanings cannot sensibly be ascribed from outside - 
i. e., by means of one-directional communication - we 
must infer that GrUnbaum's (and Eagle's) argument is 
quite seriously inconsistent. 
GrUnbaum's skepticism of the Patient's credentials as 
regards fully fledged partnership in two-directional 
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interaction is prohibitive: "one can expect the 
patient to deny his doctor's imputation of 
unconscious motives irrespective of the evidence of 
them" (24) - unless, of course, "the defenses against 
their recognition have been successfully overcome" 
(25). The patient, in other words, is unable to 
respond to the arguments presented by the 
investigator - which makes it impossible to relate to 
him in terms of two-directional interaction and 
potential agreement on a relevant interpretation. The 
patient is thus not a relevant participant in an 
agreement on an interpretation of his motives by 
definition - "even when his attention is called to 
the same things that led the outside observer to make 
his judgment" (26). 
This assertion is of particular interest for our 
purposes: if the external evidence influencing the 
investigator's interpretation were introduced into 
the interaction as arguments in the negotiation, the 
other participant "may never be able to acknowledge 
the motive attributed to him" because. no doubt, of 
his resistance to the exposition of his repressed 
experiences - Q. E. D.: as the other person's assent or 
denial is. or at least may be, influenced by his 
resistance to the "correct" interpretation, there is 
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no po: int in engaging in two-directional interaction 
with him. 
GrUnbaum seems to accept this circular view as an 
argument for the exclusion of the patient, or the 
other person, from two-directional interaction - and 
from the status of a subject - by definition. This 
conclusion leaves the other person no legitimate 
possibility of participation in the interaction 
through which psychological knowledge is produced; 
the resulting "findings' '.. after all, are independent 
of the views of the person whose conduct is being 
investigated. 
Someone, presumably, must become convinced of the 
validity of the interpretation, if it is to qualify 
as knowledge. If it is only the interpreter himself 
that is convinced, the item of knowledge is valid 
only within that particular network (N = 1); if it is 
a community of investigators, it is valid within that 
network - which does not include the person whose 
conduct and motives is being investigated and to whom 
the item of knowledge in question is supposed to 
refer. This has interesting implications for cases in 
which the person concerned is under investigation for 
problems involving what have become called "paranoid" 
experiences; the circularity problem would seem 
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particularly po: lgnant here. 
One more argument of GrUnbaum's against the notlon of 
11 patient assent" - i. e., agreement between the 
participants - as the criterion of valid 
interpretations should be considered. If the patient 
initially denies the relevance of an interpretation 
but at some later point accepts it, which position of 
his is the more trustworthy? Why should we accept his 
later assent more eagerly than his earlier denial? 
GrUnbaum elaborates: "-- the patient's assent to the 
interpretation is taken to be evidence for his 
ability was to face a conclusion about himself whose 
truth the analyst was able to infer validly while the 
patient was still denying it. -- After all, if the 
andlysand were the ultimate ep1stemic authority -a 
la Habermas - why should the doctor rely on his 
client's assent to a given interpretation I but 
discount an earlier denial and/or the patient's 
avowal of a psychoanalytic conjecture contrary to I? " 
(27) 
GrUnbaum's problem, however, is a genuine one only 
from the standpoint of the "correct" interpretation 
which may be identified by means of "external 
evidence". If the investigator barbours doubts as to 
the validity of the other person's assent or denial, 
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that assent or denial may only be made more 
trustworthy by the introduction of these doubts into 
the negotiation of an acceptable interpretation. Once 
such an interpretation is agreed upon, it is valid 
until further notice: there is no external guarantee 
of the permanence of its validity independently of 
the process of interaction in question. 
I will now try to sum up the substance of GrUnbaum's 
critique of Habermas's position on the criteria of 
the validity of interpretations within the 
psychoanalytic framework. I have tried to show that 
there are two overlapping areas of interest here: the 
notion of "Patient assent" as the criterion of a 
valid interpretation on the one hand, and the status 
of "recollection of repressed memories" on the other. 
To begin with, GrUnbaum seems to make too much of 
Habermas's assertion that "the patient himself is the 
final authority". Habermas is admittedly ambiguous on 
this point: while he does claim that the patient's 
assent is the final criterion of the validity of an 
interpretation, he also points out that "the 
empirical accuracy of general interpretations depends 
not on controlled observation and subsequent 
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communication among investigators but rather on the 
accomplishment of self-reflection and subsequent 
c ommun i cat ion between the investigator and his 
I object'" (28). This formulation seems to emphasize 
the communicative relationship between the. 
participants rather than the "final authority" of the 
patient as such - i. e., that the patient's subjective 
version should be accepted as superior to the 
investigator's subjective version; while it may be a 
reasonable working hypothesis that, if one must 
choose between rival subjective versions of the 
meaning systems involved in an instance of conduct, 
one should opt for the patient's account rather than 
the investigator's, the point is surely that an 
epistemologically legitimate interpretation should be 
based on an inter-subjective agreement. 
Given the apparent ambiguity of Habermas's wording on 
this issue, GrUnbaum may be forgiven for not giving 
Habermas the benefit of the doubt. But even if we 
were prepared to accept GrUnbaum's reading of what 
Habermas "really" meant, we are left with the more 
fundamental problem of the reliability, or 
unreliability, of the patient's "recollection of 
repressed memories" 
GrUnbaum. concludes - quite cogently, it seems - that 
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Habermas places undue emphasis on the reliability of 
the patient's memory. Habermas's use of the notions 
of "recollection", "memory" and "self-ref lection" 
seems indeed problematic: their status within the 
communicative context to the primacy of which 
Habermas otherwise subscribes remains unaccounted 
for. GrUnbaum's argument is based on the 
juxtaposition of Habermas's reliance of the patient's 
recollection and Freud's rejection of it as a 
criterion of the validity of an interpretation. In 
terms of this juxtaposition and of the central 
position of the notions of "repression" and 
"resistance" in psychoanalytic theory, it is evident 
to the point of circularity that the patient's memory 
cannot be relied upon for corroboration or 
falsification of an interpretation. It is another 
matter that Freud's own position as to the 
epistemological status of the notions of memory and 
recollection seems in the end quite ambiguous and 
appears to have varied somewhat between different 
phases in the development of his thinking. 
4. The epistemological status of "repressed memories" 
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The significance of the notions of memory and 
recoll. ection as criteria of unconscious contents 
warrants closer scrutiny. 
The validity of an interpretation may, it seems, be 
corroborated independently of such auxiliary 
concepts: the interpretation may be accepted by the 
patient - and therapeutic results may be achieved - 
without any reference to memory. While a person may 
describe his acceptance of the interpretation offered 
by the investigator - or a version constructed in 
collaboration between himself and the investigator - 
as a recollection a repressed memory, but there is no 
a priori need for it, let alone any method for 
verifying the assumption that the item produced by 
the person actually is "recollected" from "memory". 
Although Habermas and GrUnbaum present diametrically 
opposed views on the reliability of the patient's 
recollections, both fail to provide an account of the 
epistemological status of the notion of memory, and 
the possibility of recollection from memory. As long 
as no explicit clarification of this issue is 
forthcoming, we should be entitled to conclude that 
references to memory are quite uninformative at least 
in this context. 
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But the epistemological Problem remains: how are we 
to identify a statement which Purports to represent a 
"recollection" of a "repressed memory" as opposed to 
any other item constructed by present "self- 
reflection"? If the Production or at least expression 
of such statements takes place in the present as 
opposed to the past, what grounds do we have for the 
assumption that they refer to some historical event, 
or past experience? 
For my present purposes, these questions may be 
compressed into a more practical one: what is lost if 
I'memory" and "recollection" are dispensed with as 
epistemologically viable notions? 
Freud does not seem to lose a great deal. After all, 
it has been made clear that the patient's acceptance 
or denial of the analyst's interpretation do not 
qualify as epistemological criteria by definition. 
The analyst seeks to "convince" the patient of the 
validity of his interpretation, and, as we have seen, 
that conviction "achieves the same therapeutic result 
as a recaptured memory". In effect, the notion of 
memory seems superfluous in this context: while the 
patient's conviction may involve experiences of 
remembrance of things past, such experiences do not 
seem necessary for the achievement of such 
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conviction. 
For Habermas, on the other hand, the notions of 
memory and recollection seem to be relics of the 
objectivist tradition which he explicitly challenges 
but of which he at many junctures harbours a tacit 
residue. While his principle of the primacy of 
communication and agreement between the investigator 
and the other participant in the investigation (29) 
is coherent enough, his dictum that "only the 
patient's recollection decides the accuracy of the 
construction" (30) appears more or less unnecessary 
in the context of communicative interaction. If the 
patient's acceptance of the interpretation is the 
principal criterion of its validity, why should that 
acceptance be qualified by the requirement that it 
should based on "recollection"? The issue is made 
more poignant by the problem of distinguishing 
between "memories" and "not-memories". Habermas fails 
to provide explicit criteria for this distinction - 
which, after all, seems necessary for the maintenance 
of the status of any concept in d theoretical 
language. 
It may be concluded, somewhat paradoxically perhaps, 
that neither Freud nor Habermas need the notions of 
memory and recollection as an : integral part of this 
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respective theories. Freud's reliance on one- 
directional communicative interaction makes these 
concepts irrelevant - except perhaps as auxiliary 
metaphors by means of which the search for an 
intersubjectively acceptable interpretation can 
proceed; Habermas's emphasis of two-directional 
interaction and agreement between the participants, 
on the other hand, only requires the notion of the 
patient's acceptance of the interpretation; reference 
to "recollection of repressed memories" may be 
presented as an aspect of and justification for the 
agreement, but Habermas does not offer any particular 
arguments for its primacy. 
GrUnbaum continues his defence of the significance of 
extra-clinical, observational "facts" for 
psychoanalytic theory by criticizing Paul Ricoeur's 
(31) philosophy of psychoanalysis - especially 
Ricoeur's view that 11all truth claims of 
psychoanalysis are ultimately summed up in the 
narrative structure of psychoanalytic facts" (32) or, 
for our present purpose, that the domain of 
psychoanalytic truth-claims is necessarily limited to 
the construction of acceptable narratives. GrUnbaum 
(33) calls this view an "ontological amputation $I: 
apparently, the Psychoanalytic framework does extend 
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beyond the construction of narratives which takes 
place in the context of the communicative interaction 
between the analyst / investigator and the analysand 
/ other. GrUnbaum. points out that Freud's "etiologic 
hypotheses Purportedly explained generically why 
people at large acquire neuroses, regardless of 
whether they are treated psychoanalytically 2r not -- 
By the same token, he claimed to have illuminated 
why, even among the unanalyzed, the personality 
traits of obstinacy, orderliness, and parsimony 
tended to cluster together and deserved the etiologic 
label of 'anal character'" (34 GrUnbaum's italics). 
GrUnbaum makes it quite clear many times over - 
that the "therapeutic dynamics depicted in 
psychoanalytic theory is hardly restricted to speech 
acts on the analyst's couch or in his/her office" 
(35). 
GrUnbaum's arguments provide an instructive 
illustration of the very core of psychological 
epistemology: on the one hand, interpretations are 
supposed to be based on the verbal interactions 
between analyst and analysand - and on the other, on 
the analyst's "extra-clinical" observations. It must, 
however, be noted that the borderline between the 
verbal interactions between analyst and analysand and 
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"extra-clinical" observations is determ: 1ned by the 
analyst / investigator's decision on whether the 
meaning of such observational material is determined 
by both of the Participants or only by himself. In 
the former case, the investigator introduces his 
observations of the other person's conduct into the 
verbal interaction; in the latter, he keeps his 
observations to himself and attributes his own 
meanings to them. 
GrUnbaum, appears to regard "the personality traits of 
obstinacy, orderliness, and parsimony" as 
epistemologically unproblematic, i. e., as 
characteristics which can be identified without 
reference to the dynamics of interaction within which 
the meanings of events are constructed and confirmed. 
It must be pointed out that it is precisely the 
acceptance or rejection of this assumption with which 
GrUnbaum's defence of "extra-clinical" evidence 
stands or falls - and it must, judging by GrUnbaum's 
offerings, be quite unambiguously doubted. The 
categorical difference between "intra-clinical" and 
"extra-clinical" evidence is defined by the 
investigator's choice between one-directiondl and 
two-directional modes of communicative interaction. 
It is difficult to envisage just how "intra-cliniCdl" 
evidence can be complemented by "extra-clinical" 
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observations in an epistemologically justifiable 
manner. What. after all, are the criteria according 
to which some "extra-clinical" observations are 
introduced by the investigator into the "intra- 
clinical" context and others are excluded from it? 
Why should the investigator refrain from subjecting 
any relevant observations he may have within his 
grasp - clinical or extra-clinical - to 
intersubjective assessment within the therapeutic 
interaction? As long as this question remains 
unanswered, the basic issue, it seems, is evaded. 
6. The unconscious as metaphor 
On the basis of the above analysis, it may be 
ventured that the epistemological status of the 
unconscious seems quite fragile: if its existence MdY 
only be corroborated by "extra-cliniCdl" methods - 
i. e., methods relying on one-directional interaction 
- the person himself will be excluded from, and is 
irrelevant to, the community of knowers within which 
the notion of unconscious motive forces is relied 
upon, by definition; it is clear that at least 
GrUnbaum's notion of "extra-clinical" evidence 
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refers quite categorically to observations 
independent of the construction of interpretations 
which takes place in the context of a conversational 
exchange. Observation may furnish arguments and 
hypotheses, but these are relevant only insofar as 
they are introduced into the communicative 
interaction between the participants in the 
investigation. If, on the other hand, the person's 
assent is accepted as the basic criteria of the 
validity of an interpretation, that assent must 
presumably be based on a conscious choice - which 
would make the notion of a categorical distinction 
between "repressed motives" and "contemporary 
narratives" seem quite unpromising. 
Given the weaknesses of GrUnbaum's argument, it is 
not surprising that Spence (36), among others, has 
drawn the conclusion that the unconscious should be 
regarded at best as a metaphor - used by the 
participants in a psychological investigation as an 
aid in the generation of possible interpretations - 
without any pretensions to epistemological validity. 
Spence (37) points out that the form and function of 
the unconscious are never directly observed and that 
they therefore "must be reconstructed from conscious 
behaviours" (38 - my italics) - and if the 
identification of unconscious motive forces is 
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possible only by means of conscious behaviours, the 
task of drawing a reliable line between the two 
devices of making sense of why people do what they do 
becomes quite problematic. Spence (39) faults the 
conviction that an instance of conduct can be 
attributed to unconscious motivation on two grounds: 
"First, if the form of the unconscious fantasy cannot 
be established independently of its presumptive 
effect, we may have a piece of circular reasoning. 
Second, if we claim that a previously established 
unconscious fantasy can be used to account for a new 
clinical event, we may have demonstrated no more than 
the chance overlap between two unrelated happenings. " 
In other words, the notion of unconscious motive 
forces is, according to Spence, not only logically 
circular, but also beyond empirical corroboration. 
While "there may still remain a metaphorical use for 
this construct", he argues, "we should be clear that 
there may be no referent" (40). 
It is instructive to note that Freud himself was 
demonstrably ambivalent as to the epistemological and 
ontological status of the unconscious, subscribing to 
different definitions of that status at different 
points in his lifetime. These differences seem to 
offer ample scope for the accommodation of views 
quite fundamentally at variance with each other. 
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GrUnbaum, above, tends to seek support from those 
sections in Freud's writings which lend credence to 
the view that unconscious motive forces are an 
independent, epistemologically legitimate and 
verifiable feature of human conduct; Spence, on the 
other hand, points out those passages in which Freud 
seems to acknowledge the ambiguity of the nature of 
the concept - to wit, a sentence in Freud's account 
of the Little Hans case: 
--- For a psychoanalysis is not an impartial 
scientific investigation, but a therapeutic measure. 
Its essence is not to prove anything, but merely to 
alter something. (41) 
It is perhaps predictable that Spence's own solution 
of the problem of legitimate epistemological criteria 
of interpretations is congruent with the Habermasean 
principle - namely, that "truth is arrived at through 
dialogue and argumentation leading to consensus" 
(42). The task of the epistemologically serious 
investigator is to recognize "that there are any 
number of meanings contained in the clinical 
encounter" (43) and to present to the person whose 
conduct is being investigated "as full a range of 
alternatives as possible" (44). 
In the context of the basic modes of communicative 
interaction I have advocated above, the metaphoric 
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construal of the unconscious - as outlined by Spence 
- seems more justifiable than the "extra-clinical" 
evidence offered by GrUnbaum. as an argument for its 
autonomous position: the latter fails to define his 
precise location between the vantage points of the 
first-person participant and of the third-person 
observer and to provide sufficient epistemological 
justification for withholding relevant observations 
from the person whose conduct is being investigated. 
I must conclude that if the notion of unconscious 
motive forces is to be preserved as an independently 
verifiable feature of human conduct, it cannot be 
corroborated by means of psychological evidence and 
two-directional communicative interaction; other 
kinds of evidence based on one-directional modes of 
communicative interaction must be employed. It is 
another matter whether the notion of unconscious 
motive forces can be supported without recourse to 
two-directional interaction especially insofar as 
that notion is supposed to - and I would suggest that 
it must - imply a reference to. meanings attributed to 
some hypothetical events by the other person. On the 
strength of the arguments presented by GrUnbaum, on 
the one hand and Spence on the other, the metaphor 
alternative seems to be the only legitimate means of 
saving the notion of the unconscious, and unconscious 
motive forces, for posterity. 
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This conclusion. however, need not be as devastating 
in practice as it may sound in theory. Spence (45) 
reminds us that while both metaphor and empirical 
laws carry explanatory force, the kind of explanation 
provided by the first is significantly different from 
that provided by the second. "The explanatory force 
of the Freudian metaphor of the unconscious is not 
diminished by the fact that it is seen as a manner of 
speaking; indeed, its credibility may even be 
strengthened" (46). It must, however, be pointed out 
that if the credibility of the notion of the 
unconscious indeed is strengthened, this is for 
contingent, pragmatic reasons, not for any universal, 
independently determinable ones; in other words, if 
the participants in an investigative encounter agree 
that the metaphor of the unconscious is more useful 
than other possible metaphors for their attempt to 
make sense of a given instance of conduct, that is 
entirely for them to decide - but such an agreement 
does not tell us anything universal about the status 
of the unconscious. 
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7. The Causality of the Unconscious 
After the Preceding considerations, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that in a psychology based on 
communication between members of an unambiguously 
defined group, or community, the conscious- 
unconscious distinction may most usefully be defined 
in terms of those meanings, and motive forces, which 
are not identified by the participants at the 
beginning of the investigative interaction but which 
unfold - or are constructed - in its course. The 
actor gains an insight into those meanings and motive 
forces as a result of a period of communicative 
interaction involving the actor himself and any 
relevant others: the actor's initial account of the 
meaning of his conduct is revised, complemented or 
replaced by a more plausible, acceptable and 
agreeable one in the course of the ensuing exchange 
of potential interpretations. The difference between 
the actor's original account and the interpretation 
generated in the course of the interaction is - or, 
rather, was - the unconscious motive force: the actor 
did not originally recognize it, was unable to 
articulate it, was not prepared to consider it: he 
was not conscious of it. 
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In the course of this process, causes are transformed 
into reasons or choices, and action gains ground from 
behaviour: one's Personal control over one's conduct 
is enhanced - or, to Paraphrase Gergen (47), one 
achieves a greater degree of "freedom from stimulus 
control". 
It may be argued that causal explanation of human 
conduct is viable if the person whose conduct is 
being studied is - in general terms - unaware of the 
motive forces underlying his activities and choices. 
It seems that the concept of causality may, at least 
provisionally, be applied to the explanation of 
conduct determined by unconscious motive forces. 
Indeed, unconscious motive forces are, for the 
purposes of epistemology, best be described as 
causes: as long as a person is unable to present a 
convincing justification for (some aspects of) his 
conduct, the possibility remains that other people 
may - by means of observation, for instance - 
identify some stimulus-response connections of which 
he is unaware but by means of which his conduct, or 
in this case behaviour, may be predicted and 
manipulated by others. It seems reasonable to 
describe such stimuli as causes of behaviour. 
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GrUnbaum, (48) leaves no room for doubt as to whether 
psychoanalytic explanations are to be regarded as 
causal ones; he emphasizes their causal nature on 
numerous occasions. This is a prefectly logical 
observation insofar as the construction of 
psychoanalytic interpretations is based on one- 
directional communicative interaction - in which the 
patient's assent and dissent are regarded as symptoms 
stemming from unconscious motive forces and therefore 
disqualified from the category of legitimate speech 
acts - but it seems doubtful whether such 
interpretations can be accepted as epistemologically 
legitimate psychological knowledge. 
After all, it seems as if unconscious meanings or 
motive forces may only be identified in their 
conscious form. We can only meaningfully discuss 
conscious meanings - or, rather, meanings become 
conscious through communicative interdCtion: it is 
communication that defines them as conscious. When we 
understand them - or, more to the point, when we 
decide that sufficient criteria for an understanding 
of them are fulfilled - they are no longer 
unconscious; they have become as they can get at 
least insofar as our agreement presupposes, and is 
based on, conscious meanings if it is to be a 
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rational and epistemologically legitimate one. The 
existence of unconscious meanings and motive forces 
IS determined in the first instance by the 
contingency that no agreement has been reached on an 
adequate interpretation of a Problematic instance of 
conduct and one of the Participants chooses to accept 
his hypothetical explanation for the purposes of some 
pragmatic project in which the other does not take 
part - or in which the other only takes part as an 
object as opposed to d subject. 
Both participants may, of course, be equally 
perplexed by the first person's conduct and unable to 
suggest viable explanations. They may now agree that 
the motive force in question must be unconscious; 
but, unless they continue the process of constructing 
" convincing enough explanation, that agreement is on 
" par to saying something like "we just do not know 
why you did / do / keep doing this'. This admission 
does not, however, entitle the participants to 
translate their present bafflement - their inability 
to construct a reason for a particular instance of 
conduct and thus to elevate it into the category of 
action - into some independent entity called "the 
unconscious". There is hardly any justification for 
defining our ignorance as a characteristic of some 
independent reality; such logic would seem decidedly 
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circuldr. 
8. The Unconscious ds what is not known 
For the purposes of the present epistemological 
argument, the unconscious is quite simply synonymous 
with what is not known about the motive forces 
underlying a person's conduct. When adequate 
interpretations are agreed upon, unconscious motive 
forces become conscious reasons, and the unknown 
becomes known. While the participants may choose to 
decide that something or other has now been 
"retrieved" from the unconscious - and thus uphold 
the notion of the unconscious in general - that 
notion is by no means an epistemologically necessary 
one. Spence's redefinition of the unconscious as a 
metaphor which may be successfully employed in, for 
instance, various therapeutic enterprises, appears 
quite cogent. 
In conventional uses of the notion of unconscious 
motive forces - such as psychoanalysis - 
the 
translation of such forces into conscious 
interpretations is supposed to be accompanied by 
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therapeutic effects. It must be asked, however, 
whether such pragmatic results ipso facto qualifY as 
an epistemological argument. If the new 
interpretation of a person's conduct is accompanied 
by favourable changes in that conduct, all the better 
for him; but it is by no means self-evident that the 
new interpretation has hit upon something in the 
recesses of the person's unconscious. The most we can 
confidently say, it seems, is that the new 
interpretation seems to have provided a more useful 
framework for the actions of the person in question 
than the old, or missing, one. There appears to be no 
compelling reason to believe that the interpretation 
of the motive ' forces underlying somebody's 
problematic behaviour constructed in the course of 
the interaction should correspond to something which 
previously resided in the unconscious. The case is, I 
think, elegantly summed up by Cioffi (49): 
The error in question might be described as looking 
for consummation in the wrong place; an instance of 
which is asking for the etiology of the phenomenon 
where what we really want is an analysis of the 
impression produced on us by the phenomenon. For 
example, we often think we are interested in the past 
when it is really the experience of pastness which 
absorbs us. 
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9. Therapeutic results as epistemological arguments 
But problems do not end here. The Person whose 
conduct is being investigated may continue to behave 
in what was regarded as a problematic manner despite 
the agreement on a Plausible explanation, as in some 
patterns of behaviour traditionally diagnosed as 
neurotic, e. g. obsessive or compulsive syndromes. May 
the agreement still be properly called knowledge? 
If we remain faithful to the present argument, we 
should probably answer to the effect that this 
depends on the criteria set by the participants: if 
knowledge of the motive forces underlying a form of a 
form of conduct - or the elevation of those forces 
from the unconscious into the conscious - is assumed 
to have a therapeutic effect per se, the agreed 
explanation should be seriously questioned, and the 
search for a more convincing interpretation - i. e. 
one the explication of which would effect a change in 
the person's conduct - should be resumed. If, on the 
other hand, the participants agree that knowledge and 
therapeutic effects do not necessarily have to be 
linked, or that the new knowledge constructed in the 
course of the investigation may need some time to 
"sink in", the original explanation may still retain 
its epistemological status as legitimate knowledge. 
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As the therapeutic effects of rendering an 
unconscious meaning or motive force conscious may not 
be immediate, the evaluation of the validity of the 
agreed interpretation may be a complicated affair, 
and it is beyond the scope of the present analysis to 
speculate on the various possible alternatives of 
such an evaluation. 
It should be noted that therapeutic results may also 
be achieved without any attempt towards constructing 
a new interpretation. The idea of behaviour therapy, 
for example, relies primarily on causal explanations; 
any meanings underlying the unwanted behaviour are 
supposedly irrelevant to the process of treatment. As 
such therapeutic methods do not aim for an 
understanding of meanings, they are not of 
epistemological concern and will not be discussed 
here. 
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10. Conclusion: The Demise of the Unconscious 
The by now inevitable question must finally be asked: 
May the construction of the new interpretation or 
narrative itself not be held responsible for the 
therapeutic effect without any reference to 
unconscious motive forces? 
A convincing narrative is one in which the 
participants believe; it helps make sense of 
behaviour which was previously unintelligible. The 
afflicted person may have had no coherent narrative 
at his disposal at all in the framework of which the 
causes of his behaviour could have been transformed 
into reasons for his action, or his original 
narrative may have become obsolete for the purposes 
of his present activities and relationships with 
others. The objective of the therapeutic encounter is 
the construction, or reconstruction, of a 
satisfactory interpretation of whatever it is that is 
relevant in the person's life. While the notion of 
the unconscious may play a part in the construction 
of such an interpretation, the arguments for the 
status of unconscious motive forces as a universal, 
independent entity seem - at least from the 
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epistemological viewpoint - quite unconvincing. 
By way of conclusion, there seem to be sufficient 
reasons for suggesting that there is no method 
available to us of producing any epistemologically 
legitimate knowledge about unconscious motive forces. 
In the interests of epistemological parsimony, we 
must ask whether the construction of a conscious 
reason is not in itself sufficient for the 
understanding of any changes in a person's conduct 
and whether there is adequate justification for the 
notion of unconscious motive forces. On present 
evidence, the latter seems expendable. 
We may only have knowledge about conscious reasons 
for actions; but the successful construction of a 
conscious reason does not mean that an unconscious 
motive force would thus have been unearthed. It 
should perhaps be stressed once more that the 
pragmatic value of what may best be termed the 
metaphor of the unconscious may be considerable for 
many therapeutic and heuristic purposes. This is not, 
and could not reasonably be, disputed; but pragmatic 
value should not be equated with epistemological 
legitimation - or vice versa. 
If it is nevertheless considered desirable to afford 
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the notion of the unconscious some sort of a 
theoretical, ontological status, it must clearly be 
in the context of physiological rather than 
psychological mode of explanation - insofar as the 
former is defined in terms of one-directional and the 
latter in terms of the two-directional communicative 
interaction. Psychological descriptions of 
unconscious motive forces may be plausibly, and 
rationally, understood only as metaphors which may or 
may not be of use in the construction of acceptable 
reasons for actions (50). In a psychology based on 
two-directional interaction, there is no place for 
the unconscious as an ontological entity. 
It seems justifiable to conclude that the notion of 
unconscious motive forces does not constitute a 
sufficient challenge to the proposition that 
agreement between the investigator and the person, or 
persons, whose conduct is being investigated is the 
basic criterion of the epistemological validity of 
psychological knowledge. In the following chapter, I 
will consider the notion of commonsense psychological 
explanations from the epistemological viewpoint. 
While the content of commonsense explanations is 
quite unrelated to the claims of the psycho- 
analytical mode of explanation, I will try to show 
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that the epistemological status of both notions is in 
effect the same. 
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Chapter Six 
COMMON SENSE AND COMMUNICATIVE INTERACTION: 
A CRITIQUE OF SMEDSLUND 
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1. Introduction 
Smedslund's (NOTE 1) attempts to establish the 
concept of common s_ense as a basic element in 
psychological explanation provides another useful 
illustration of the persistent difficulty of grasping 
the sometimes subtle but epistemo logically decisive 
difference between what may usefully be called 
objective and intersubjective modes of psychological 
knowledge. Smedslund sets out with a cogent 
criticism of traditional notions of the nature of 
psychological research and knowledge, but since he, 
too, ends up with a neo-objectivist position, his 
efforts warrant closer scrutiny. 
Smedslund's principal charge against traditional 
empirical psychology is that in many instances, 
empirical evidence is based on semantic tautologies, 
or common sense, and subjects of experiments are 
bound to behave in accordance with the theory because 
there is, logically, no sensible alternative. 
Empirical results of this kind, Smedslund argues, are 
therefore not properly empirical; they are based on 
an implicit or explicit set of common sense theorems 
about human behaviour/conduct, and psychological 
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investigations would therefore be best advised to 
concentrate on the explication of these common sense 
theorems in order for them to be Productive of any 
legitimate knowledge. 
After having developed his approach in a succession 
of Papers, Smedslund has finally constructed a "non- 
empirical system" (2) of 11 psycho-logic" consisting of 
a series of definitions, axioms, theories and 
corollaries purported to be logically necessary 
determinants of human conduct (3). The axioms range 
from "A conscious person is continuously acting" (4) 
to "Every person wants to continue to exist" (5) and 
"A person's belief system will change in the least 
extensive way possible, which is taken by that person 
to be compatible with a perceived inconsistency" (6). 
I will try to show that while Smedslund manifestly 
distances himself from the traditional objectivist 
notion of psychological knowledge (7) and champions a 
psychology based on meanings (8), his alternative 
approach does not solve the epistemological problems 
involved - contrary to his own confidence: "In my 
view, the predictive and explanatory power of the 
non-empirical system to be presented far exceeds that 
of any existing psychological theory. As I see it, 
this system may replace many preceding empirical 
188 
Psychological theories and reflects and alternative 
and more adequate view of Psychology. According to 
this, Psychology is the study of the culturally 
created order in human behaviour, and this is the 
only order to be found in this domain, besides the 
biological constraints within which each individual 
functions" (9). Although this formulation seems to 
establish quite unambiguously Smedslund's position 
vis-a-vis the objectivist notion of psychological 
knowledge, the implications of his non-empirical 
system do not seem to bear this out. 
2. Commonsense Psychology: Smedslund's Definition 
Smedslund def ines common sense as "the system of 
implications shared by all members of a culture" (10) 
or "the set of all implications taken for granted by 
all members of /a culture/" (11); commonsense 
psychology is thus defined as "The set of all 
implications pertinent to psychological matters, 
taken for granted by all members of /a culture/" 
(12). Smedslund goes on to provide an "operational 
criterion" of the concept: "A proposition stating an 
implication of the given context is a successful 
explication of common sense to the extent that 
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members of the culture involved, 
type of context, agree that 
correct (acceptable) and that 
incorrect (unacceptable). " (13) 
familiar with that 
the proposition is 
its negation is 
Smedslund elaborates his notion of common sense 
further "As socialized adults we -- agree about 
rules, including what are proper meanings and 
implications. This agreement makes it possible to 
formulate generally acceptable logically necessary 
propositions. It also ensures that common sense 
propositions become factually true, since everyone 
obeys them, and expects everyone else to do so, etc. " 
(14). It should be*noted at this point for further 
reference that in his definitions of common sense, 
Smedslund makes no explicit distinction between 
(formal) semantic tautologies and (substantive) rules 
of conduct. 
To complement his theoretical analysis, Smedslund has 
reported empirical attempts to support his advocacy 
of the importance of common sense theorems in the 
study of human conduct. One of these studies involved 
presenting a number of students with 36 theorems (15) 
- for example, "if P wants to do A in S at t and if P 
believes with complete certainty that she can do A in 
S at t, and no other circumstances intervene, then P 
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will try to do A in S at t. " (16) - and asked them to 
indicate whether the theorems were correct and 
whether their opposites were incorrect. The results 
showed that 93 per cent of the predictions of the 
respondents were consistent with the theorems (17). 
These results encourage him to state in another paper 
(18) that "-- the possibility of direct studies of 
the degree of consensus elicited by attempted 
explications of common sense means that much of the 
programmatic discussion -- about the consistency, 
preciseness, stability, etc. of common sense may, 
henceforth, be dispensed with. The high degrees of 
consensus observed in my most recent studies /(19)/ 
have convinced me that common sense is a reasonably 
stable and measurable system" (20). Smedslund 
asserts, furthermore, that "Mhe very fact that 
people generally manage to communicate, collaborate, 
and live in societies bears witness to the existence 
of a solid consensual foundation" (21) - an 
observation which is, indeed, difficult to contest as 
such. 
Finally, Smedslund describes his system as relating 
"to psychological realities in the same way as 
geometry relates to physical realities, that is, 
geography" (22) and goes on to claim that "(t)he 
formal analogy between geometry and psycbo-logic 
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holds up in every respect" (23) 
3. Logical necessity and historical contingency: some 
problems with Smedslund's position 
On closer analysis, however, Smedslund's system of 
Is psycho-logic" seems to overreach itself in some 
crucial respects. The linkage between the formal 
definitions and theorems on the one hand and the 
apparently substantive axioms on the other remains 
unclear. 
A number of the substantive axioms seem to rely on a 
vague notion of normality from which there may be 
deviations - to which, apparently, the logic of 
common sense does not seem to apply. While Axiom 
2.4.2. states that "A person wants to believe what is 
the case" (24), the subsequent Note 2.4.3. points out 
that "There obviously exist cases of denial and cases 
of reluctance to know the truth. " (25) The notion of 
the existence of such cases would, however, imply 
that the axiom is not a necessary one and that its 
validity would, after all, be an empirical issue to 
be settled by means of entering some sort of an 
interaction with the person or persons in question. 
it does not seem consistent with Smedslund's 
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purported aim of explicating a set of logically 
necessary commonsense axioms to refer to normal 
situations and deviations from these; the 
establishment of the borderline between the norm and 
deviations from the norm would seem to be the- 
crucial issue here - and if the norm may be deviated 
from, it may not, it seems, legitimately be called 
logically necessary. 
A number of similar paradoxes may be pointed out in 
Smedslund's supposedly non-empirical system. Axiom 
5.6.5., for example, states that "Every person wants 
to continue to exists' (26). This assertion 
immediately brings up the notion of suicide. 
Smedslund proceeds to address this obvious counter- 
example in the subsequent Corollary 5.6.7.: "If a 
person attempts suicide, then that person has a want 
to escape suffering, which is stronger than the want 
to continue to lives' (27). Note 5.6.6. extrapolates 
on this: "Although the want to continue to exist is 
one of the strongest that people have, it is 
sometimes weaker than the want to escape from the 
suffering of life. In line with the general 
distinction between unreflective and reflective 
acting, one may, roughly, distinguish between 
spontaneous and premeditated suicide attempts. The 
spontaneous suicide attempt occurs when the person is 
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overwhelmed by accumulated suffering and acts 
spontaneously in a here-and-now context. The 
premeditated suicide attempt is planned over time and 
involves reflective awareness in the context of the 
person's total life situation. Obviously, many 
suicide attempts may involve intermediate or mixed 
states of awareness" (28). 
Taken literally, corollary 5.6.7. and Note 5.6.6. 
show, effectively, that Axiom 5.6.5. does not hold 
axiomatically after all. In other words, we do not 
know for certain whether every person actually wants 
to continue to exist unless we do know - and that, 
again, would necessarily appear to be an empirical 
matter which may be settled only by means of entering 
a communicative relationship with the person or group 
in question. 
On a similar note, Smedslund's Axiom 4.3.5. states 
that 'T /= the person/ wants to minimize exertion" 
(29). In the subsequent Note 4.3.6., he elaborates: 
"This axiom does not state that people are lazy, but 
only that a want to minimize exertion exists among 
other wants. The extent to which it determines trying 
depends on the relative strengths of the entire set 
of wants and beliefs involved" (30). 
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Again, Smedslund's elaboration seems counter- 
productive to his original aim of Presenting a system 
of non-empirical axioms. The reservation explicated 
in Note 4.3.6. effectively re-confers on the 
preceding axiom an empirical status. Everyday 
examples may also be lined up to counter the 
invariant suggested by the axiom. I may want to play, 
say, squash in order to keep physically fit. For this 
purpose, I want to maximize exertion. It may be that 
I want to keep fit with minimum exertion - i. e. that 
I set myself a goal involving a particular state of 
fitness and attempt to reach that goal with minimum 
exertion - but it would be nonsensical to claim that 
"keeping fit" would involve "minimum exertion". At 
least in some instances and for some purposes I have 
chosen, I do not want to minimize exertion. It may be 
that most people in most situations want to minimize 
exertion, but that, again, is a hypothesis pertaining 
to a contingent state of affairs which needs to be 
established by empirical means - which involves 
entering a communicative relationship of some 
description with particular People in a particular 
context; and that is quite unquestionably an 
empirical enterprise. 
Some of Smedslund's axioms, on the other hand, d. 0 
appear genuinely non-empirical. Axiom 4.1.0 seems 
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indeed logically necessary: "A person P does A in the 
context C at time t if, and only if, P can do A in C 
at t and P tries to do A in C at t" (31). The 
semantic relationship between the verbs "do", "be 
able" ("can") and "try" seems to guarantee the non- 
contingent status of the proposition (32). This means 
that the proposition is devoid of substantive 
psychological content: it does not provide any 
information on why a person or a group Of people 
engages in particular kind of conduct. The same 
observations apply to Axiom 4.2.0: "A person P can do 
A in the context C at time t if, and only if, P's 
ability to do A in C at t exceeds the difficulty of 
doing A inC at t" (33). As Smedslund offers no 
justification for this discrepancy between different 
axioms, their purpose remains puzzling. 
Apart from this formal inconsistency, it seems that 
the problem with Smedslund's enterprise is a basic 
disregard of the communicative dimension of the 
production of psychological knowledge. While his 
point about the semantic interrelatedness of the 
variables used in many supposedly empirical 
investigations of human conduct is a sound one - it 
is, as it were, common sense that empirical variables 
should be semantically independent of each other - 
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his fdi lure to anchor his axioms to a basis of 
communicative interaction derives them of the status 
of logical necessity he explicitly wants to confer on 
them. His account of the reflectivity of feelings 
(34) provides an illustration. Note 3.2.1. states 
that "Feelings may be unreflective or reflective. In 
the former case, they may only be inferred, with 
certainty, from knowledge of the relationship between 
the person's wants and beliefs and, 
probdbilistically, from various symptoms. In the 
latter case they may also be described and talked 
about by the person who harbors them" (35). 
Smedslund goes on in Corollary 3.2.6.: "If P in C at 
t has an unreflective feeling, then P in C at t 
cannot describe and talk about that feeling" (36). 
The epistemological status of "unreflective 
feelings", however, remains questionable: how do we 
know about the existence or characteristics of a 
person's unreflective feelings without consulting the 
person in question? If we are interested in a 
person's feelings, we are faced with the choice of 
whether or not to present our inferences and 
interpretations - based on, in Smedslund's terms, on 
our "knowledge of the relationship between the 
person's wants and beliefs" and "various symptoms" - 
to him, to provide him with an opportunity to respond 
to our suggestions and thus to change the status of 
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4. Is common sense transculturdl and stable? 
Smedslund suggests that his system of commonsense 
psychology is both transcultural and stable over 
time. "In view of the relatively high approximate 
translatability among most human languages", he 
ventures (37), "it may perhaps be surmised that the 
present system is at least approximately 
transcultural' As for stability, Smedslund argues 
that "Mhere are two reasons for believing that the 
present system must be relatively stable. The first 
is that societal changes must always involve 
considerable translatability in order to preserve the 
conditions for orderly itneraction and communication. 
The second is that the concepts described in the 
present system appear to be of such a fundamental 
nature that it is hard to see how they could change 
very much" (38). Paradoxically, however, Smedslund 
adds to both statements (i. e., transculturality and 
stability) the rejoinder that they must be 
investigated in actual cases" (39). This addition 
would, again, seem to refer the entire system back to 
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empirical confirmation - which seems to be in 
diametrical opposition to Smedslund's origInal aim. 
Smedslund's advocacy of a commonsense psychology 
which can be explicated non-empirically - or, for the 
present purposes, without reference to actual cases 
of communicative interaction - seems distinctly at 
odds with his initial argument about the 
unreliability of psychological laws: "The illusion 
that one is looking for hitherto unknown empirical 
laws is maintained through refraining from gathering 
the necessary antecedent information. In 
contradistinction to the above research strategy of 
psychologists, a layperson who is asked to predict 
another person's behavior in a given situation will 
naturally try to obtain the information necessary for 
doing so. This will include trying to find out what 
the person wants, what options he or she sees, how 
the situation is perceived, what remote consequences 
and what norms are taken to be relevant, and so on" 
(40). 
Valsiner (41) suggests that the commonsense 
foundation of Psychology sought by Smedslund is 
determined by historical rather than logical 
necessity: "It is argued that the theorems are 
amenable to change during cultural r estructuration 
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periods - first, the meanings of concepts in culture 
change, and that results in the change in the content 
of the theorems. The similarity of common sense 
theorems with those of geometry can therefore only be 
formal, but not substantial" (42). In the context of 
communicative interaction, the difference between 
logical and historical necessity is a decisive one. 
The former are independent of communicative 
practices, whereas the latter is determined by the 
vicissitudes of communicative interaction and the 
agreements wrought by means of negotiation. As 
Valsiner (43) puts it, Smedslund 
expects the interpersonal dialogue to reveal 'the 
conceptual system of psychological relevance 
underlying the cultural order '. The emphasis is 
clearly on the hope that dialogue can clarify the 
ideal picture of Platonic shadows, made fuzzy by the 
'noise' of the circumstances of human interaction and 
its particular contexts. -- An alternative view of 
the 'interpersonal hermeneutic spiral' is that 
'theorems' of common sense are constructed through 
joint efforts of the experimenter and the informant 
(psychotherapist and the patient), where the 
investigator (therapist) dominates the joint 
construction process. 
Smedslund's reply to Valsiner seems to highlight the 
root of the problem with his notion of common sense: 
"Since I can agree completely with the above, it 
appears that the difference between Valsiner and 
myself does not reside in a dichotomous opposition 
developmental - not-developmental, but rather in the 
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degree of emphasis on stability vs. change" (44). 
"While I acknowledge the possibility and occurrence 
of slow and piecemeal changes", he goes on, "I must 
insist on emphasizing the importance of stability as 
the normal state. -- Without an extensive s-PtabilitY 
in the shared rule-system (the meaning of words and 
acts in context = the system of implications - common 
sense), the task of socializing babies, the managing 
of daily face-to-face interactions, and the 
maintaining of societies would be impossible. Orderly 
communication and interaction presupposes a shared 
rule system that can be taken for granted" (45) - 
While this is undoubtedly true in most practical 
interactions, Smedslund's formulation does not solve 
the basic epistemological problem of demonstrating 
the suggested distinction between what is given and 
what is constructed by the participants in 
interactive situations. 
"Particular interactions", Smedslund maintains, "may 
change the behavior of the participants, but it 
cannot change the meanings of ordinary words and 
nonverbal rules in the society to which they belong" 
(46). But Smedslund's position remains ambiguous: if 
it is accepted - as Smedslund seems to do in 
principle - that meanings and rules are socially 
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constructed, they are liable to change through 
changes which take place in particular interactions. 
It is obvious that the basis of a language must 
remain at least partly stable in order for 
communication to be possible at all, but it does not 
follow that a specific proportion of meanings and 
rules remain static and predetermined. This is 
paradoxical against the background of Smedslund's 
emphasis of the centrality of communication between 
participants in an investigation as the basis of 
psychological knowledge (47). 
A related problem is brought out by the exchange 
between Jones (48) and Smedslund (49). Jones (50) 
defends empiricism in psychology by stating that 
although observations of behaviour tend to reveal 
culture-bound and situation-bound regularities and 
reflect changing historical circumstances, such 
observations may still lead to eventual discovery of 
universally valid regularities of behaviour. 
Smedslund maintains in his comment (51) that a 
"suitable scientific language" (52) as opposed to 
ordinary language must be constructed if adequate 
psychological theories are to be formalized. 
Seen from the viewpoint of communicative interaction, 
the distinction between ordinary language and a 
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separate, "scientific" language appears problematic. 
If legitimate psycholog: 1cal knowledge entails a 
feedback system between the investigator and the 
person whose conduct is being investigated, the 
language used in the construction of "universally 
valid regularities of behavior" must at least be 
translatable into some language understood by both, 
or all, of the participants in the investigation - 
otherwise no agreement or disagreement on the 
inferences or interpretations suggested by the 
investigator is possible. 
5. Proving non-empiriCdl theorems by empirical means: 
the weakness in Smedslund' method 
The above criticism seems pertinent to the problem of 
common sense in general: its substantive content is, 
in any given context, so ephemeral as to defy 
reliable explication. Smedslund (53) has tried to 
pre-empt protests of this persuasion by pointing out 
that "by taking into account the comments of 
participants in interviews, there is a possibility of 
improving the explications. This sort of research 
proceeds through a process that may be characterized 
as an interpersonal hermeneutic spiral. The goal is 
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to arrive at ever more precise explications of the 
conceptual system of psychological relevance 
underlying a cultural order" (54) and, by way of 
conclusion, that "(t)he system of common sense 
theorems or rules is used as a kind of implicit 
calculus in every interaction between people, yet it 
has until now remained masked by the contextual 
flexibility and richness in ordinary language" (55). 
Smedslund's defence of his position is quite 
instructive in the present context. In his emphasis 
on dialogue between the investigator and the people 
whose responses are being used as evidence for the 
hypothesis in question, he actually comes 
tantalizingly close to the heart of the matter, yet 
ultimately failing to grasp the fundamental flaw in 
the whole of his development of the notion of common 
sense as a basis of psychological knowledge. As 
Valsiner (56) puts it, Smedslund "resorts to the use 
of social consensus as the criterion of accuracy in 
his explications. However, social consensus on some 
issue illustrates similarity in construction of 
cultural objects. and need not immediately verify our 
reconstruction of some underlying rules, which might 
not exist in a stable form in principle". 
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Smedslund's empirical demonstration of statistically 
significant Support for a set of behavioral theorems 
mainly serves to betray his reliance on some 
particular, universal content pertaining to the 
dynamics of human conduct -a notion which he, if his 
introductory statements to "Psycho-logic" (57) are 
anything to go by, sets out to challenge. Insofar as 
it is accepted that the content of what Smedslund 
terms common sense psychology and what may more 
legitimately be called psychological rules. is 
constructed by negotiation and agreement within a 
network of communicative interaction, any vagueness, 
imprecision and variance observed in such content is 
not merely a minor and potentially correctable 
empirical imperfection in an otherwise sound 
hypothesis, but a necessary and intrinsic feature of 
the dynamics of any system of communicative 
interaction; as such contents are, by definition, 
constructed through negotiation and agreement 
however explicit or implicit - in a given network of 
interaction, they are necessarily subject to re- 
evaluation and revision, or, as the case may be, 
further endorsement. 
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6. Common sense: underlying structure vs. social 
construction 
Smedslund's attempts to establish as 
epistemologically legitimate psychological knowledge 
a set of universal, substantive theorems, by 
empirical means are not only bound to remain 
imprecise; they are logically beside the point, and 
incapable of resolving the epistemological problems 
at hand. They lend no support to the argument for the 
importance of common sense as the basis of 
psychological knowledge. Despite his assertions to 
the contrary, Smedslund has not shown why statistical 
consensus, or near-consensus, about the correctness 
or incorrectness of certain behavioural theorems 
should in principle raise those theorems above the 
contingent, the historical, and the local. Such a 
consensus may, of course, be used as a possible 
alternative in the search for satisfactory reasons 
for someone's conduct in a particular situation, but 
it seems quite unwarranted to present a consensus 
achieved in some social context as authoritative with 
regard to some - let alone every - other context, or, 
as the case may be, to any context. 
The status of cormnon sense as a basis f or 
psychological knowledge would thus appear highly 
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questionable. It is undoubtedly true that, as 
Smedslund puts it, a common ground of accepted 
presuppositions is necessary for all communication, 
collaboration, and social life; but the suggestion of 
some Permanent, autonomous and universal content tc) 
this common ground seems unfounded. Smedslund's quest 
for "ever more precise explications of the conceptual 
system of psychological relevance underlying a 
cultural order" seems thus tantamount to chasing the 
proverbial rainbow's end. There is no conceptual 
system underlying the cultural order which could be 
precisely revealed; as soon as such a system is 
explicated in a communicative context - or as it is 
consciously, or unconsciously, constructed - it is 
liable to become questioned and subjected to eventual 
endorsement, revision, or replacement. It enters the 
sphere of negotiation, evaluation, and choice; and 
while it may be elected for a further "term of 
office", so to speak, it seems quite misleading to 
refer to it in the Smedslundian terms of "ever more 
precise explications". If there is such a system of 
theorems, it is bound to float upon the surface of 
communicative interaction and is subject to 
continuous, or intermittent, re-evaluation according 
to whatever criteria are applicable in the particular 
social context at the particular time - and it seems 
rather bold to suggest that such criteria could be 
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precisely explicated without reference to the 
particular network of communicative interaction at 
work in each case. To choose some particular set of 
such commonsense theorems theoretically applicable at 
some arbitrary point in time as a, or the, "true", 
"real", or "basic" set of theorems amounts, for all 
practical and theoretical purposes, to precisely the 
same thing that the proponents- of the common sense 
notion set out to criticIze - i. e. the traditional 
empirical-objectivist approach to the study of human 
conduct. 
This is not to say that there is no possibility of a 
precise explication of a common ground of consensual 
beliefs or theorems underlying human conduct in a 
particular social context, but rather that the 
precise explication of that common ground takes place 
- quite exactly, unambiguously and univocally - at 
the point in time, and location, when and where it is 
decided that an agreement has been reached. That 
particular moment, and location, is the only point 
where precise explication of beliefs, assumptions, or 
theorems can take place. As soon as doubt sets in and 
the basic assumptions underlying the current 
agreement - as well as the relevance of the goals of 
the project of practical action it may have entailed 
- become questioned, that explication becomes 
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obsolete once more, and its status is transformed 
into one of historical interest only. The substantive 
content of the current set of theorems is something 
else again, and its investigation must begin anew 
from square one. 
The identification of semantic tautologies in 
psycholOgiCdl investigations 
Smedslund's defence of conunon sense as a substantive 
basis for psychological knowledge is useful in 
underlining the persistence of objectivist notions of 
the study of human conduct. His argument is 
convincing only insofar as it concerns semantic 
tdutologies or conceptual overlap between purportedly 
empIrical variables; it is certainly cogent to show 
that some of what have passed for empirical 
investigations are in fact misguided attempts to 
corroborate logically necessary truths by empirical 
means. This point has been made by several others; 
for example, Gergen (58) states that "All reasonable 
propositions declaring a functional relationship 
between the stimulus world and the psychologica. 1 
domain. or between the latter domain and subsequent 
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action, are true by definition. --- such statements 
are necessary derivatives of the definitional 
structure". Shotter (59) Puts the same case by 
demonstrating the conceptual circularity of a 
(supposedly) empirical study. In effect, the 
criticisms bring out what their proponents regard as 
instances of conceptual circularity in what is being 
offered as an empirical finding. 
While the relevance of showing that some empirical 
results are not really empirical, but simply 
demonstrations of a necessary logical relationship 
between synonymous, overlapping or inter-dependent 
concepts is obvious enough, it is difficult to see 
how it could amount to any substantive development in 
the understanding of what people do and why they do 
it. It is undoubtedly a good thing that such 
circularities are exposed and purged from empirical 
investigations; it seems, however, that we are left 
with nothing but a demonstration of the circularity 
that a circularity is a circularity. Some would-be 
empirical studies are not empirical; they are pseudo- 
studies based on conceptual confusion. This is a 
sound point. It seems, however, unlikely that all 
psychological problems could be explained away by 
means of conceptual analysis. There are genuine 
problems which require empirical solutions - i. e. 
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ones based on communicative interaction between the 
relevant participants as opposed to a semantic 
investigation performed by the Psychologist on his 
own. For example, emotional Problems experienced and 
expressed by a person who comes to the Psychologist 
for therapeutic help are real enough, and while they 
may well involve various kinds of conceptual 
confusion, it seems improbable that they would be 
resolved solely by means of demonstrating their 
semantic circularity. This, however, is itself an 
empirical problem. 
8. Concluding remarks 
It may be concluded that what is non-empirical about 
Smedslund's common sense psychology is devoid of 
substantive content and, conversely, that the part of 
his common sense psychology which has substantive 
content is not non-empirical. The more ambitious of 
Smedslund's projects - i. e. the explication of a body 
of substantive common sense theorems - remains 
unconvincIng for two major reasons: first, he fails 
to differentiate clearly between logical and semantic 
necessity on the other hand and socially constructed 
substantive rules on the other; and second, he fails 
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to substantiate his assertion that the substantive 
content of the axioms and theorems which make up his 
system of non-empirical psychology are both trans- 
cultural and stable over time. The latter reason 
seems to derive from Smedslund's implicit assumption 
that any consensus on a set of psychological theorems 
is a reflection of some underlying, independent 
system instead of being an agreement on acceptable 
rules of conduct applicable in a particular context. 
The notion of common sense does not solve the 
epistemological problems involved in the production 
of psychological knowledge. 
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Chapter Seven 
AGREEMENT AS A CRITERION OF VALIDITY: 
PRECONDITIONS AND CONSEQUENCES 
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1. The Story So Far 
In the preceding three chapters, I tried to show that 
the positions of Habermas, GrUnbaum and Smedslund on 
the validation of psychological interpretations are 
based on epistemological inconsistencies. The 
view which emerges from these considerations is, I 
think, this: objections to the view that agreement 
between the investigator and the person or persons 
whose conduct is being investigated is indeed both a 
necessary and a sufficient criterion of the validity 
of psychological propositions should, in order for 
them to be relevant, be introduced into the network 
of communicative interaction at hand as statements 
the validity of which could be assessed within the 
context of that communicative network according to 
whatever criteria of justification are currently 
applicable. We would possibly want to apply our 
particular - and undoubtedly highly sophisticated - 
criteria, but so would, presumably, everybody else. 
All local networks of communicative interaction 
entertain some criteria of justification of validity 
claims, and it is hardly viable to expect that our 
system of criteria should be accepted as universal 
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before we have argued for : its superiority within some 
context of communicative interaction, however 
advanced we may think it is. This observation seems 
particularly apposite with regard to Habermas. 
While this conclusion seems inescapable, its 
implications for the notions of knowledge, 
explanation and understanding of the motive forces of 
conduct warrant further elaboration. I will try to 
draw out some of these implications in this chapter. 
2. Habermas and Garfinkel: Universal vs. Local 
Agreements 
It seems useful at this point to refer once more 
to 
Habermas - this time, to his critique of 
Garfinkel's 
ethnomethodology (1). Habermas, as might 
be 
expected, expresses doubts about 
Garfinkel's liberal 
conception of rationality which he seems 
to regard as 
theoretically barren. 
"The radical self-application of this methodological 
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critique leads to the conclusion that interpretive 
sciences must give up the claim to produce ob3ective 
knowledge at all. The insight that interpretdtion of 
an action context presupposes participation in. and 
constructive influence upon, this context merelY 
brings a dilemma to consciousness", Habermas argues 
(2); "it does not resolve it 
According to Habermas, the adoption of the 
ethnomethodological perspective leads to the 
conclusion that "(t)he universality of the claim to 
truth is an illusion; what is accepted as true at any 
given time is a matter of convention" 
Here, the vulnerability of Hdbermas's emphasis of the 
universal characteristics of rationality makes Its 
presence felt; Garfinkel's position of concentrating 
on the justification by means of accountability of 
every organized setting seems, if weaker" than 
Habermas's theoretical notion of a universal 
rationality, epistemologicdlly the better grounded. 
In exactly the ways that a setting is organ: ized, it 
consists of member's methods for making evident that 
setting's ways as clear, coherent, planful, 
consistent, chosen, knowable, uniform, reproducible 
connections - i. e., rational connections. In exactly 
the way that persons are members to organized 
affairs, they are engaged in serious and Practical 
work of detecting, demostrating, Persuading through 
displays in the ordinary occasions of their 
interactions the appearances of consistent, coherent, 
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clear, chosen, planful arrangements. (4) 
It is unclear why Habermas should find Garfinkel's 
version of rationality so suspect; after all, 
agreements on the criteria of acceptable 
justifications must, Presumably, be recognized by 
some local networks of interaction, if they are 
supposed to wield universal applicability. "How can 
this type of research into universals be carried out 
at all if social-scientific interpretations are 
context dependent in the same way as everyday 
interpretations? " Habermas asks (5). The answer, it 
seems, may be located somewhere between "social- 
scientific" and "everyday" interpretations; as 
opposed to Garfinkel, Habermas wishes to maintain a 
categorical distinction between the two forms of 
justification -a distinction which seems quite 
fragile. "Garfinkel treats standards of rationality 
like all other conventions, as the result of 
contingent interpretive practices that can be 
described but not systematically evaluated on the 
basis of the standards intuitively applied by 
participants themselves", Habermas writes (6); "Mhe 
etbnomethodologically enlightened sociologist regards 
validity claims that point beyond local, temporal, 
and cultural boundaries as something that 
participants merely take to be universal. " Again, 
Habermas betrays the objectivist residue in his 
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thinking. Even if validity claims did point beyond 
local, temporal and cultural boundaries, what would 
be the difference, in epistemological terms, between 
"taking something to be universal" and "something 
being universal"? If truth is available to us only in 
the form of propositions, as Habermas has argued in 
his consensus theory of truth, there is no difference 
between the substantive content of the two 
expressions. Habermas goes on: 
Garfinkel -- has to reserve for the 
ethnomethodologist the privileged position of a 
"disinterested" observer who watches how those 
immediately involved formulate their utterances in 
such a way that others can understand them and how 
they interpret as intellIgible the utterances of 
others. The ethnomethodolog: Lst who credits himself 
with this position, claims his own statements 
standards of validity that a fortiori lie outside the 
domain of those applied by the partic1pants 
themselves. If he does not credit himself with such 
an extramundane position, he cannot claim a 
theoretical status for his statements. At best he can 
allow for an additional type of criterion of validity 
that function in their own ways in the various 
departments of life. (7) 
The same comment seems to apply here as above: 
Habermas does not seem to be prepared to argue for 
his criteria of rationality within the network of 
conununicative interaction to which he refers. His 
largely misplaced critique of Garfinkel suggests that 
he has failed to make an explicit choice between 
the first-person, Participatory Position and the 
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Position of a third-person observer. 
In the words of Bernstein (8), it may be concluded 
that "(b)y constantly leading Us to think that what 
we really need is some sort of theory in order to 
9-round communication and conversation, Habermas is 
Making the same sorts of mistakes that philosophers 
have always made in their desperate (and failed) 
attempts to discover real constraints and 
foundations", failing "to realize that he is just 
giving expression to the old positivist hope that we 
can come up with determinate rules which will once 
and for all tell us (in principle) what will count as 
legitimate and illegitimate (or meaningless) 
discourse" (9) . 
Given the inescapable inconsistencies in Habermas's 
theory of communicative action, this conclusion seems 
justified. 
There is. however, one more Point to be made on 
Habermas in relation to psychological epistemology, 
and an important one at that. Habermas has outlined a 
world in which the truth of propositions is to be 
assessed on the basis of consensual agreement as 
opposed to correspondence with the objective reality. 
This world -a world of argumentation - is empty of 
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substantive propositions until such Proposations are 
introduced; it is merely a method of validation of 
substantive ProposItions. Habermas has first 
constructed a method and then proceeded to introduce 
a set of substantive Propositions - i. e., his theory 
of communicative action - into it. If he is faithful 
to such essential features of his method as the 
distinction between action oriented to success (qua 
one-directional communicative interaction) and action 
oriented to reaching understanding (qua two- 
directional communicative interaction) , his emphasis 
of the universal nature of the concepts of 
communicative rationality and communicative 
competence should perhaps be seen as rhetorical 
rather than substantive elements. If this is the 
case, we should perhaps not make too much of the 
apparent inconsistency between these aspects of 
Habermas's theory. Certain passages by Habermas may 
in fact be interpreted in this vein - to wit: 
We cannot simultaneously assert a proposition or 
defend a theory and nevertheless anticipate that its 
validity-claims will be refuted in the future. Only 
in the performative attitude can we put forward 
assertions, and this attitude compels us (with the 
gentle but irresistible force of transcendental 
necessity) to advance a claim that bursts all local 
and temporal limits, transcends all cultural and 
historical bounds. (10) 
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3. Agreement as a Necessary and Sufficient Criterion 
The arguments I have summoned so far should lend 
credence to the Proposition that agreement betwet-=--n 
the investigator and the person whose conduct : is 
being investigated is a necessary criterion of 
epistemologically legitimate psychological knowledge. 
If instances of conduct may not be understood without 
reference to the meanings the person ascribes to what 
he does, and if a person's meaning may only be 
established by means of two-directional communicative 
interaction, an agreement on the interpretation of 
his conduct seems a necessary precondition of the 
validity of that interpretation. 
But is agreement a sufficient criterion of the 
validity of an interpretation? 
This is a crucial question for the epistemology of 
psychology. Before we venture a straight answer, we 
must first remind ourselves of the practical setting 
in which psychological knowledge is produced. An 
investigator trieds to accumulate evidence for his 
hypothesis. That evidence is provided by the other 
participants in the investigation through a process 
of communicative interaction which involves the 
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presence or absence of feedback on the basic 
assumptions and purpose of the investigation and on 
the meaning of the responses provided by the other 
participants in the context of the investigation. 
Finally, the investigator reports his results tO the 
larger community of investigators for discussion and 
evaluation of their significance. If the production 
of acceptable psychological propositions takes place 
in terms of two-directional communicative 
interaction, we would expect a report on an agreement 
between the participants in an investigation on the 
validity of the resulting proposition or 
interpretation. 
Let us consider the situation in terms of our 
position in relation to the network of interaction 
within which a particular psychological proposition 
is being validated. If we are participants in that 
network of interaction, we would, presumably, present 
our arguments for and against the suggested 
proposition about the motive forces underlying our 
conduct until a satisfactory formulation is reached, 
or until the interaction is discontinued without an 
agreement on such a formulation. From this vantage 
point, it does seem as if agreement indeed were not 
only a necessary but also a sufficient criterion of 
the validity of the proposition at hand: when we 
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present our arguments f or and against the suggested 
Proposition, we, presumably, make use of and try to 
explicate all the relevant information available to 
us, including any lingering and vague doubts we may 
be aware of. Any external factors enter the proce. -RO 
of argumentation only as propositions proffered by 
the participants. When our objections, suggestions 
and doubts have been accommodated to a sufficient 
extent, we no longer have reason to disagree with the 
suggested Proposition. In short: if we count 
ourselves as competent participants in an 
investigation, it follows that the agreement which we 
finally endorse is a sufficient criterion of the 
validity of the current proposition in this 
particular context. If we do not count ourselves as 
competent participants in an investigation, we should 
not endorse the agreement. In this case, no agreement 
results. and no knowlegde is produced. 
If, on the other hand, we are participants in the 
community of investigators to whom the resulting 
proposition is reported but not in the network of 
interaction in which the evidence for the proposition 
is constructed, the locus of agreement or 
disagreement on the validity of the proposition 
shifts: now it is the community of investigators 
which presents arguments for and against the validity 
226 
of the proposition. It may be concluded that the 
agreement reported by the original investigator is 
based on - to borrow Habermas's terminology - 
systematically distorted communication or the 
communicative incompetence of the participants, and 
that the agreement would therefore he illegitimate; 
hut, if we maintain the two-directional mode of 
communicative interaction in relation to the original 
network of interaction, we would have to refer back 
to that network and establish the validity of the 
agreement from the first-person, participatory 
position, and the process would start anew. 
All this, of course, only applies if we wish to 
produce epistemologically valid knowledge about the 
motive forces underlying people's conduct. This 
requIres the adoption of the two-directional mode of 
communicative interaction. PragmatiCdllY useful 
information on other people's behaviour may be 
produced in a one-directional setting, but that, I 
take it, is not our present concern. 
I am thus prepared to suggest that agreement between 
the investigator and the other participants in the 
investigation is both a necessary and a sufficient 
criterion of psychological propositions. Obviously, 
this does not mean that local agreements should be 
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accepted as universals; they are arguments in that 
process of negotiation and agreement : in which 
propositions about people's conduct are validated. 
This is the function of all agreements. and we locate 
ourselves within some network of communicative 
interaction within which valid propositions are 
constructed. 
Bhaskar's (11) objections to the notion of agreement 
as d criterion of validity are instructive here. "But 
agreement between agent and investigator hardly seems 
either d necessary or sufficient criterion for an 
adequate interpretation", Bhaskar notes (12). 
"Rather, it would seem that the adequacy of any 
interpretation, or more generally of any act of self- 
understanding, can only be shown, in relation to the 
point of interpretation (or understanding), in the 
always more or less contingently circumscribed 
context of an agent's self-formation, that is, his 
total developing life activity (and not just, pace 
HaLbermas, his discourse)" (13) 
The Problem, it seems, focuses again on the 
epistemological status of the "total developing life 
activity" Of the agent. Does not that activity also 
present itself to the particip ants in the 
investigation in the guise of communicative 
228 
expressions which are essentially negotiable and 
corrigible? While I have supported the view that in 
the end, the rational understanding of the motive 
forces of conduct sinks back into the only 
intermittently explicated background of the soclal 
and material practices of a community, the poInt of 
psychological knowledge surely is that it Is based on 
such explications negotiated intersubjectively - and 
it does not resolve the problems to introduce into 
the negotiation external factors which cannot be 
subjected to validation by means of communicative 
interaction. Bhaskar's objection seems quite beside 
point here. 
4. Agreements as Necessarily Local 
As I pointed out above, a consensus is a consensus: 
if counter-arguments are no longer forthcoming from 
participants, the agreement is legitimate - and, 
conversely, if the agreement is legitimate, counter- 
arguments are no longer forthcoming. We cannot make 
an epistemologically justified distinction between an 
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agreement reached with enthusiasm and one reached 
grudg2ngly: if all the participants an a network of 
interaction say yes, an agreement has been reached. 
At this point, the central issue is the decision 
among the participants to subject their agreement to 
criticism from outside their current network or 
community - i. e., to extend the network of 
interaction, which would open the agreement to 
argumentation once more. If we are outside that 
network of interaction, the agreement is not our 
agreement, and we have no particular reason - or 
possibility, for that matter - to endorse it. We may 
wish to emphasize the importance of particular 
criteria of legitimate agreements, but such criteria 
bear no relevance to the network of interaction as 
long as we remain outside. 
All agreements are necessarily local from the 
viewpoint of the participants in the process of 
interaction within which that agreement is 
negotiated. It may be that the same propositions are 
regarded as acceptable in other interactive networks 
of which we do not know, but, if we have an 
agreement, that agreement is necessarily local. If we 
are observing an agreement from outside the network 
of interaction within which it has been or is being 
negotiated and reached and if we have reason to 
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believe that the validity claims upon which the 
agreement is based are insufficient, we should enter 
that network of interaction and challenge the 
agreement with our arguments. If this challenge is 
welcomed, the case is re-opened, negotiations be-gin 
anew, and the potentially resulting revised agreement 
is still local, but now it is closer by one vote to 
the theoretical notion of universal consensus and the 
merging of the notions of "objective" and 
"intersubjective" truth. 
When local agreements are entered into a process of 
validation with other local agreements and if a 
common agreement is reached, the degree of 
universality of the agreements involved is increased. 
This may include variations of revision and 
compromise from simple observation of agreement 
between agreements to the abandonment in toto of one 
or another of the agreements by its original 
supporters and the adoption of the competing one, or 
an altogether new one. If no agreements is reached 
and negotiations are discontinued, the agreements 
remain local, and valid in the local context as long 
as no counter-arguments are brought forward. As long 
as no communicative interaction between different 
localities takes place, statements pertain: lng to the 
validity of an agreement currently in force in 
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another locality are valid only in the context of the 
locality in which such statements are expressed. 
I might add that all potential and actual 
participants in interactions in which agreements are 
negotiated should make sure that their participation 
in the process of argumentation is as astute and 
uncompromising as possible, but, as there are no 
objective criteria of knowing whether this actually 
is the case, the function of such an exhortation 
would be primarily dramaturgical. We must take it for 
granted that if we endorse an agreement on the 
validity of a psychological proposition, we do so for 
sound reasons. Otherwise we would not agree. 
5. What if no agreement is reached? 
It is clear that, in real life, explicit agreements on 
unambiguously defined psychological propositions are 
rare. In most cases, dgreementS are probably more or 
less tacit, temporary and ambiguous. It is equally 
clear that all negotiations do not end in agreement. 
The interaction May be discontinued due to 
explicit or implicit disagreement, pressure of time 
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or other pragmatic concerns. Heritage (14) describes 
discontinuation due to disagreement: 
In their most complete form, the politics of these 
disjunctures involve procedures through which the 
very attempt by each party to uphold his alternative 
depiction of the state of affairs is treated by the 
other as grounds for discounting the depiction. Thus, 
in the case of A's conviction that someone is 
persistently following him, B's assertion that this 
is not the case may boý sufficient for A to conclude 
that B is 'in on the plot. Whilst that conclusion 
is, in turn, sufficient to confirm B's conclusion 
that A is paranoid. -- Under these circumstances, a 
potentially endless cycle of assertion and counter- 
assertion is potentiated which permits no means of 
resolution. Under these conditions, the relationship 
between community merhbership and subscription to 
particular ways of depicting real world events is 
vividly displayed. 
If negotiation ends in disagreement, no val2d 
proposition emerges. The Participants must seek 
criteria of justification elsewhere - possibly in 
another network of communicative interaction or 
merely in the more ephemeral and tacit consensus 
inherent in a larger and more loosely defined 
framework of reference, i. e. a culture or, as Harr6 
(15) points out, a moral order. As the consensus 
becomes more and more implicit when we relate 
ourselves to larger frameworks of reference, we can 
no longer speak in terms of epistemologically valid 
knowledge. 
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6. The Status of Theoretical Languages in the 
Production of Psychological Knowledge 
It might be objected that the conclusions I have 
reached so far make it impossible to justify any 
theoretical language in psychology. While such an 
objection is understandable, I do not think it holds. 
Even if we may have to concede that the concepts 
employed in understanding people's conduct must, 
ultimately, be defined, legitimated and endorsed 
within each network of communicative interaction, it 
is clear that - given the basic assumptions of the 
present study - there is at least a preliminary 
conceptual framework which we cannot ignore of escape 
and which we have to defend when the language of 
understanding conduct is negotiated in the community 
in which we are involved. 
The conceptual framework to which we must commit 
ourselves if we accept the basic tenets of the 
present study may be expected to be based on 
conscious reasons as opposed to unconscious causes, 
on wants as opposed to needs, on intersubjective 
agreement and disagreement as opposed to objective 
determination, and on the understanding of truth as 
the winning Proposition in a process of argumentation 
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as opposed to correspondence to an independent 
reality. These concepts are intimately linked to the 
projects to which we have chosen to commit ourselves 
in whatever it is that we experience as the world; 
and as the number and nature of potential projects in 
the world is in principle indeterminate, any attempts 
to determine particular criteria of understanding 
people's conduct independently of their commitment to 
particular projects are bound to remain ultimately 
uninformative. 
While we cannot justify any pretensions to the effect 
that our theoretical language and conceptual system - 
i. e., our particular brand of rationality - should be 
accepted as universally valid, it is with the support 
of that language and those concepts that we face 
other rationalities. The notion of universal validity 
without reference to intersubjective agreement is 
surely senseless. We should, however, see clearly 
that, ultimately, our theoretical language has a 
normative basis: it is couched in our commitment to 
particular goals, particular teams of work and 
particular communities of interaction - and we have 
to accept that there is no objective guarantee of the 
justification of such commitments. From time to time, 
we make choices, and discover that we have made 
choices. Our most fundamental choice is our 
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abandonment of solipsism, i. e., our acceptance of the 
notion that other people exist in their own right and 
that our conduct is to an unknown extent dependent on 
other people's conduct. 
If our theoretical language is not accepted by other 
communities, there is no independent court of appeal. 
We must try to make our theory more convincing and 
argue for it better - if, that is, we for some reason 
want to make it acceptable and applicable to other 
communities. Our theoretical language is based on the 
conceptual system which we rely on to render our 
experience and activities understandable. As Harr6 
(16) puts it., (a) person is a being who has learned 
a theory in terms of which his or her experience is 
I ordered'. We must, presumably, be prepared to expect 
that this is the case with other people also. When we 
investigate the motive forces underlying other 
people's conduct, our theoretical language is liable 
to become modified: it has to accommodate the 
theoretical language employed by the other 
participants in the investigation. People give us 
their version; we give them ours. Comments on these 
versions are exchanged; some of the concepts employed 
in the original versions retain their relevance, 
while others are dropped or replaced by more powerful 
ones. This, I think, is how theoretical languages in 
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psychology develop; and it would be quite 
uninformative to aspire to a universal theoretical 
language which would encompass all possible 
categories of conduct and the motive forces which 
underlie them. We go in equipped with the theory we 
consider cogent, and emerge with a modified and, it 
is to be hoped, an improved version. Taylor (17) 
encapsulates the consequences of this view as 
follows: 
It may not just be that to understand a certain 
explanation one has to sharpen one's intuitions, it 
may be that one has to change one's orientation - if 
not in adopting another orientation, at least in 
giving one's own in a way which allows for greater 
comprehension of others. Thus, in the sciences of man 
insofar as they are hermeneutical there can be a 
valid response to 'I don't understand' which takes 
the form, not only 'develop your intuitions', but 
more radically 'change yourself This puts an end to 
any aspiration to a value-free or 'ideology-free' 
science of man. A study of the science of man is 
inseparable from an examination of the options 
between which men must choose. 
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7. Objectivity, Relativism and Intersubjectivity 
The notion of local agreement as a both necessary 
and sufficient criterion of epistemologically valid 
knowledge about the motive forces underlying people's 
conduct - which I have argued for above - raises the 
problem of relativity and objectivity in psychological 
knowledge. This issue must be dealt with briefly. 
Barnes and Bloor (18) put the case for what they term 
epistemological relativism thus: 
Our equivalence postulate is that all beliefs are on 
a par with one another with respect to the causes of 
their credibility. It is not that all beliefs are 
equally true or equally false, but that regardless of 
truth and falsity the fact of their credibility is to 
be seen as equally problematic. The position we shall 
defend is that the incidence of all beliefs without 
exception calls for empirical investigation and must 
be accounted for by finding the specific, local 
causes of their credibility. 
For all practical purposes, these remarks seem quite 
congruent with the notion of psychological knowledge 
produced in the two-directional mode of communicative 
interaction - the validity of propositions hinges on 
their being subjected to assessment in (local) 
communicative networks, i. e., to intersubjective 
evaluation. In the production of psychological 
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knowledge, as I tried to point out above. this 
intersubjectivity is at work both within the network 
of interaction in which evidence for the 
investigator's hypothesis is being provided by the 
other participant(s) in the investigation and outside 
of it, namely in the community of investigators. 
Rorty (19) elaborates on the necessary context- 
dependence of this intersubjectivity: "To say that 
truth and reference are 'relative to a conceptual 
scheme' sounds as if it were saying something more 
than this, but it is not, as long as 'our conceptual 
scheme' is taken as simply a reference to what we 
believe now - the collection of views which make up 
our present-day culture. " 
In this sense, the difference between "objectivity" 
and "Intersubjectivity" is that the proponents of 
objective knowledge refer to some argument which is 
supposed to have privileged authority and which is 
somehow exempt from the process of negotiation and 
agreement in a community. That kind of unquestioned 
authority is certainly anathema to the rational 
production of knowledge through communicative 
interaction. 
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For the purposes of a psychology based on two- 
directional communicative interaction, the notion of 
objectivity is nothing more - or less, for that 
matter - than a limit value of intersubjectivitY: it 
is a state of affairs in which argumentation has, at 
least for the present, drawn to a close, and all 
members of the relevant community agree on the 
validity of a particular interpretation. The 
coordinates of reality are defined in terms of 
intersubjective agreement in an at least potentially 
finite social context. Reference to some external 
criteria independent of the vicissitudes of 
communicative interaction is a contradiction in 
terms: such a reference becomes a statement to be 
discussed within a network of interaction as soon as 
it is expressed. There is nothing beyond the boundary 
of the prevailing intersubjective agreement that 
could be known. The notion of an infinitely 
extensible intersubjectivity can, I think, render 
obsolete and irrelevant the concepts of universal 
applicability of propositions on the one hand and 
relativism on the other: universality. in other 
words, is reducible to a limit value of 
intersubjective agreement initially based on 
relativistic, local agreements. 
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I give the last word on this issue, and in thi s 
chapter, to Rorty (20): 
"Relativism" is the view that every belief on a 
certain topic, or perhaps about any topic, is as good 
as every other. No one holds this view. Except for 
the occasional cooperative freshman. one cannot find 
anybody who says that two incompatible opinions on an 
important topic are equally good. The philosophers 
who get called relativists are those who say that the 
grounds for choosing between opinions are less 
algorithmic than had been thought. ... So the real issue is not between people who think one view is not 
as good as another and people who do not. Iti0. 
between those who think our culture, or purpose, or 
intuitions cannot be supported except 
conversationally, and people who still hope for other 
sorts of support. " 
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ChdPter Eight 
CONCLUDING REMARKS: BEYOND PSYCHOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
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I have argued that agreement between the investigator 
and the person or persons whose conduct is being 
investigated is the basic epistemological criterion 
of valid psychological propositions. In the previous 
chapter, I concluded that agreement is both a 
necessary and a sufficient criterion if the 
investigation is based on the two-directional mode of 
communicative interaction and if the investigator 
locates himself in a first-person, participatory 
position. This, I wish to suggest, is how 
epistemologically valid psychological knowledge is 
produced. 
It needs to be asked what, if anything, makes the 
present argument relevant to psychological knowledge 
as opposed to knowledge in general. Does the 
principle of local agreement not extend to all truth- 
claims based on two-directional communicative 
interaction - regardless of discipline? 
This question leads us to a discussion of the 
distinction between the "natural sciences" and the 
"human sciences" which, as I noted in Chapter One, is 
often held responsible for the conceptual confusion 
typical of the production of psychological knowledge. 
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I wish to argue that this distinction cannot be 
sustained on epistemological grounds. It is not a 
matter of an a priori distinction between natural 
objects and human subjects, but of different modes of 
communication between participants in an 
investigation. Objectification constructs objects; 
subjectification constructs sub-lects. Harr, 6 
elucidates the matter as follows: 
I have argued throughout that persons are the product 
of a certain kind of work done on beings who are 
merely animate by nature. The work is essentially the 
teaching of a theory to that being in terms of which 
it can conceive of itself. The possession of such a 
theory and the exact form that its self-conception 
takes is intimately bound up with the language it 
learns and with the social rights it can conceive of 
itself as having. Persons can be "grown" from any 
kind of being capable of learning such a theory. Some 
suitable beings may be inanimate, though I have 
confined my discussion in this work only to the 
growing of persons on animate beings. Animate or 
inanimate, to be in possession of certain theories by 
means of which reflexive discourse can be formulated, 
and to have certain rights to the public display of 
those skills and knowledge. It is not to be embodied 
in any particular way. 
In other words, we must choose the mode of 
communicative interaction in which we relate to 
entities around us, and it is this choice between 
modes of communication that determines the identity 
of the "other", not any a priori definition. If this 
observation is justifiable, it means that there is no 
categorical distinction between psychological 
245 
knowledge and other modes of knowledge constructed by 
means of communicative interaction. Distinctions 
appear through communicative practices. if an 
investigator believes that he can achieve two- 
directional communicative interaction with a block of 
stone and acts as if messages were conveyed between 
them, that block of stone is certainly a 
participating subject in the context of that 
particular network of interaction. The "animistic" 
practices of "primitive societies" (2) are a relevant 
example. Outsiders may dismiss them as absurd, but 
being outsiders, and thus not participants in the 
network of communicative interaction at hand, they 
are in no position to know. 
I will sum up the implications of the argument I have 
defended in this thesis as briefly as possible. As 
Gergen (3) says, psychological "research must be 
viewed primarily as a rhetorical implement. Its chief 
function is to lend power (persuasive impact, appeal, 
felicity) to the theoretical language In the 
context of a psychology - or any discipline - based 
on two-directional communicative interaction, this 
observation seems sound enough. The role of research 
is to provide arguments for the Rortyan conversation 
in which reality is continuously constructed. 
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Empirical results may be used as an argument in the 
process of negotiation of the coordinates of the 
practical reality of participants, but only as one 
argument among others. Shotter (4) characterizes 
what he terms a practical-descriptive psychology as 
an enterprise "which describes (or instructs) people 
in the ways in which people can tell (or instruct) 
one another in how to do things - including the ways 
in which they describe themselves and their 
psychological states to themselves". The objective of 
such a psychology would be "to increase people's 
personal powers of responsible action; not to 
increase people's mastery over other people but their 
mastery over their own possible ways of life" (5). 
It is clear that the task of epistemology ends here, 
and commitment to a particular form of life, and a 
particular community, begins. As the coordinates of 
reality constructed by means of an investigation 
based on two-directional communicative interaction 
merge into the sphere of practical action, 
communicative rationality gradually dissolves into 
irrationality, and what was for a while explicit 
gradually becomes implicit - until it is brought back 
into the sphere of rational argumentation for a fresh 
assessment. This is the point where knowledge 
dissolves into belief, myth, tradition and convention 
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- and, more metaphor: ically, where consciousness meets 
the unconscious. "Our rules do not create new 
meanings, our conventions do not dictate to us what 
has sense and what has not. We create new meanings, 
deter-mine the limits of sense by what we do with our 
language. Grammar is a free creation of the human 
mind. It may seem to force our hand. But in fact 
nothing forces our hand except our own 
determination. " (6 ) 
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